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This dissertation analyses patterns of power and influence in the context of proxy 
alliances between states and armed, non-state groups. In particular, I explore the 
following questions: Why do some states have leverage over their non-state proxies, 
while others find themselves at the behest of their far weaker allies? Put differently, why 
doesn’t a state’s enormous material advantage systematically translate into an ability to 
influence the behavior of proxy groups? Governments often find themselves stymied by 
belligerent proxies and drawn into unwanted conflict escalation with adversaries—
precisely what states sought to avoid by relying on covert, indirect alliances in the first 
place. I argue that the very factors that make proxy warfare appealing to states—its 
clandestine, informal nature—threaten to undermine governments’ abilities to exert 
leverage over their proxies.  
Governments seek out proxy alliances when the material or political costs of 
directly confronting an adversary are unappealingly high, driven by the logic that proxy 
groups can help states achieve their foreign policy objectives “on the cheap” and in a way 
that allows states to plausibly deny involvement in a conflict. However, the actions states 
must take to ensure plausible deniability, specifically the decisions political leaders make 
about how they will manage and oversee a proxy ally, can undermine their leverage. The 
decisions political leaders make about alliance design and management, which have 
negative effects on their bargaining power, are fundamentally driven by two related 
logics: the requirements of plausible deniability, and attempts to navigate the preferences 
of domestic political veto players and bureaucracies. 
Plausible deniability requires establishing as much distance as possible between a 
decision maker and a proxy and/or operating with a minimal footprint on the ground. To 
do so, political leaders often delegate authority for managing tasks pertaining to the proxy 
alliance to covert organizations with the security sector (e.g., intelligence organizations). 
However, this clandestine and informal delegation is problematic in two respects. First, 
the bureaucratic actor to whom the political leader delegates authority for carrying out 
tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance has a general incentive to ensure its organization is 
abundantly resourced. Therefore, it has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the proxy 
alliance. Second, bureaucratic leaders (as well as all of the other individuals to whom 
authority is delegated) may have personal, political, or ideological preferences that differ 
substantially from those of the political leadership. 
If the effects of delegating authority in this way are so perverse, why do leaders 
do it? And why don’t they reign in wayward bureaucrats? At the most basic level, leaders 
have a high valuation for plausible deniability for international or domestic political 
reasons (to avoid retaliation from an adversary or keep things secret from domestic 
political actors), and powerful, entrenched bureaucracies are difficult to control. Digging 
deeper, however, there is a compelling domestic political story that existing accounts of 
proxy alliances have neglected to tell. Political leaders often abdicate authority to other 
bureaucratic actors or individuals—even when they may foresee the issues identified 
above—as a strategy for protecting themselves from domestic political veto players with 
strong policy preferences that diverge substantially from their own. 
To evaluate the explanatory scope of the theory, I explore patterns of influence in 
proxy alliance in a series of comparative case studies, in which I use process tracing and 
structured, focused comparison to assess whether and to what extent decisions about 
alliance management affect a state’s leverage over its non-state proxy. Specifically, I 
analyze bargaining power in six different proxy alliances: the Syria-Fatah alliance in the 
1960s-70s; the alliance between the FNLA and UNITA in Angola and the United States 
from 1975-76; the India-Mukti Bahini alliance in East Pakistan in 1971; the United 
States-UNITA alliance in Angola in the 1980s; the alliance between the United States, 
Iran, and Israel, and the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s; and the alliance between 
India and Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. I compare the explanatory scope of 
my theory to the interstate alliance politics literature, and find that my theory not only 
accounts for the unexplained variation in the universe of cases, but also offers a more 
complete understanding of the dynamics of state-proxy relationships.      
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Chapter 1 
Of Power and Proxies 
 
The Puzzle 
When the civil war broke out in Lebanon in April 1975, Yasser Arafat, the leader 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its most powerful constituent group, 
Fatah, was faced with a choice. Arafat could align the Palestinian resistance with the 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which was contesting the Phalange militias as well 
as the Lebanese national government, or he could heed the preferences of his most 
important external sponsor, the Hafez al-Assad regime in Syria, and prevent Fatah 
fighters from sowing even greater instability in Lebanon. Both Fatah and Syria had 
critical security interests at stake in Lebanon: the former sought to prevent instability 
from spilling over the border into Syria or giving Israel a pretext for intervening in the 
conflict, while the latter sought to protect its Lebanese bases and, therefore, the viability 
of its resistance movement. In the spring of 1976, Kamal Jumblatt, the LNM’s leader, 
refused to accept the terms proposed during a series of Syrian-led attempts to at a 
political settlement to the conflict and resumed military activities in earnest. Assad called 
Arafat to Damascus and exhorted him to break his alignment with the LNM. Despite 
signaling to Assad that he would do so, Arafat returned to Lebanon and threw in his lot 
with the LNM, brazenly defying Assad’s orders. This forced Assad to cut off all support 
for Fatah and intervene in Lebanon to forcibly subdue the Palestinian resistance with the 
Syrian Army in June 1976. Syria’s intervention in Lebanon was incredibly costly for the 
Assad regime, both in absolute material terms and politically. Given Fatah’s dependence 
on Syria for external support—Syria provided critical assistance to Fatah during the 
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organizations formative years in the early 1960s, continued to provide enormous financial 
and material support to Arafat, and served as the implicit guarantor of Palestinian bases 
in Lebanon—and Syria’s incredible material advantage relative to its proxy, why did 
Arafat believe he could defy Assad’s preferences? Why was Assad unable to control 
Fatah? 
A similar story played out in Angola in the 1980s, where the United States under 
the Ronald Reagan administration was spearheading a technically covert (but not very 
secret) operation to arm and fund Jonas Savimbi’s rebel group, the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Angolan 
government. Despite a massive covert aid program, Reagan (and, subsequently, George 
H.W. Bush) was unable to leverage American material largesse to induce UNITA to 
comply with U.S. preferences. Specifically, Savimbi consistently acted as a spoiler to 
successive U.S.-sponsored diplomatic attempts to resolve several outstanding territorial 
disputes in Southern Africa, including the Angolan civil war—an effort known as 
Constructive Engagement, the centerpiece of Reagan’s foreign policy initiative in the 
region. Furthermore, revelations in the late 1980s about UNITA’s egregious human rights 
abuses, following years of the media and the Conservative foreign policy establishment 
lauding Savimbi as an African version of George Washington, damaged U.S. reputation. 
Nevertheless, as Savimbi became more recalcitrant and less accommodating, he 
continued to receive increasingly larger allocations of covert aid from the CIA. By the 
end of the 1980s, American covert aid to UNITA had quadrupled from its initial 1986 
allocation. Given that the United States was a global superpower with a vast array of 
material and political capital at its disposal, why was it unable to control Savimbi? Why 
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did it take until the fall of the Soviet Union to allow the United States to extricate itself 
from its relationship with UNITA? 
These two examples diverge in critical respects: the first concerned a middling 
autocratic regime in the Middle East facing a pressing security threat along its border, 
while the second involved a democratic, global superpower engaged in a Cold War 
confrontation of minimal national security concern in Southern Africa, far away from its 
own territory. Nevertheless, they share a similar logic: both are examples of sovereign 
states far more powerful than their non-state proxies that are nevertheless beholden to the 
latter’s political interests and beset by unwanted conflict escalation. Despite profound 
material weakness, non-state proxies have not served as loyal allies willing to do the 
bidding of their state sponsors. Governments often find themselves stymied by belligerent 
proxies and drawn into unwanted conflict escalation with adversaries—precisely what 
states sought to avoid by relying on covert, indirect alliances in the first place.1  
However, not all states have shared a similar fate. Examples of successful proxy 
alliances, from the state’s perspective, stand in sharp contrast to the failures. The United 
States and Iran, for instance, deftly managed their alliance with the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1972-1975. Mustafa Barzani, leader of the KDP, 
was unable to use the KDP’s multiple external sponsors to his advantage. Instead, 
Barzani was naively reassured of external support and took a hardline stance vis-à-vis the 
Iraqi government concerning the terms of Baghdad’s offer regarding Kurdish autonomy. 
However, with the KDP on the brink of defeat, the United States and Iran withdrew 
external support in exchange for an Iranian agreement with Iraq resolving competing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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sovereignty claims over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Similarly, Indira Gandhi’s 
administration was able to secure India’s most preferred outcome when the Bangladesh 
crisis broke out in 1971, using Bangladesh rebels to bleed the Pakistani Army dry in East 
Pakistan until the Indian Army was sufficiently prepared to intervene directly and take 
Dacca in only two weeks. Why do some states have leverage over their non-state proxies, 
while others find themselves at the behest of their far weaker allies? Put differently, why 
doesn’t a state’s enormous material advantage systematically translate into an ability to 
influence the behavior of proxy groups? These are precisely the questions my research 
seeks to explain. 
Understanding the dynamics of relationships between states and their proxies is 
crucial for international relations scholarship as well as policymaking. From a general 
perspective, proxy alliances are pervasive in the international system. By one measure, of 
the 443 rebel groups operating in armed conflicts between 1945 and 2011, 214 (48%) had 
explicit or alleged external support, the vast majority of which involved military support 
(including the deployment of ground troops).2 In the past decade, non-state groups with 
external support have played a critical role in fueling intra- and interstate conflict; the 
United States and its allies contended with Iranian-backed Shiite militant groups in Iraq, 
while Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is buttressed by its (and Iran’s) proxy, 
Hezbollah. Furthermore, external support to warring parties to intrastate conflicts often 
has negative and destabilizing regional effects. For example, Kenneth Schultz finds that 
external state support to rebel groups in civil wars is associated with the increased risk of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, “Non-State 
Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 30, no. 
5 (November 2013): 527. 
	   5	  
militarized interstate disputes, more lethal disputes, and recurrent violence.3 Existing 
empirical studies have also demonstrated a strong and positive correlation between 
external support for insurgency and war outcomes.4  
In terms of international relations scholarship, the puzzle of how the weak come 
to influence or dominate the strong is part of a longstanding debate in international 
relations theory in general, and the Realist tradition in particular, about how material 
capabilities shape outcomes in international politics.5 In fact, what we often observe in 
the context of proxy warfare flips Thucydides’ dictum, that the strong do what they can 
and the weak suffer what they must, on its head.6 In other words, there is a gap between 
material power and influence: an advantage in capabilities does not systematically 
translate into an ability to influence the behavior of other political actors in the 
international system. More specifically, exploring how influence works in proxy alliances 
offers important critiques and illustrates the limits of the existing literature on alliance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate 
Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars,” International Organization 64, no. 2 (April 
2010): 281-312. 
4 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes 
in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, no. 1 (January 2009): 88. 
Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2008): 21.  
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 
1980): 3-35. Ivan Michael Arreguin-Toft, How The Weak Win Wars: A Theory of 
Asymmetric Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Andrew Mack, 
“Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175-200.  
6 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. and ed. Sir Richard Livingstone 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
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politics, as well as the new and growing literature on the role played by external parties to 
civil wars and internal conflicts.7  
From an American foreign policy perspective, as the United States closes the 
chapter on twelve and a half years of large-scale, troop-intensive wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, policymakers will be tempted to shift resources toward indirect, covert, and 
deceptively cheaper means of achieving foreign policy objectives. Ongoing covert 
operations and clandestine alliances as part of the United States’ effort to combat various 
al-Qaeda franchises, as well as the Title 50 authorization to provide lethal aid to the 
Syrian rebels, are perhaps the most notable examples of these efforts. Therefore, 
understanding the risks and implications of these kinds of relationships will be crucial for 
making informed policy decisions. Furthermore, a critical understanding of these 
relationships could shed light on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities inherent in the proxy 
alliances of American adversaries, providing an opportunity the United States could 
exploit. Iran’s longstanding relationship with Hezbollah and the pivotal role that group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The interstate alliance politics literature contains a wealth of theorizing on bargaining, 
influence, and leverage in the context of alliances between asymmetrically capable states. 
Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Glenn H. 
Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Robert Jervis, System 
Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997). James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of 
Political Science 3 (June 2000): 63-83. Additionally, is a proliferation of new scholarship 
on the relationship between rebel groups and states sponsors. Byman, Deadly 
Connections. Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying 
Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism,” International Studies 
Perspectives 11, no. 1 (February 2010): 1-18. Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to 
Rebel Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (June 2010): 493-515. 
Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining 
External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65, no. 4 (October 
2011): 709-744. Navin A. Bapat, “Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups,” 
British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (January 2012): 1-29. However, to date, this 
emergent literature has not provided a comprehensive theory of the topic explored in this 
dissertation.  
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has played in buttressing Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is only one of many 
examples. More broadly, my research taps into a larger debate about the future of 
American grand strategy, namely, how the United States should best allocate resources to 
manage and shape a changing international order in a way that supports U.S. interests.  
 
The Argument 
I argue that the very factors that make proxy warfare appealing to states—its 
clandestine, informal nature—threaten to undermine governments’ abilities to exert 
leverage over their proxies. Governments seek out proxy alliances when the material or 
political costs of directly confronting an adversary are unappealingly high, driven by the 
logic that proxy groups can help states achieve their foreign policy objectives “on the 
cheap” and in a way that allows states to plausibly deny involvement in a conflict.8 In the 
words of Henry Kissinger, referring to the American covert operation in Angola in the 
mid-1970s, there are situations “in which diplomacy without leverage is impotent, yet 
direct military confrontation would involve unnecessary risks…[These are precisely] 
those grey areas where covert methods are crucial if we are to have any prospect of 
influencing certain events of potentially global importance.”9 However, the actions states 
must take to ensure plausible deniability, specifically the decisions political leaders make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, David Brannan, Trends 
in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001). 
Salehyan, “Delegation of War.” Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction.” Bapat, 
“Understanding State Sponsorship.” 
9 Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, 29 January 1976, Document 
67Volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973-1976, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p1/d67.  
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about how they will manage and oversee a proxy ally, can undermine their leverage.
 Proxy alliances are formed and operate in the shadows of the international system. 
They are typically characterized by informal, interpersonal relationships. How burdens 
will be shared between alliance partners and the actions that trigger the casus foederis are 
often not written down and are intentionally vague. Given that there is an extensive 
literature that documents the benefits of formal, public, highly institutionalized alliances, 
why would political leaders chose to forge the benefits of similarly structured alliances 
with proxy groups?10 For example, alliances are hypothesized to reduce the likelihood of 
war because the terms of alliance agreements provide information to external parties 
about alliance intent and reliability.11 Conversely, if mutual obligations are not clearly 
stipulated in formal security arrangements, there are opportunities for manipulation and 
uncertainty. Allies can exploit the ambiguity of alliance commitments and escalate 
disputes to their advantage, increasing the risk of war and entrapment dynamics.12 
The decisions political leaders make about alliance design and management, 
which have negative effects on their bargaining power, are fundamentally driven by two 
related logics: the requirements of plausible deniability, and attempts to navigate the 
preferences of domestic political veto players and bureaucracies. Plausible deniability 
requires establishing as much distance as possible between a decision maker and a proxy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Morrow, “Alliances.” Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of 
Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).  
11 Brett Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military 
Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of 
Political Science 47, no. 3 (July 2003): 427-8. 
12  Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Coercive 
Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011): 4. Morrow, 
“Alliances,” 67-73. 
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and/or operating with a minimal footprint on the ground. To do so, political leaders often 
delegate authority for managing tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance to covert 
organizations with the security sector (e.g., intelligence organizations) because they 1) 
require fewer oversight and accountability to other members of government and can 
therefore operate under the domestic political radar and 2) already have institutions and 
operations in place for working in the shadows of the international system in ways that 
distance a state from nefarious activities. Typically, however, there are also additional 
layers of delegation that occur to decouple the activities of a proxy group from its state 
sponsor. For example, a political leader could delegate authority for alliance management 
to an intelligence organization, which then further parcels out tasks to a private 
contractor, a local ally, or another non-state group (or all three). At each step in this chain 
of delegation, specific lines of authority, limits and parameters, proscribed activities, etc., 
are often intentionally vague and rarely written down. Accountability is intentionally 
minimal so that other actors cannot trace the chain of relationships from a proxy group to 
a political leader of a state. Thus, the greater the distance between the political leader and 
the proxy group, the less authority, information, and control the former possesses—by 
design. 
These multiple layers of clandestine and informal delegation are problematic in 
two respects. First, the bureaucratic actor to whom the political leader delegates authority 
for carrying out tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance has a general incentive to ensure its 
organization is abundantly resourced. Therefore, it has a vested interest in the 
perpetuation of the proxy alliance. This is basic bureaucratic politics logic, with the 
distinction that these operations occur in secret and under the radar of everyday 
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government operations, which heightens the agency problems political leaders face. 
Second, bureaucratic leaders (as well as all of the other individuals to whom authority is 
delegated) may have personal, political, or ideological preferences that differ 
substantially from those of the political leadership. This interacts with the political 
leader’s decision to delegate significant authority with minimal oversight in problematic 
ways. Because political leaders are empowering these individuals and foregoing 
supervision, the latter have the capabilities to take actions that undermine the former’s 
goals and, often, their leverage over their proxies. A state’s leverage over its proxy stems 
from the ability to strategically use its enormous material resources to get the latter to act 
according to its preferences. This means enticing proxies with promises of much-needed 
materiel or credibly threatening proxies to withhold or cut off support in response to 
undesirable behavior. Having a series of interlocutors with their own interests in the 
perpetuation of the alliance, the power to disperse resources as they see fit, and the ability 
to control and shape the information going back to the decision-maker, undermines the 
credibility of threats coming from the top.  
If the effects of delegating authority in this way are so perverse, why do leaders 
do it? And why don’t they reign in wayward bureaucrats? At the most basic level, leaders 
have a high valuation for plausible deniability for international or domestic political 
reasons (to avoid retaliation from an adversary or keep things secret from domestic 
political actors), and powerful, entrenched bureaucracies are difficult to control. Digging 
deeper, however, there is a compelling domestic political story that existing accounts of 
proxy alliances have neglected to tell. Political leaders often abdicate authority to other 
bureaucratic actors or individuals—even when they may foresee the issues identified 
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above—as a strategy for protecting themselves from domestic political veto players with 
strong policy preferences that diverge substantially from their own. Covert alliances and 
operations usually provide executives with a substantial amount of leeway and far less 
accountability than other foreign policy choices. This can protect political leaders from 
veto players who have more dovish foreign policy preferences (prompting leaders to fear 
that veto players may intercede to stop a desired policy) or more hawkish ones (making 
them to worry that veto players may drag the state into even more expansive involvement 
in areas in which political leaders are circumspect about getting involved). Political 
leaders care about the preferences of veto players because it is these actors who 
determine their tenure in office. Thus, states get entangled in costly alliances with proxy 
groups due to conscious decisions by political leaders, who are motivated by the basic 
goals of political protection and survival.  
 
Roadmap 
 The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the 
scope of the issue at hand and sets the stage for the theory: it defines proxy alliances, 
explores the parameters of the universe of cases, identifies how proxy alliances differ 
from most interstate alliances, and probes state and proxy motivations for alliance 
formation. Chapter 3 presents an in-depth discussion of the theory, assesses how the 
theory relates to the existing literature, derives competing testable implications from my 
theory and the alternative explanation, and outlines the methodology and case selection 
strategy. Chapters 4 through 6 evaluate the explanatory scope of the theory in a series of 
comparative case studies, in which I use process tracing to assess whether and to what 
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extent decisions about alliance management affect a state’s leverage over its non-state 
proxy. I compare the explanatory scope of my theory to the interstate alliance politics 
literature, and find that my theory not only accounts for the unexplained variation in the 
universe of cases, but also offers a more complete understanding of the dynamics of 
state-proxy relationships.      
 Chapter 4 is an in-depth case study that examines variation in intra-alliance 
influence over time and across cases between Syria and Palestinian militant 
organizations. The case study illustrates two important aspects of the theory and 
represents a first cut at assessing the validity of the causal mechanisms that underlie part 
of the theory. First, at a more granular level of analysis, the different ways in which Syria 
oversaw and delegated authority to different Palestinian militant groups it was supporting 
(most notably, the differences between Fatah and other groups, such as as-Sa’qia and the 
Palestine Liberation Army) led Syria to have dramatically different levels of influence 
over the various groups. Syria had far less institutional control over Fatah than the other 
Palestinian militant organizations, which were formally incorporated into the chain of 
command of the Syrian military.  
Second, the case shows one way in which domestic and bureaucratic politics 
affect alliance management. Syria is a particularly interesting case because, unlike other 
cases explored in the dissertation, the newly-independent state was initially so 
fragmented that the bureaucratic autonomy enjoyed by various organizations in the 
security sector was less the conscious product of strategic political decision-making by 
leaders and more the result of regime weakness. Furthermore, it is also a case in which 
the members of the security sector (and, therefore, the organizations tasked with alliance 
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management) are also the domestic political veto players (because they could, and did, 
overthrow the regime in response to political disagreements). The case, therefore, 
presents a dramatic illustration of how the combination of bureaucratic actors with strong 
political motivations and significant autonomy can take actions vis-à-vis proxy allies that 
undermine the goals of the political leadership. Furthermore, the Syrian case also exhibits 
significant variation over time on an important independent variable (bureaucratic 
autonomy) and, therefore, allows me to assess the latter’s effect on bargaining power. In 
1970 the Syrian state experienced a significant discontinuity, namely, Hafez al-Assad’s 
coup, which ushered in decades of regime consolidation and the subordination of the 
security sector to Assad’s preferences. 
The case largely conforms to the theory’s predictions. From the mid-1960s to 
1970, successive Syrian regimes struggled to control Fatah and were drawn into repeated 
crisis escalation with adversaries and costly interventions in neighboring states, including 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and a botched intervention in Jordan in 1970. However, 
Assad’s 1970 coup ushered in a new dynamic between Syria and Fatah, as Assad’s 
subordination of the security sector allowed him to control the conditions under which 
Syria involved itself in endeavors to support its Palestinian proxies. Furthermore, across 
the entire time period under consideration (both pre- and post-1970) there were 
substantial differences in Syria’s ability to control Fatah versus as-Sa’iqa and the PLA. 
Assad even used the latter two groups to forcibly subdue Fatah during the Lebanese civil 
war in the 1975, effectively pitting one set of Palestinian militants against another.  
 Chapter 5 builds on the initial insights provided by the Syrian case study, and 
represents a deeper dive into the causal logic of the theory. Specifically, it is an in-depth 
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case study that explores the relationship between the United States and UNITA in Angola 
during the 1980s and into the early 1990s. The outcome of the Angola case was 
somewhat over determined: both my theory and the alternative explanation would expect 
that UNITA would have a bargaining advantage over the United States. And, indeed, 
both the Reagan and Bush administrations found themselves stymied by UNITA’s leader, 
Jonas Savimbi, and were unable to cajole Savimbi into accepting any political resolution 
to the Angolan civil war. However, careful process tracing illustrates how the causal 
story behind the case study support my theoretical framework.  
 I find that Reagan’s alliance management decisions were driven by his domestic 
political constraints and, specifically, his desire to protect the Angola policy from 
domestic veto players (both more hawkish members of Congress as well as the broader 
Conservative base), who were highly motivated to tether the United States to an even 
more expansive role in Angola. For Reagan, this meant choosing to run the Angola 
operation as a covert war under the discretion of the CIA rather than an overt operation 
with more Congressional and public involvement. However, Reagan’s decision to 
delegate authority for alliance management to the CIA had counterproductive effects 
because the CIA had its own longstanding vested interested in a robust proxy alliance 
with UNITA (which stemmed from decades of involvement in Angola prior to the 
Reagan administration), and CIA Director William Casey had a deeply personal and 
ideology interest in helping Savimbi. Ultimately, Reagan’s hands were tied in both 
directions, providing Savimbi with an opportunity to pressure the Reagan administration 
from within (through the CIA) and without (through Congress and the Conservative 
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establishment) to become increasingly involved in supporting UNITA even as it 
undermined American foreign policy objectives in the region. 
 Chapter 6 is a medium-N qualitative analysis that provides further empirical 
support to the theory as well as greater confidence that the findings are generalizable 
beyond the first two cases. The chapter contains analysis of four cases: the proxy alliance 
between Iran, the United States, Israel and the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan between 1972 and 
1975; India’s alliance with the Mukti Bahini in Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) in 
1971; India’s covert support for various Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 
1986; and the relationship between the United States, Zaire, and South Africa, and the 
National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and UNITA between 1975 and 1976. 
Beyond the desire for generalizability and variation on the independent and dependent 
variables, I chose these cases for two basic reasons. First, they present two natural paired 
comparisons because the state sponsor is held constant for two different sets of cases (in 
other words, we can compare the United States’ proxy alliances with the KDP versus the 
FNLA and UNITA, and India’s proxy alliances with the Mukti Bahini and the Sri Lankan 
militants). Second and, more importantly, each of the cases presents a relatively easy test 
of the alternative explanation but, in each case, the alternative explanation fails to 
anticipate the outcome. In the KDP case, the existing literature would have expected the 
proxy group to have a bargaining advantage over its multiple external sponsors. 
Nevertheless, Barzani was strung along by the Shah and the KDP was nearly decimated 
when Iran, followed by the United States and Israel, abruptly revoked support for the 
group. In Bangladesh, despite the ostensible advantage the Mukti Bahini enjoyed due to 
having considerably higher interests at stake than its single external sponsor, the rebels 
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were unable to draw India into intervening in the conflict sooner than the state preferred. 
Conversely, in Sri Lanka, India was unable to exploit its multiple Tamil proxies to 
contain the expansion of the civil war in Sri Lanka and prevent a single militant group 
from becoming too powerful. In fact, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
quickly eclipsed the other Tamil militant groups and forced India into intervening directly 
in Sri Lanka and fight against its former proxy. Finally, the case of the United States’ 
involvement in Angola during the Ford administration presents an interesting represents a 
case of the exception that proves the rule and, therefore, illustrates the scope conditions 
of my theory. In many ways, the stage was set for the United States to be drawn into 
unwanted commitments in Angola through mechanisms expected by my theory. 
However, the Ford administration was only prevented from doing so because the 
existence of the program to covertly support the FNLA and UNITA was abruptly leaked 
to the public, prompting Congress to pass the Clark amendment and prohibit American 
support to the Angolan rebels. 
 Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and derives policy implications from the 
research and identifies theoretical extensions and avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2  
Proxy Alliances: What Are They? What Are They Good For? 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I define proxy alliances and discuss the scope of the universe of 
cases contained by that definition. Next, I explore how proxy alliances differ from other 
types of alliances, most notably interstate alliances, and I begin to outline the 
implications of these differences for alliance bargaining. Finally, I probe broad 
motivations for alliance formation.  
 
Definitions: Proxy Alliances as Incomplete Contracts 
Broadly conceived, proxy alliances are security partnerships formed between 
pairs of asymmetrically capable states and non-state groups that involve the exchange of 
qualitatively different resources.13 Namely, a state furnishes a non-state group with 
financial resources, arms, training, political and organizational support, and/or access to a 
territorial base in exchange for the latter agreeing to fight on the state’s behalf or 
otherwise work to help to state carry out its foreign policy goals.14 Proxy alliances allow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In the general parlance, proxy alliances are defined even more broadly to include both 
state-non-state alliances as well as alliances between pairs of asymmetrically capable 
states. For example, it is common parlance to refer to alliances between the Soviet Union 
and various client states in the so-called Third World as proxy relationships (e.g., in 
Afghanistan). However, I focus on alliances between states and non-state groups because 
that subset of the universe of cases of proxy alliances presents a particularly compelling 
puzzle (given non-state groups’ overwhelming material disadvantage), and because, as 
will be discussed in great detail below, those alliances differ even from proxy alliances 
between asymmetrically capable states in important ways. Therefore, from henceforth I 
will refer to proxy alliances to signify alliances between state and non-state groups. 
14 Salehyan, “Delegation of War.” 
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states to contest an adversary indirectly to avoid the domestic or international costs of 
direct military action, or distance themselves from unpalatable behavior in which a proxy 
may be engaged. Therefore, maintaining plausible deniability is a paramount concern.15 
Indeed, many or even most alliances between states and non-state groups involve a 
degree of secrecy and plausible deniability, because these are major motivating factors 
for states to recruit non-state allies.  
In many respects, this kind of proxy relationship between a state and a non-state 
group resembles an interstate alliance. Alliances are contracts formed between 
functionally similar units (states), which agree to cooperate under a set of pre-determined 
future contingencies. Allies pool resources (aggregate capabilities) to achieve a mutually 
desired security goal, such as the management of an internal or external threat.16 
Relations between allies involve a mixture of overlapping and opposing interests.17 While 
the literature generally assumes allies pool qualitatively similar resources, this does not 
preclude allies from pooling different types of resources, which is what typically occurs 
in the context of proxy alliances.18  
However, there are critical differences between proxy and interstate alliances that, 
as I will show, have important implications for bargaining power. First, every definition 
of alliances in the literature assumes sovereign states are the sole contracting parties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction,” 6. Bapat, “Understanding State 
Sponsorship,” 1-2. 
16 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Walt, Origins of Alliances. 
17 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 165. 
18 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability 
Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 
(November 1991): 904-933. 
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Nevertheless, proxy alliances between states and non-state groups proliferate in the 
international system 19  and, as already detailed above, share many attributes with 
interstate alliance. Second, the interstate alliance politics literature generally characterizes 
alliance agreements as formal, complete contracts—they clearly stipulate burden sharing 
within the alliance, as well as the conditions under which the casus foederis is activated. 
For example, Glenn Snyder defines alliances as “formal associations of states for the use 
(or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own 
membership.”20 Similarly, James Morrow contends that an alliance is formed when “two 
or more states…conclude a treaty that obliges them both to take certain actions in the 
event of war.” Alliances are “explicit records of the allies’ expectations of action in the 
case of war, and they specify the conditions under which obligations are activated.”21 The 
identity of the adversary, the conditions under which force will be used against her, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For example, since the end of World War II, Lyall and Wilson find that states 
sponsored a rebel group in 64% of all insurgencies, see Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against 
the Machines.” Further, the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars dataset finds that 66 states 
supported at least one rebel group, see Salehyan, “Delegation of War,” 498. 
20 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 4. 
21 Morrow, “Alliances,” 63. Others define alliance more loosely, but the assumption of 
contractual completeness is still present. For example, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy 
define an alliance as “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between 
two or more states and involving mutual expectations of some degree of policy 
coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future,” Michael N. 
Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of 
Egypt, 1962-73,” no. 3 (June 1991): 370. Jeremy Pressman defines an alliance as “a 
relationship between two or more states based on shared interest, an exchange of benefits, 
security cooperation, specific written agreements, and/or an expectation of continuing 
ties,” Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008): 5. Stephen Walt’s definition is by far the 
broadest, allowing for both formal and informal relationships to be considered an 
alliance: “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more 
sovereign states,” Walt, Origins of Alliances, 12. 
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how the burden to do so will be shared between alliance partners, are explicitly 
delineated in alliance agreements. 22  Third, interstate alliances (and the content of 
interstate alliance agreements) are almost always publically known; indeed, they are 
designed with the express purpose of being openly known.23 
The fact that interstate alliances are public and codified in formal, written 
agreements (usually defined by contractual completeness, in which mutual obligations for 
all possible future contingencies are stipulated ex ante) has important and well documents 
effects. The formalization of alliance agreements, usually in treaty form, creates 
“specificity, legal and moral obligation, and reciprocity.”24 Further, Brett Ashley Leeds 
argues that the publicly known content of alliance agreements affects the propensity for 
war through providing information about intent and alliance reliability: 
[F]ormal military alliance agreements provide information to state leaders 
about the likelihood of intervention by other states in potential conflicts.  
Because alliances help state leaders to predict which conflicts will remain 
bilateral and which are likely to become multilateral, they affect the 
willingness of leaders to initiate particular militarized disputes.25   
 
For Morrow, if mutual obligations are not clearly stipulated in formal security 
arrangements, there are significant opportunities for manipulation and uncertainty. The 
absence of publicity and formalization makes it difficult for outsiders to assess the level 
of commitment within an alliance and for allies to signal intentions. It also provides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Morrow, “Alliances,” 64.  
23 There are of, course, secret alliances (e.g., the Nazi-Soviet pact), as well as secret 
clauses of alliance agreement, but the vast majority of interstate alliances (especially in 
the post-World War II era) are public. 
24 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 8. 
25 Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression?” 427-8. 
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opportunities for allies to exploit the ambiguity of alliance commitments and escalate 
disputes to their advantage. These information problems, therefore, increase the risk of 
war, escalation of disputes, and entrapment dynamics, making these relationships 
inherently more destabilizing than traditional interstate alliances.26 Similarly, Thomas 
Christensen argues that alliances characterized by “disunity [and] lack of coordination” 
increase the risk of regional conflict and the escalation and persistence of existing 
conflicts because they send ambiguous signals about alliance commitment and 
reliability.27 
Proxy alliances are rarely characterized by formal, public, complete contracts. In 
fact, states choose to form proxy alliances precisely because it allows them to come to 
informal, clandestine agreements with agreements political actors willing to work on their 
behalf.28 It follows, therefore, that the greater uncertainty and poor information inherent 
in these alliances increase the risk of miscalculation and conflict, both between alliance 
partners and between allies and adversaries. When uncertainty and poor information 
dominate intra-alliance politics, “aggressive actors within an alliance are most capable of 
dragging their partners into conflicts.”29 Alliances between states and non-state actors 
almost always resemble the suboptimal world Christensen describes—one where “mutual 
suspicion among security partners about each other’s near-term and long-term goals and 
reliability are strongest, and burden-sharing arrangements within alliances have not been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Morrow, “Alliances,” 67-73.   
27 Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 1. 
28 Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction.” 
29 Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 4. 
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clearly delineated.”30 These broad claims are consistent with Kenneth Schultz’s finding 
that the provision of state support for non-state actors is associated with repeated, costly 
patterns of interstate violence.31  
Yet, despite their informality, security agreements between states and non-state 
armed groups are not supremely flexible and without constraint—this fact lies at the crux 
of the puzzle explored in the dissertation. Much of the alliance literature assumes that 
informal alliance agreements operate in the exact inverse way as formal ones. For 
example, Snyder claims that it is easier for parties to renege on informal alliance 
agreements because the reputational and credibility costs of doing so are relatively low.32 
In other words, informal relationships are “more flexible and thus more easily adapted to 
changing circumstances, they are less public and hence less subject to domestic 
constraints, they can be more quickly arranged or negotiated, and they are less 
constraining as diplomatic precedents;” they are more easily formed, but also more easily 
abrogated.33 Empirically, however, this is not the case. Rather, these relationships involve 
a qualitatively different set of constraints, which the theory explores in considerable 
detail.  
 Given these differences between interstate and proxy alliances, the latter more 
closely approximate an incomplete alliance contract. The incomplete contracting 
literature, developed by economists such as Oliver Hart, responds to the fact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 4. 
31 Schultz, “Enforcement Problem,” 299.   
32 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 9. 
33 Ibid., 15-6. 
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contracting parties cannot always reach an agreement on all possible future contingencies 
ex ante due to transaction costs, bounded rationality, and uncertainty. Therefore, rather 
than form contracts which clearly stipulate mutual obligations for all possible future 
states of the world, parties form incomplete contracts in which they agree to a broader set 
of commitments which can be renegotiated over time as greater information is revealed. 
Political scientists have applied the logic of incomplete contracting to understand 
sovereignty arrangements between states.34 For example, Alexander Cooley and Hendrik 
Spruyt use incomplete contacting theory to explain agreements between states concerning 
the reapportionment of sovereignty, such as agreements about military basing or the 
delegation of portions of sovereign authority to supranational institutions. In these cases, 
states transfer or reapportion aspects of their sovereignty among themselves without 
precisely stipulating the nature and scope of sovereignty arrangements because there is 
considerable uncertainty about the future distributional consequences of those 
agreements.35  In these agreements, “the allocation of sovereign rights [is] a matter of 
ongoing negotiation.” 36  Incomplete contracts are particularly appealing for states 
considering reapportioning sovereignty because uncertainty, information asymmetries, 
and lack of enforcement inherent in the anarchic international system impede complete 
contracting.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2009). Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
35 Cooley and Spruyt, Contracting States, 3-5. 
36 Ibid., 6. 
37 Ibid., 9-10, 26. 
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In this respect, security arrangements between a state and a non-state armed group 
resemble incomplete alliance contracts. Contracting in proxy alliances is incomplete 
because agreements are not explicit about all possible future contingencies and are 
subject to continued bargaining over time.38 States and non-state armed groups form 
contracts under conditions of extreme uncertainty about the future, which makes it 
difficult to stipulate obligations for all possible scenarios. There are also considerable 
levels of information asymmetry between actors. States face significant barriers to 
collecting information about their contracting partners because proxy groups often reside 
in the territories of other states (which are not easily penetrable and necessitate secrecy 
on the part of the non-state group); this is exacerbated by the fact that the groups are 
frequently operating under conditions of low level violence or outright war. Furthermore, 
non-state groups often lack a public record of their behavior, which makes it difficult for 
them to establish reputations. States also lack an overt record of their previous alliance 
commitments to non-state groups, so it is challenging for non-state groups to assess their 
prior reliability. Additionally, agreements are difficult to enforce not only because they 
occur in anarchy, but also because they are conducted in clandestine environments (there 
are few reputational costs for reneging on secret agreements). 
 
A Brief Note on Principal-Agent Theory  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 I do not intend to claim that interstate alliances cannot also be incomplete contracts. 
Rather, I am drawing a distinction between how the literature treats interstate alliances 
from a theoretical perspective, and how I conceive of proxy alliances from a theoretical 
perspective. 
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Beyond the classic interstate alliance politics literature, a new crop of literature 
has emerged on the topic of proxy alliances. What this new literature has in common is 
its treatment of proxy alliances as being largely defined by a principal-agent relationship 
between the state (as principal) and the proxy (as agent).39 While my theory draws on 
principal-agent logic to illustrate problems of agency loss within the state, I argue that it 
is inappropriate to conceive of relations between a state and proxy group in principal-
agent terms. 
The principal-agent literature was initially developed by economists to explain the 
relationship between employers and employees, and has been most commonly applied by 
political scientists to understand the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.40 
Broadly speaking, a principal-agent relationship is an “agency relationship, in which one 
party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the 
agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Saleyhan, “Delegation of War.” Salehyan et al., “Explaining External Support.” Byman 
and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction.” Lucy Hovil and Eric D. Werker, “Portrait of a Failed 
Rebellion: An Account of Rational, Sub-optimal Violence in Western Uganda,” 
Rationality and Society 17, no. 1 (February 2005): 5-34. 
40 George A. Akerlof, “The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (August 1970): 488-500. 
Michael Spence and Richard Zeckhauser, “Insurance, Information, and Individual 
Action,” The American Economic Review 61, no. 2 (May 1971): 380-387. Terry M. Moe, 
“The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 4 
(November 1984): 739-777. John Winsor Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser, Principals and 
Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985). John 
D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of 
Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). David Epstein 
and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency 
Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (August  1994): 697-722. 
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics 
Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
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outcomes desired by the principal.” 41  The primary purpose of a principal-agent 
relationship is to increase efficiency for the principal: if an agent has a particular skill set 
required by a specific task, it is more efficient for a principal to contract out the task to 
that agent than to do it herself. 42  While the principal gains efficiency from the 
relationship, the agent gains financial compensation. However, principal-agent 
relationships are plagued by problems of agency loss, where agents are incentivized to 
take actions that run against the preferences of principals. Problems of agency loss, such 
as adverse selection and moral hazard, stem from the imperfect alignment of interests 
between principals and agents and information asymmetries (agents have private 
information about their will and ability to carry out tasks desired by principals). 
Therefore, principals must design mechanisms for screening, monitoring and 
incentivizing agents to mitigate problems of agency loss.43 
While some of these insights gleaned from principal-agent theory are similar to 
the dynamics between states and proxies, the core assumptions that underlie principal-
agent theory make a wholesale application of the principal-agent literature to proxy 
alliances a poor and inadequate fit. The underlying intuition of principal-agent theory is 
that most of the contracting power lies with the principal. While agents can shirk duties 
or take independent action once the relationship has been formed, the power to select into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Moe, “New Economics,” 756. 
42 Pratt and Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents, 2. 
43 Moe, “New Economics,” 754-7. Pratt and Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents, 2-5. 
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the relationship lies with the principal. In other words, the principal is the first mover: it 
has a particular goal it seeks to achieve and, for efficiency reasons, prefers to delegate 
rather than carry out the task itself. More broadly, the entire purpose of the relationship is 
centered on serving the principal’s interests and carrying out the tasks stipulated by the 
principal.44 Principals set the rules of the game: “before the agent chooses the action [it 
will take], the principal determines a rule that specifies the fee to be paid to the agent as a 
function of the principal’s observations of the results of the action.”45 Indeed, political 
scientists’ application of principal-agent theory to the context of proxy alliances assumes 
that the relationship is formed based on the principal’s goals: “the [external] financier is 
the principal and he has hired the insurgent as his agent to conduct a rebellion.”46 
The dominant role played by the principal makes principal-agent theory appealing 
for scholars of proxy alliances because it fits well with the gut intuition that states, by 
virtue of their material capabilities, are generally the first movers in these relationships. 
However, this obscures and ignores the very real political (rather than financial) 
motivations of proxy groups, which are usually already engaged in a rebellion before they 
are “hired” by states to do so. Thus, both states and proxies can theoretically act as first-
moving principals. Indeed, rather than wait as passive recipients of states’ supplications, 
many non-state groups actively seek out external support; purported “agents” can initiate 
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an agreement, rather than the reverse.47 Therefore, Daniel Byman and Sarah Kreps’ 
characterization of the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a principal-agent 
one, for example, is tenuous at best, because in that case al-Qaeda acted as a first mover 
seeking a state willing to offer a territorial safe haven, in exchange for providing financial 
resources to the state (thus, it was the proxy that hired the state, rather than the reverse).48 
Therefore, characterizing non-state groups as agents downplays the role of agents’ 
preexisting preferences and interests—it strips agents of their agency. Furthermore, while 
principal-agent theory does assume agents can have interests that are independent of 
principals’ (in fact, this is a source of agency loss), the impetus behind the formation of 
the relationship is largely defined by the principal’s interests, rather than those of the 
agent. The implication is that agents carry out a task because they are contracted by 
principals to do so. In fact, armed, non-state groups almost always have preexisting 
political goals that they wish to pursue regardless of the preferences of a potential state 
ally. For example, the Tamil Tigers initiated attacks against targets in Sri Lanka 
beginning in the early 1970s, well before the Indian government began to actively 
provide support to the group. Therefore, it is unconvincing to depict the LTTE as an 
agent and India as the principal, as the existing literature does.49 Furthermore, focusing 
on efficiency as the primary motivation for alliance formation from the state’s 
perspective also downplays the vastly more important and compelling political story. 
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If proxy alliances are in fact simply principal-agent relationships, then the 
principal’s (the state’s) primary problem in the relationship should stem from incomplete 
information. Principal-agent theory suggests that principals lose control of their proxies’ 
behavior when there are information asymmetries. Specifically, agents have private 
information about their capabilities, their willingness to act, and conditions on the 
ground. Therefore, bargaining outcomes that favor the non-state group should be driven 
by large information asymmetries, and states’ primary directive should be to carefully 
design institutions to screen agents ex ante and monitor then ex post. In fact, while 
information asymmetries certainly abound in this context, and screening and monitoring 
mechanisms are important aspects of states’ control over their proxies, they are not the 
central problem and are not sufficient to explain variation in bargaining power in proxy 
alliances. To wit, much of the application of the principal-agent literature to this issue 
focuses on the problem of moral hazard.50 Moral hazard follows from the unobservability 
of behavior ex post; principals can only observe policy outcomes (not agents’ behavior), 
so they cannot know whether suboptimal outcomes are products of “bad” behavior by 
agents, or exogenous events beyond the scope of agents’ control. This incentivizes agents 
to shirk and divert principals’ resources for private gain.51 Problems of moral hazard 
“may arise in any situation in which someone…is tempted to take an inefficient action or 
to provide distorted information…because the individual’s interests are not aligned with 
the group interest and because the report cannot be easily checked or the action 
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accurately monitored.”52 Because agents are responsible for implementing policies, they 
can use their private information to take actions that are against the preferences of the 
principals.53 
However, problems arise between states and proxies even under conditions 
approximating perfect information. States can have nearly perfect information about the 
interests and behavior of the non-state groups to which they provide support, and 
nevertheless be at a bargaining disadvantage (for reasons that, I claim, stem from 
domestic political processes). For example, Syria had reliable information about the more 
militant preferences of the Palestinian groups it supported during the 1960s. These groups 
were able to draw Syria into conflict with Israel not due to information asymmetries but, 
rather, due to problems of credibility: Syria could not credibly threaten to withhold 
support in response to undesired behavior. As I will discuss in greater detail in the 
following chapter, rather than information, the central bargaining problem in proxy 
alliances is credibility. This is why the alliance politics literature, which hinges on the 
credibility of commitments, is a better framework for understanding these relationships 
than the principal-agent literature.  
This does not imply, however, that principal-agent theory is wholly inapplicable. 
Indeed, a core insight of my theory draws from the principal-agent literature, but it is 
applied in a way that is more consistent with the original insights of the literature—to 
elucidating the incentives and dynamics governing the relationship between political 
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leaders and the various bureaucracies and organizations within the state to which they 
have delegated authority for alliance management. 
 
Material Capabilities and Alliances Politics 
 From the perspective of the alliance politics literature, the fact that proxy group 
are so often capable of getting their way with state sponsors is puzzling because states 
have a vast material advantage. While the interstate alliance politics literature does 
identify conditions under which “weakness may be strength,” 54  and “vulnerability 
can…be a bargaining asset,”55 actors that are extremely weak (a category in which many 
proxy groups would fall) are characterized as being at a bargaining disadvantage by 
virtue of their material poverty. Walt claims that strong states are able to get their way 
when their clients are especially weak.56 Navin Bapat advances a similar contention in the 
context of proxy alliances, arguing that material resources have an overwhelming, but 
non-monotonic, effect on whether states can extract benefits from interstate rivals 
through supporting non-state proxies.57 Bapat claims that moderately weak states are 
likely to gain the most from sponsoring non-state proxies, because such states are best 
able to extract concessions from their interstate rivals while still retaining some capacity 
to enforce an agreement on their non-state allies.58 The basic logic underlying this 
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argument is that material capacity is the primary driver of a state’s ability to manage its 
relationship with its non-state ally.  
However, while material capabilities certain factor into a state’s ability to 
influence the behavior of its proxy, a purely capabilities-based explanation of leverage in 
proxy alliances is deeply deficient. A vast material discrepancy between state and proxies 
is nearly constant across the universe of cases, yet there is considerable variation in 
leverage. While there may be variation in the size of this gap, it’s not convincing that it is 
anything more than marginal (in other words, most of the time, as powerful as proxies 
become, they can’t rival the capabilities of their state sponsors). Additionally, we often 
observe the reverse phenomenon—as proxy groups become materially stronger, they lose 
bargaining power. For example, even Fatah became more powerful, growing from just a 
few dozen poorly equipped militants to a large and well-resourced organization, it was 
nevertheless unable to prevent Syria from intervening in Lebanon to suppress the group.  
Therefore, while I certainly do not claim that material resources have no effect on 
bargaining power, they are neither the sole nor the most important drivers of outcomes.   
 
Motivations for Alliance Formation 
 In order to understand the sources of leverage within proxy alliances, it is 
important to consider why actors choose to form these relationships in the first place.59 
This is because the factors that induce states and non-state groups to pick a particular 
bargaining table—to choose to form a proxy alliance rather than a different vehicle for 
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achieving a foreign policy objective, such as forming an interstate alliance or acting 
directly—play a considerable role in shaping their constraints once sitting at a specific 
table.60 Therefore, exploring the motivations for alliance formation addresses the fact that 
actors don’t randomly select into these relationships. However, these broad motivations 
for alliance formation are not wholly determinative of leverage. In other words, under 
similar structural conditions, where political leaders prefer to avoid direct and overt 
military action against a rival, political leaders make different decisions about alliance 
management that ultimately implicate their future bargaining power.  
 Combining insights gleaned from the alliance and incomplete contracting 
literatures can shed light on why states choose to ally with proxy groups to achieve 
foreign policy goals, rather than form interstate alliances or act directly, and why non-
state groups seek out state sponsors rather than pursue independent modes of resource 
extraction or ally with other non-state groups. The existing literature focuses on one 
comparison: why states could choose to ally with non-state groups (i.e., act indirectly) 
rather than act directly.61 However, the more interested and neglected question is why 
states would reject interstate alliance formation in favor of alliances with non-state 
groups. Furthermore, the literature on proxy warfare generally ignores the foreign policy 
alternatives proxies could pursue. Notably, rather than form alliances with state sponsors, 
non-state groups could extract resources from the local population (e.g., NRA in 
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Uganda), cultivate domestic sources of natural resources (e.g., RUF in Sierra Leone), 
collect donations from transnational networks of co-ethnics (e.g., LTTE in Sri Lanka) or 
INGOs (e.g., Zapatistas in Mexico), and/or trade in transnational markets for illicit goods 
(e.g., FARC in Colombia). A political actor’s policy decisions cannot be considered in 
isolation: the decision to pursue one means of achieving a policy objective often implies 
rejecting other means of achieving the same objective.62 Therefore, what is appealing 
about proxy alliances that would prompt states and non-state groups to choose them over 
other foreign policy tools? 
The interstate alliance politics literature provides a useful broad framework for 
identifying motivations for alliance formation. Specifically, the existing literature locates 
causes of alliance formation at both the systemic and domestic levels. Alliances are 
formed between states with overlapping security interests in order to protect against 
external attack, increase domestic political stability, and/or control an ally. At the 
systemic level, ex ante patterns of conflict and interest in the international system create 
incentives for states to form alliances with other states.63 There is considerable debate in 
the literature concerning whether states balance against capabilities or threats,64 and the 
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conditions under which states balance, bandwagon, hedge, or tether.65 Nevertheless, what 
these arguments have in common is the idea that states make strategic, cost-benefit 
calculations about alliance formation in anarchy in response to a threatening security 
environment. When a state decides to form an alliance, it takes into account its own 
capabilities relative to those of its adversary; its anticipation of how forming versus not 
forming an alliance will affect the calculations and behavior of other states in the 
international system; the costs and benefits of alliance formation in terms of what an ally 
might be able to contribute and what it would have to sacrifice; and its allies’ valuation 
for an alliance.66   
This logic is broadly applicable to the proxy alliances: both actors are strategic 
and politically motivated, with varying interests, preferences and capabilities, and seek 
means of curtailing or managing the threats posed by adversaries. For states, the 
distribution of threats and capabilities in the international system can create unique 
incentives to form alliances with non-state groups, rather than with other states, or to use 
force directly. The clandestine and informal nature of proxy alliances allows a state to 
challenge an adversary or further its regional influence in an indirect manner, and can 
provide a state with plausible deniability for actions committed by non-state allies.67 
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Thus, these alliances are well suited for states that are at a strategic disadvantage relative 
to their adversaries or that find the costs of challenging an adversary directly exceedingly 
high. States might also benefit from allying with non-state groups due to the latter’s 
unique skill sets. Non-state groups often have a comparative advantage in knowledge of 
local networks and terrain. Non-state groups operate within the borders of sovereign 
states and in areas that are difficult to penetrate; they know the relevant local political 
actors; they have control over networks for the distribution of resources and information; 
and they possess information about government presence, the preferences of local 
populations, and the shape of the battlefield.68  
External pressures also create incentives for non-state groups to ally with states, 
rather than pursue other avenues of resource acquisition. Clearly, states provide easy 
access to the material resources necessary to sustain a military campaign against another 
state, in which non-state groups are almost always at a significant material disadvantage 
and risk the extinction of their organization. However, non-state groups can acquire 
material resources from other sources, such as illicit markets, the domestic population, or 
networks of ethnic kin, and they can acquire military training and organizational support 
from other non-state groups that run training camps for fellow militants (e.g., Hezbollah). 
Non-state groups often choose to form proxy alliances because the quantity of material 
resources states are capable of providing makes them particularly appealing. 
Furthermore, states have sovereign territorial rights and, therefore, can provide non-state 
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groups with access to a resource that they can’t get elsewhere: a territorial base.69 In fact, 
possessing a territorial safe haven is crucial for insurgent success.70 
In addition to systemic pressures and incentives, domestic political processes are 
important causes of alliance formation. Deborah Larson claims that elites within states 
decide to form alliances based on considerations about protecting their own regime and 
ensuring domestic political stability. She argues that a weak state—weakness is measured 
in terms of material capabilities, regime legitimacy, and the nature of its relationship with 
society—is especially likely to bandwagon in order to undermine domestic challenges to 
its regime.71 Michael Barnett and Jack Levy articulate a different domestic political 
explanation for alliance formation, arguing that elites make decisions about forming 
external alliances based on political economy calculations about the tradeoffs between 
self-arming and allying, and on whether forming alliances can help elites combat internal 
threats to the regime.72 Weak states are especially likely to face resource or domestic 
political constraints that prevent self-arming (for example, devoting economic resources 
to arming can divert resources away from buying off potential rivals to a regime), and 
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they are also likely to face internal challenges to their rule.73 Similarly, Steven David’s 
discussion of omnibalancing highlights how both external threats and domestic political 
vulnerabilities factor into the alliance formation decisions of weak states.74 
Domestic political vulnerabilities and constraints also create incentives for both 
states and non-state groups to ally with each other, rather than pursue other means of 
achieving foreign policy objectives. For both states and non-state groups, internal 
political weaknesses—such as when elites have a tenuous hold on power, experience 
difficulties arriving at consensus on or executing foreign policy decisions, lack sufficient 
resources to confront adversaries directly, or can’t pay the political costs of mobilizing 
resources from the population—can make allying with one another appealing. For states, 
the very factors that distinguish alliances with non-state groups from traditional interstate 
alliances make them suitable for weakly positioned elites: their secrecy and informality 
means there are fewer institutional impediments to their formation, and elites are less 
accountable; and non-state groups require far fewer resources than states and, therefore, 
alliances with them are cheaper. Furthermore, the ideological or ethnic identity of a group 
can be an important asset to enhance a patron’s legitimacy. For non-state groups, states 
can provide greater amounts of resources than other external actors, and provide an easier 
route to enrichment than building up the organizational apparatuses and ideological 
legitimacy necessary to extract resources from the population.75 Thus, alliances with 
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states can be particularly appealing to organizationally weak groups. Indeed, domestic 
political constraints and opportunities are crucial determinants not only of alliance 
formation, but also of bargaining power within proxy alliances, as will be detailed in 
Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
A Theory of Influence in Proxy Alliances 
 
Sources of Influence in Proxy Alliances 
Why are some states able to manage relations with their proxies—successfully 
using proxies to execute foreign policy goals while simultaneously avoiding being drawn 
into costly escalations or becoming ensnared in unwanted conflicts—while other states 
find themselves at the behest of their far weaker allies? Why doesn’t a state’s enormous 
material advantage systematically translate into an ability to influence the behavior of 
proxy groups? This chapter presents a theory that addresses these questions. I argue that 
the very reasons states choose to form proxy alliances—their indirect and deniable 
nature—create the conditions for states to lose leverage over their non-state proxies. 
Specifically, the decisions political leaders make about how they will manage the 
distribution of resources to and the activities of the proxy—the actors and organizations 
to whom political leaders delegate authority; the level of oversight and accountability 
they impose; and the political and institutional preferences and motivations of those 
actors—affect the ability of political leaders to exert leverage over their proxy. I also 
claim that these decisions have path dependent effects that persist over time. 
Furthermore, I argue that political leaders often foresee the problems associated with 
delegating authority for alliance management to certain organizations or actors, but 
nevertheless choose to do so as part of a conscious strategy to protect themselves and 
their policies from domestic political veto players.   
Relations between a state and proxy can be conceived of as comprises two stages: 
an initial bargaining stage when a state and proxy group come together to form an 
	   41	  
alliance and arrive at a broad set of agreements about its terms, and a subsequent 
enforcement and renegotiation stage in which parties carry out (or fail to) their end of the 
bargain, violations are punished (or not), and terms are renegotiated over time.76 The 
dissertation focuses on this second stage, which is more interesting from both a 
theoretical and empirical perspective. Indeed, as already discussed in Chapter 2, at the 
point of alliance formation the initial bargain is often vague and ill defined. Proxy 
alliances, as incomplete contracts, are continually negotiated over time in response to 
changing environments. This dissertation seeks to explain why the outcome of a 
particular bargain at a moment in time in a proxy alliance favors one side versus another.  
 
A Note on the Initial Bargain 
Bargaining problems occur in a context in which there are “multiple self-
enforcing agreements or outcomes that two or more parties would all prefer to no 
agreement, but the parties disagree in their rank of the mutually preferable agreements.”77 
Allies have a mixture of overlapping and opposing interests, but almost always prefer an 
alliance to none at all—otherwise, an alliance would not form. Alliance bargaining, 
therefore, involves negotiating to agree upon a set of cooperative outcomes over which 
allies have differently ranked preferences. Alliances differ from other forms of bargaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Fearon, “Bargaining.”  
77 Ibid., 274. 
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because they involve negotiations about cooperating to achieve particular policies relative 
to a mutual adversary.78  
When a state and an armed non-state group decide to form an alliance, they 
negotiate along two dimensions: 1) the quantity and quality of material resources 
committed to the alliance (e.g., the number of weapons and the sophistication of 
particular weapons systems being provided); and 2) how those resources will be 
employed to achieve particular tactical, operational, or strategic objectives. Proxy 
alliances are almost always asymmetric in that they involve the contribution of 
qualitatively different resources to the alliance by states and non-state groups. Resources 
usually come with strings attached—stipulations about how actors should use them and 
the types of behavior that are proscribed. For example, a state may promise to deliver 
anti-aircraft missiles to a non-state group under the condition that the latter agree to 
refrain from using the missiles against the former’s interests. In a small subset of cases, 
proxies provide resources to states, such as al-Qaeda’s financing of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in the 1990s, or Hezbollah’s recent training of the Syrian military in the 
latter’s attempts to defeat the Syrian rebels.  
One can make some basic assumptions about the preferences of both states and 
proxies along these two dimensions. First, proxies should prefer to maximize the amount 
and quality of the resources they receive from the state while minimizing the conditions 
attached to them. Second, states should prefer to provide the cheapest possible 
configuration of resources necessary to achieve their political objectives with the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 165. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among 
Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
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conditions. Of course, the specific content of the issue over which states and proxies are 
bargaining will vary across and within cases. When bargaining, states and proxies might 
be willing to make tradeoffs between resources and conditionalities, such as arriving at a 
bargain that involves the transfer of more resources with greater restrictions associated 
with their use. Nevertheless, as discussed above, bargains between state and proxies are 
often underspecified—allies are ambiguous or leave as open-ended the distribution of 
responsibilities and burdens within the alliance.  
 
Explaining Bargaining Power in Proxy Alliances 
Where does leverage come from? At the most basic level, one ally’s leverage over 
another rests on marshaling an appropriate and credible combination of threats and 
promises to induce an ally to comply with one’s preferences—promises to reward good 
behavior, and threats to punish bad behavior. Credible threats are particularly important 
for reigning in recalcitrant allies and minimizing the risk to states of entrapment.79 
Proxies must believe that continued support is contingent on good behavior and that 
states will reduce their commitment to an ally or, in the extreme, walk away from an 
alliance rather than get drawn into unwanted conflict escalation. My theory identifies the 
conditions under which and the reasons why states are unable to issue credible threats to 
withhold support to their proxy allies, and the factors that make proxies doubt the 
willingness of their state sponsors to make their support conditional.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Glenn Snyder defines entrapment as occurring when a state is “dragged by one’s 
commitment into a war over interests of the ally that one does not share. The ally behaves 
recklessly or takes a firmer position toward its opponent than one would like because it is 
confident of one’s support.” Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181. 
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I claim that the decisions political leaders make about how they will manage a 
proxy ally—the bureaucratic organizations to whom they delegate authority for carrying 
out tasks pertaining to the alliance and the institutions they establish to direct the flow of 
resources to proxies—affect their abilities to issue credible threats to proxy groups to 
make support conditional on desired behavior. These ineffective alliance management 
decisions stem from two related desires on the part of the political leader: the need to 
maintain plausible deniability and to protect the leader and his/her policies from domestic 
political veto players. In this chapter, I first discuss the different alliance management 
decisions political leaders could make and the causal mechanisms through which they 
undermine a state’s leverage over its proxy. Then, I explain the sources of this decision-
making and the domestic political logic of seemingly counterproductive policies. Next, I 
identify the conditions under which problems of bureaucratic agency loss and domestic 
political veto players are more or less acute. Subsequently, I discuss alternative 
theoretical explanations for bargaining power in proxy alliances. Finally, I detail my 
methodological approach to testing the explanatory weight of my theory versus the 
alternative explanation.    
 
Plausible Deniability and Alliance Management Choices 
When political leaders want to keep the existence and/or the specific nature of 
proxy alliances hidden from domestic political actors or external adversaries, they have to 
take certain steps to maintain plausible deniability. The requirements for plausible 
deniability shape the decisions political leaders make about how they will manage and 
administer proxy alliances. In particular, three sets of alliance management choices are 
	   45	  
crucial for determining the leverage a political leader has over a proxy as the alliance 
progresses: 1) the oversight and authority the political leader gives to the organization(s) 
within the state (usually within the security apparatus) tasked with carrying out the 
administrative tasks of the proxy alliance (e.g., transferring resources to proxies, 
overseeing proxies’ activities, shaping proxies’ political agenda); 2) the institutions 
established and decisions made by said organization(s) to govern the proxy relationship; 
and 3) the role played by third parties external to the proxy alliance (e.g., local state 
allies, other proxies, mercenaries, private contractors, etc.). Across all of these decisions, 
to maintain plausible deniability political leaders must maximize the distance between 
themselves and the proxy group; delegate considerable authority for decision-making to 
other actors, both internal and external to the state; and impose minimal accountability 
and oversight mechanisms. It is these same things, however, that undermine a leader’s 
bargaining power. In this section, I will review the logics of each of these alliance 
management decisions, and then shown how the varying modes of organizing and 
overseeing proxy allies produce different effects on bargaining power and control. 
First, to ensure plausible deniability, political leaders delegate authority for 
alliance management to secretive bureaucracies within the security sector that are 
segmented from normal governmental operations or otherwise have a mandate to operate 
with little oversight from other governmental bodies (typically intelligence 
organizations). These bureaucracies are a natural fit for proxy warfare because they 
already have organizational structures in place to operate in the shadows of the 
international system and, in most cases, the domestic constitutional or legal authority that 
vests these bureaucracies with the ability to operate will less oversight already exists. By 
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design, these bureaucracies in the security sector in charge of managing alliance relations 
will be minimally accountable to political leaders.80 Budgetary allocations may be secret 
or not require specific accountings of how resources were used; understandings between 
political leaders and bureaucrats about the parameters and limits of a relationship with a 
proxy may be implicit and informal; and political leaders may make known to 
bureaucrats their aversion to being informed of specific details pertaining to the proxy 
group to minimize liability. Because bureaucrats are responsible for implementing 
policies, they can use their private information to take actions that may run contrary to 
the preferences of the principals, such as providing proxies with resources in excess of 
original alliance agreements.81 This lack of oversight is not inherently problematic, 
however. In fact, it can prove quite beneficial to political leaders seeking to keep their 
hands clean and avoid any untoward associations. However, if the organization(s) in 
charge of administering a proxy alliance have policy preferences that diverge 
substantially from the goals of the political leader, and are subsequently given 
considerable authority for making decisions pertaining to that alliance, then the political 
leader may later encounter considerable difficulty enforcing agreements with a proxy 
group. The proxy may perceive threats from the political leader to revoke or cut off 
support in response to undesirable behavior to be less than credible if the organization 
within the state with which the proxy is interfacing continues to provide funding or even 
communicates assurances about the continuation of support. Furthermore, the political 
leader may be unable or unwilling to reign in wayward bureaucrats precisely because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Huber and Shipan, Deliberate Discretion, ch. 2. 
81 Ibid., 19. 
	   47	  
authority that the former granted to the latter (in the interests of plausible deniability) 
empowered the bureaucracy and therefore increased the costs to the political leader of 
cracking down. 
The divergent preferences between the political leadership and the organization(s) 
within the security sector tasked with alliance management can stem from a variety of 
sources. First, individual bureaucrats often develop close interpersonal relationships with 
their assets, coming to identify with and feel a sense of obligation to them. Second, 
bureaucrats are motivated to ensure their organizations are abundantly resourced and 
therefore develop vested interests in the perpetuation of a proxy alliance.82 Third, and this 
is especially the case for higher-level political appointees, bureaucratic leaders may be 
motivated by particular ideologies or political preferences that differ substantially from 
those of the political leadership.83   
This undermines a state’s leverage through multiple pathways. First, a political 
leader may not even have information about potentially undesirable behavior of a proxy 
group or changing situations that might warrant a move away from the proxy alliance 
because the leader’s bureaucratic interlocutors have concealed it. Second, even with 
perfect information, the political leadership may be unable to restrain the state’s proxy 
because s/he can’t restrain the bureaucratic or individual actors within the state to whom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 For classic works on bureaucratic politics see James March and Herbert Simon, 
Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958); James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What 
Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989). In the 
context of international relations see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). 
83 In weak states, political leaders may be aware of the strong political disagreements 
they have with important members of the security apparatus, but may be insufficiently 
strong to do anything about it. 
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s/he delegated authority for alliance management in the first place (because doing so 
could implicate the political leadership, or because the bureaucracies have simply become 
too powerful that the costs of reigning them in are prohibitive). Therefore, delegating 
authority for alliance management to bureaucrats, and providing such bureaucrats with a 
broad and ill-defined mandate to execute policies, can impinge on political leaders’ 
abilities to use threats to influence the behavior of their non-state allies.84 Specifically, 
proxies will not perceive threats to withhold or reduce support as credible if the political 
leaders making the threats cannot rein in the bureaucrats responsible for executing them. 
Having bureaucratic interlocutors with their own interests in perpetuating an alliance and 
sufficient autonomy to do so undermines the credibility of threats to respond to violations 
of the terms of an alliance agreement. The relationship between the level of oversight a 
political leader imposes on the organization to which it has delegated authority and the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 The bargaining literature expects that delegating authority or otherwise tying one’s 
hands can enhance bargaining power. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966): 92-125. James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign 
Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, 
no. 1 (February 1997): 68-90. Similarly, the presence of domestic veto players is usually 
considered to be a bargaining asset; when domestic veto players’ preferences diverge 
from those of the decision-maker, actors can credibly claim that certain bargains are off 
of the table. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460. However, 
the content of veto players’ preferences matters: veto players can be a bargaining liability 
if their preferences are closer to those of the ally than to those of the decision-maker. See, 
e.g., Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of 
Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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Table 1: The Relationship Between Oversight and Policy Preferences 
 Robust oversight of 
organization(s) for 
alliance management 
Minimal oversight of 
organization(s) for 
alliance management 
Policy preferences of 
political leader and 
organization(s) are closely 
aligned 
Agents act in accordance 
with the political 
leadership’s preference, but 
the significant oversight is 
unnecessary/inefficient and 
could undermine plausible 
deniability. 
Political leadership reaps 
the gains of plausible 
deniability by delegating 
authority to an agent with 
very similar policy 
preferences. 
Policy preferences of 
political leader and 
organization(s) are far 
apart  
Agents are stymied in 
attempts to undermine the 
political leadership; likely 
to observe friction between 
political leaders and 
bureaucrats. 
Agents take actions that run 
counter to the preferences 
of the political leadership, 
but the latter can’t reign in 
the former. 
 
Second, the organization(s) within the security sector tasked with alliance 
management makes important decisions about how it will disperse resources to proxies; 
the level of command and control it will establish; and generally how much it will 
oversee and involve itself in the daily activities of proxy groups. Plausible deniability 
also informs these choices. Allowing proxies to established bases on a state’s territory 
and/or sending agents to work with proxies on the ground (assisting with training; 
making tactical and strategic decisions, such as selecting particular targets or weighing in 
on when an offensive should be launched; contributing to organization management, such 
as making personnel decisions; and generally overseeing and observing proxies in action) 
is good for monitoring and enforcement but bad for secrecy because it establishes a direct 
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link between the state and the proxy. This creates an information gap that further 
enhances the ability of proxies to take matters into their own hands.85  
Third, political leaders and/or the bureaucracies tasked with alliance management 
can subsequently further delegate responsibilities to third parties that are external to the 
executive branch, such as local state allies, private contractors, or even other proxies, to 
serve as intermediaries. Involving parties external to the alliance establishes greater 
distance between the state and the proxy group and therefore serves the interests of 
plausible deniability. However, it also brings additional actors into the fold who may 
have political or economic interests that run counter to those of the political leadership. 
For example, flush with resources from the state sponsor, intermediaries may develop 
vested interests in the perpetuation of the relationship and can threaten to reveal the 
existence of the relationship as leverage. In another scenario, local state allies with whom 
a state sponsor may work to coordinate and disperse resources to proxy groups may have 
political interests that diverge from those of the political leadership and independent 
relationships with proxy groups, and can therefore take actions that undermine the 
interests of the state sponsor (and can also use the revelation of the relationship as a 
bargaining chip). In particular, if a state delegates considerable authority for alliance 
management to a local ally, the ally’s own internal institutional configurations (the 
bureaucratic actors within the ally’s security sector tasked with managing these 
resources) and the chains of command that ally establishes play a large role in shaping 
the state’s control over events happening on the ground. This does not always produce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Moe, “New Economics,” 754-7. Pratt and Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents, 2-5. 
Huber and Shipan, Deliberate Discretion, 19, 27. Niskanen, Bureaucracy, 26. Milgrom 
and Roberts, Economics, 168. 
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negative results for the state. For instance, when the United States provided covert aid to 
the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s, nearly all of the support was funneled through 
the Shah’s Iran with little oversight from the Nixon administration. This worked to the 
United States’ advantage, however, because the Shah had established strong command 
and control over the KDP’s operations, and because the Shah and the Nixon 
administration’s policy preferences were closely aligned. 
Thus, the management of proxy alliances, from the state’s perspective, is often 
characterized by long chains of delegation of authority, with minimal oversight and 
accountability at each step in the process, and involving many different types of actors 
(organizations within the security apparatus, state allies, private organizations, other 
proxy groups) with their own interests and political preferences. At each of these steps, 
responsibilities, mandates, parameters, limits, and burdens may be intentionally left 
vague and not written down. This implies that the further removed the political leader is 
from the first act of delegation, the less authority, information, and control the political 
leader possesses—by design. These efforts to ensure plausible deniability, therefore, 
empower individuals and institutions with a vested interested in the continuation of a 
state’s proxy alliance (often irrespective of the proxy’s behavior), and with the authority 
to act independently and often without the knowledge or consent of the political 
leadership.  
Similar mechanisms are present when this kind of agency slack occurs as the 
unintentional byproduct of state fragmentation and institutional weakness. This often 
occurs in newly independent states or regimes where the executive has poor control over 
security apparatuses. In these cases, leaders of security apparatuses are empowered to act 
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independently of political leaders, but not necessarily by design. For example, between 
the birth of the independent Syrian state in 1946 and Assad’s 1970 coup, Syria was beset 
by endemic political instability and cycles of coups and countercoups, which provided 
significant autonomy to military commanders. If the commanders of a state’s security 
forces have established close ties with proxy groups, the government cannot credibly 
threaten to punish violations of alliance agreements because the bureaucratic actors 
responsible for carrying out the punishment are committed to upholding the interests of 
their proxy allies. 
 
Path Dependence 
The alliance management choices political leaders make have path dependent 
effects that can persist even as a state’s strategic or domestic political context may 
change.86 Broadly construed, path dependence is the idea that “history matters.”87 
Defined more narrowly, path dependence “refers to the dynamic processes involving 
positive feedback, which generate multiple possible outcomes depending on the 
particular sequence in which events unfold.”88 In this definition, path dependence hinges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Conversely, the interstate alliance bargaining literature assumes changes in bargaining 
power follow from changes in relative dependence and interests at stake. Furthermore, 
enforcement issues that stem from domestic political costs are not path dependent; they 
persist for as long as the particular domestic political power configurations and 
preferences exist. 
87 Scott E. Page, “Path Dependence,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (2006): 87. 
88 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004): 20. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments 
(New York: Free Press, 1967). Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A 
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on positive feedback, whereby traveling down a particular path produces self-reinforcing 
mechanisms that make it increasingly difficult to reverse course as time passes, because 
exit options become increasingly costly and therefore less appealing.89 Much of the 
theoretical work on path dependence and institutions focuses on how institutions allow 
more powerful actors to solidify their existing power advantage and maintain that 
advantage over time even as their power might later erode. For example, John Ikenberry 
argues that powerful states are presented with brief moments in history in the wake of 
hegemonic war in which they can take advantage of military victory to establish 
international institutions that lock in their power advantage for long periods of time, 
making short term sacrifices for long term gains.90 Thus, international institutions allow 
powerful actors to perpetuate their power even as it might decline. In the context of 
alliances between states and armed non-state groups, however, decisions made by 
political leaders about how they will manage a proxy alliance often produce the opposite 
path dependent process; they can lock states into power disadvantages despite their 
relative material strength.  
In particular, the choice to confer authority for alliance management on a 
particular organization can lock states into a relationship with that specific organization, 
which in turn has positive or negative effects on its ability to exert leverage over a proxy 
group depending on the factors discussed above (the amount of overlap between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the 
Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 251-267. 
89 Pierson, Politics in Time, 21. 
90 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding 
of Order After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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political leader and the bureaucracy, the level of oversight, etc.). Upon observing that 
bureaucratic agents are engaging in subversive or damaging behavior, why wouldn’t a 
political leader merely change agents? Indeed, this sometimes occurs. Indira Gandhi, for 
example, abruptly switched authority for managing India’s covert relationship with the 
rebels in East Pakistan in 1971 from one arm of the security apparatus (the Border 
Security Force) to another (the Indian Army). More often than not, however, political 
leaders stick with the original bureaucracy they chose to manage a proxy alliance, even if 
the relationship begins to sour. I claim that this is in large part because imbuing a 
particular organization or bureaucracy with the authority to manage a proxy alliance 
produces path dependent effects. It creates vested interests in the perpetuation of the 
proxy alliance independent of the strategic or domestic political context in which it was 
established. Specifically, the choice to endow a particular organization with considerable 
authority and resources, and minimal oversight, empowers that bureaucracy and allows 
bureaucrats to developed entrenched interests. Most of the time, political leaders do no 
create de novo organizations to manage a proxy alliance (although they could create sub-
organizations within existing ones). Rather, leaders choose among an array of 
organizations that already exist within the security sector (intelligence, paramilitary, 
military, and police organizations) to oversee a proxy alliance. This is because there are 
extremely high startup costs associated with creating new organizations and institutions 
to manage a proxy alliance. Existing organizations within the security sector have already 
invested significant resources in building and maintaining the infrastructure necessary to 
manage and oversee a relationship with a proxy group (communications infrastructure, 
skills and personnel necessary for training militant groups, logistics, etc.). They may also 
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have a monopoly on certain highly specific and difficult to procure or produce resources 
(e.g., advanced military hardware). These high startup costs mean political leaders will 
usually opt to grant additional authorities to an existing organization rather than start a 
new one. They also mean political leaders are likely to get locked into certain 
relationships because the costs of exiting become increasingly high as these organizations 
establish connections with proxy groups and build or expand infrastructure to manage the 
transfer of resources, skills, and information from the state to the proxy. Thus, “the 
entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice.”91  
The timing of alliance formation interacts with a state’s alliance management 
choices, specifically the institutional decisions made by bureaucracies. In particular, 
whether alliance onset occurs in the initial stages of a proxy group’s organizational 
development, or once the group has already been established, affects a state’s ability to 
shape the organizational trajectory of its non-state allies. Specifically, states have an 
opportunity to exert a deeper form of influence over their proxies—actually shaping 
proxies’ preferences rather than behavior—if alliance formation occurs during the 
incipient stages of a group’s existence. This is analogous to Steven Lukes’ conception of 
the third face of power; by playing a large, even hegemonic role, in the development of a 
proxy group’s organizational development, a state can affect how the proxy conceives of 
its own interests (in a way that is more aligned with those of the state).92 Alliance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and 
Historical Analysis,” in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative 
Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997): 28. 
92 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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formation in the early years of a non-state group’s existence provides the state with the 
opportunity to invest in its ally’s organizational structure (e.g., training, recruitment and 
political/ideological indoctrination). States continue to see returns from this early 
investment years into the alliance because it increases the size of the overlapping policy 
space between the two actors. In other words, alliance formation in a proxy’s early years 
coupled with significant institutional investment can actually shape the proxy group’s 
policy preferences to make them more in line with those of the state. 
A state’s relationship with its security apparatus and, by extension, its proxy ally, 
is not perfectly rigid; actors are not locked into certain power arrangements forever, but 
they are constrained by the prior trajectories of their relationships. Major exogenous 
events can create moments of opportunity in which states can alter the existing 
institutional configurations. In particular, exogenous shocks that provide states with the 
political capital to override entrenched bureaucrats can allow states to extricate 
themselves from a vicious path. For example, when Assad assumed power in Syria in 
1970, he reversed years of a fractured security sector that had allowed the PLO to 
cultivate close and independent relations with various bureaucrats. While some states are 
able to alter their paths, doing so does not come without costs. Non-state groups that have 
long enjoyed autonomy vis-à-vis their state allies are unlikely to accept major changes to 
the terms of the relationship without resistance. Therefore, states must be willing to pay 
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Domestic Veto Players, Open Secrets, and Selection 
The argument articulated above—that the institutional arrangements and 
relationships between political leaders and organizations in the security sector affect how 
states manage proxy alliances and, therefore, the former’s influence over the latter—
raises potential issues of selection. In other words, what explains the institutional choices 
political leaders make? Why do some leaders select themselves into “good” institutional 
arrangements, while others select themselves into “bad” ones, and are the bargaining 
outcomes endogenous to the factors that propelled leaders to make these choices in the 
first place? Some of these choices may be epiphenomenal, where the impetus for 
selecting a path derives from factors about which we can't systematically theorize. For 
instance, some leaders might be more worried than others at the beginning of a proxy 
alliance about how they will manage their proxy for non-systematic reasons (they may 
have had prior problems with other proxy groups, making them more sensitive to the 
issue in general; they may have observed neighbors or allies experiences similar issues; 
they may just be smart leaders with foresight who make good decisions). Furthermore, as 
already implied by the discussion in the preceding section, how much leaders value 
plausible deniability over institutional control explains a large portion of these decisions. 
But there is also a related domestic political story that is largely neglected by existing 
accounts of proxy alliances and that moves beyond the simple plausible deniability 
narrative. Indeed, information and secrecy play a more complicated role in these alliances 
than previously understood. In particular, beyond calculations about the tradeoffs 
associated with plausible deniability, I claim that three variables factor into leaders’ 
decision-making: 1) the power and preferences of domestic political veto players; 2) how 
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much information has been revealed about the proxy alliance around the time of alliance 
formation; 3) political leaders’ institutional inheritance. 
To a large extent, political leaders’ delegation decisions are the effects of attempts 
to manage and anticipate the constraints posed by leaders’ domestic political 
environment. For any given policy, political leaders try to maximize their desire to 
remain in office and their own policy preferences on a given issue but, sometimes, these 
conflict. Specifically, domestic political veto players (on whom political leaders rely to 
remain in office, so that they can achieve desired policy objectives) may have 
dramatically different policy preferences on a particular issue than the political leader.93 
Indeed, the merits of proxy warfare are often highly contested political issues over which 
veto players typically have strong preferences. Domestic political veto players’ 
preferences could run in one of two directions. First, a political leader may prefer a more 
robust and expansive program of material support to a proxy group, while veto players 
may prefer to provide minimal support or eschew proxy warfare all together. Second, a 
political leader may prefer to refrain from a proxy alliance or provide only nominal 
amounts of support, while veto players may prefer a robust program.  
Why and when do the preferences of domestic political veto players matter? Veto 
players are important when they have policy preferences that are considerably different 
from political leaders; when they have the capability to act independently vis-à-vis a 
proxy group (either to cut off or limit the amount of support a political leader provides, or 
provide their own support); and when have some information about the existence of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 For a classic work on veto players, see George Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political 
Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and 
Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 3 (July 1995): 289-325. 
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proxy alliance or when the issue of forming one is generally part of a public political 
debate.94 It is important to point out, therefore, that not all proxy alliances are kept 
entirely secret from veto players or domestic publics. Plausible deniability, in order 
words, does not always imply complete secrecy; the existence of some proxy alliances 
can be known (alluded) to some actors outside of the political leader and security sector, 
but the alliance can nevertheless remain deniable if more specific details and provisions 
of the alliance remain hidden. To distinguish these proxy alliances from those that are 
entirely clandestine, I refer to the former as “open secrets.”  
Specifically, I divide the universe of cases of proxy alliances into two different 
types based on the extent to which they are secret. In the first type of proxy alliance, the 
existence of the alliance is entirely secret from actors outside of the political leadership 
and the bureaucracies managing the alliance. Of course, the existence of the alliance may 
eventually be revealed, but this occurrence would be unintended and undesirable from the 
perspective of the political leadership (however, the threat of revelation factors into 
leaders’ calculations, as will be discussed below). In the second type of proxy alliance, 
the existence of the alliance is known to some veto players or to the general population, 
but its specific previsions nevertheless remain secret. In some cases, involved parties 
refrain may accept the fact that the existence of the alliance is generally known, but 
refrain from directly acknowledging it or otherwise only make oblique and vague 
references to it. In other cases, political leaders may admit that the proxy alliance exists 
but do not divulge any further details about its specific provisions. These different types 
of proxy alliances are illustrated in Table 2: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 However, they factor into decision-makers’ calculations even if veto players don’t 
know about the existence of a proxy alliance. 
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Table 2: Types of Proxy Alliances 
 Existence of alliance is 
public 
Existence of alliance is secret 
Terms of alliance 
are public 
Public alliance (traditional 
interstate alliances, e.g. 
NATO).95 
(Void) 
Terms of alliance 
are secret 
Open secret (existence of 
the alliance is generally 
known but the terms of 
the alliance remain secret, 
e.g., Arab support for the 
PLO in the 1980s). 
Secret alliance (existence of 
the alliance and its terms are 
secret, e.g., American support 
for FNLA and UNITA in the 
1970s). 
 
All will be elaborated in greater detail below, opens secret alliances threaten to be 
doubly dangerous for political leaders. This is because when a proxy alliance is part of 
the political debate, decision-makers have to satisfy the preferences of domestic political 
veto players who now have some information about the policy. In some instances, 
political leaders may worry that they will pay domestic political costs for failing to be 
seen as sufficiently supporting a proxy ally if the latter has close connections with 
domestic political veto players or if political leaders have staked some of their regime’s 
legitimacy on an implied relationship with politically popular non-state groups.96 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 In theory, there could be public proxy alliances where both the existence of the alliance 
and its specific provisions are public, but empirically these cases are rare. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, at one point in time the proxy alliance between Syria and the 
PLO came close to resembling this. 
96 Larson, “Bandwagoning Images.” Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources,” 369-70, 
372-8. David, “Third World Alignment,” 233-256. Crucially, a political leader can be 
placed at a bargaining disadvantage only when powerful domestic political actors have an 
interest in the survival of the publicly known alliance. In other words, the mere fact of the 
existence of the alliance being known to the general public does not in itself create 
enforcement problems. The conventional wisdom is that states generally prefer to 
maintain a reputation for following through on their threats and promises; if adversaries 
and allies doubt a state’s credibility, the state might find itself being taken advantage of 
by adversaries in times of international crisis and abandoned by allies worried about the 
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example, the Assad regime in Syria used its support of the PLO and Palestinian 
nationalism to garner domestic political legitimacy. The PLO offered an important 
ideological asset to the Syrian regime because “the idea of Palestine and the plight of the 
Palestinian people [had] enormous emotional appeal at a popular level.”97 Therefore, 
Assad had to expend considerable political capital to intervene against the PLO during 
the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s when the group failed to comply with Syria’s 
demands that it cease military activities with the Lebanese National Movement against 
the Lebanese government.98 Similarly, in the 1980s UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, was 
able to use U.S. domestic politics and support from conservative elements in Congress 
and the media to his advantage in negotiations with Ronald Reagan concerning aid to 
UNITA, because he knew Reagan’s base was more staunchly supportive of UNITA than 
the President himself.99  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
state’s reliability. These concerns dominated U.S. foreign policy deliberations during the 
Cold War (see, e.g., Schelling, Arms and Influence; Jervis and Snyder, Dominoes and 
Bandwagons). It has also been asserted that political leaders are generally concerned with 
their domestic political reputations for following through on terms of agreements. James 
D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” 
American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-592. If these lines of 
reasoning were true, states would always be on the hook relative to their proxies. 
97 Aaron David Miller, “The Palestinian Dimension,” in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., The 
Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1984): 160. 
98  Itamar Rabinovich, The View from Damascus: State, Political Community, and 
Foreign Relations in Modern and Contemporary Syria (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 
2008): 175. Anoushivaran Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: 
Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (New York: Routledge, 1997): 64-6. 
99 George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation: United States’ Policy Toward Angola 
Since 1945 (London: Pluto Press, 1997): 120-131. Elaine Windrich, The Cold War 
Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi, The United States Media, and The Angolan War (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1992).  
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I argue that delegation strategies political leaders choose are in part functions of 
their attempts to placate the desires of domestic political veto players while also ensuring 
they achieved desired policy objectives. Specifically, political leaders choose how much 
authority to delegate to bureaucratic actors within the state based on the constraints 
imposed by domestic political veto players. Delegating significant authority to 
bureaucratic agents within the executive, under certain conditions, allows political leaders 
to keep alliance management decisions away from veto players who may have significant 
differences in policy preferences on the issue at hand. However, political leaders are also 
operating in the context of certain inherited institutional and bureaucratic arrangements 
over which they may have more or less control. Therefore, political leaders often find 
themselves steering between Scylla and Charybdis—trying to insulate themselves from 
domestic political veto players who could obstruct or undermine their policy goals, while 
also forced to work with entrenched bureaucracies with their own interests and 
motivations.  
In the context of proxy alliances, divergent policy preferences on the part of 
domestic political veto players raise two different types of concerns for the political 
leader, depending on the content of those preferences. First, if veto players are more 
hawkish in their stance toward the proxy, political leaders may be concerned that the 
former will create the conditions for the political leader to get drawn into more expansive 
involvement in support of the proxy. Second, if veto players are more dovish in their 
stance toward the proxy, political leaders may worry that the former will take action to 
cut off support or otherwise limit the leader’s maneuverability.  
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These different concerns suggest different delegation strategies. But these 
strategies are also influenced by the extent to which information about the proxy alliance 
has already been revealed. In some cases, the existence of the proxy alliance is kept 
secret from veto players. This could occur in two ways. First, at the time political leaders 
are contemplating alliance formation, veto players could be entirely ignorant and not 
privy to any part of the policy debate. In this case, political leaders are making decisions 
about delegation strategies based on anticipations about how veto players might behave if 
such information were to be revealed. For example, the Ford administration’s decision to 
support the FNLA and UNITA in Angola in 1975 was entirely secret—it was not part of 
the public debate and Congress was kept in the dark. Second, there could be public 
debate about the merits of forming a proxy alliance, but the fact that the political leader 
has decided in the affirmative is kept secret. In this case, political leaders have better 
information about how veto players may behave (whether they may be more 
obstructionist or push for more involvement). For example, there was widespread public 
debate during the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971 about how India should respond, but 
Indira Gandhi managed to keep her decision to support the Mukti Bahini secret until 
India’s direct intervention in the winter of that year. In both of these worlds, political 
leaders have a bit more maneuverability because veto players remain ignorant about the 
existence of the proxy alliance. Therefore, political leaders can make decisions about 
alliance management in anticipation of how veto players might behave, while also taking 
steps to ensure they don’t find out about it.  
In some cases, however, the merits of a proxy alliance are a matter of public 
debate and political leaders cannot keep the formation of the alliance secret, what I term 
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an “open secret” alliance. For example, at the time the United States formed a proxy 
alliance with UNITA in 1986, there was not only significant public debate (indeed, 
pressure) about supporting Savimbi, but Reagan essentially announced that his 
administration would be aiding the group. This world is particularly difficult for political 
leaders because they have to prevent veto players, who may have significant policy 
disagreements with the leader, from exercising their veto, under conditions in which said 
veto players already have signification information about the policy. It is too late, 
therefore, for the political leader to simply hide the existence of the alliance from veto 
players. However, political leaders can strategically use delegation decisions to keep veto 
players as far away from a proxy alliance as possible—they can delegate significant 
authority for alliance management to intelligence organizations or other secretive 
bureaucracies within the executive that lack accountability. In this way, by relinquishing 
control and authority to bureaucracies governed by covert laws, political leaders can 
shield decisions about a proxy alliance from veto players (while also providing lip service 
to veto players by disclosing small pieces of information about the proxy alliance to keep 
them placated). In other words, paradoxically, political leaders retain greater control of 
the direction of a policy by relinquishing control to a covert bureaucracy. Of course, this 
runs the risk of enabling powerful bureaucratic actors, who may also be motivated by 
interests that run counter to those of the policymaker. 
This suggests several empirical implications. In an entirely secret world, when 
veto players have policy preferences that are significantly more hawkish than those of the 
political leader, the latter is incentivized to refrain (if possible) from delegating 
significant authority for alliance management. While political leaders may fear that 
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revelation of the program will prompt hawks to push the leader into taking more 
expansive action, independently motivated bureaucracies represent a bigger and more 
immediate threat because veto players don’t know the proxy alliance exists. When veto 
players have more dovish preferences, however, political leaders are incentivized to 
delegate authority so they can give a free reign to bureaucrats to achieve as much as 
possible without veto players finding out. In an open secret world, however, regardless of 
whether veto players have hawkish or dovish preferences, political leaders are uniformly 
incentivized to delegate significant authority for alliance management to bureaucrats to 
sequester the policy from veto players, either to prevent veto players from intervening to 
cut off support to proxy groups, or taking independent action to draw the state into an 
even more expansive role. This situation, however, presents a particularly acute problem 
for policymakers if the preferences of bureaucrats and veto players align—if both are 
hawkish, political leaders will find themselves pressed from both sides to ramp up 
support for a proxy group.  
All of these choices are mediated by political leaders’ institutional inheritance, 
which limits the decision-making leeway political leaders enjoy. My theory identifies a 
strong tension between imposing tight, institutional controls on the one hand, and 
ensuring plausible deniability on the other. Actions that enhance institutional control 
often undermine plausible deniability. Perhaps a bigger problem, however, is that, in 
most cases, political leaders lack maneuverability on the former front. In addition to 
responding strategically to the incentives posed by the domestic political context in which 
political leaders are embedded, leaders also must contend with an institutional inheritance 
that afford them more or less choice in terms of delegation strategies. Much of the time, 
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political leaders inherent previously delegated relationships, according to which 
bureaucracies operate consistent with standard operating procedures and whatever the 
bureaucracies see as their mission and interests (recognizing that a bureaucracy’s 
delegated mission may not necessarily be in its interests). In other words, political leaders 
face decisions about alliance management in institutional contexts that they have already 
inherited from prior administrations or past decisions. In fact, in many cases political 
leaders do not even make decisions about to which bureaucratic actor it will delegate 
authority for alliance management or the extent of the latter’s authority because such 
relationships have already been delineated and codified (for example, in the United 
States, Title 50 of the U.S. code explicitly stipulates the relationship between the 
President and the CIA and the required oversight of the latter by the President and 
Congress).  
When political leaders assume office, they often inherit a vast security apparatus 
with preexisting bureaucratic actors (with their own entrenched interests and 
prerogatives) and authority relationships. Therefore, the ability of political leaders to 
make smart, strategic decisions about alliance management can be quite limited by the 
existing institutional and bureaucratic arrangements—unless leaders are willing to pay 
high costs for reforming, disbanding, and/or changing institutional arrangements. 
Therefore, while principals do select themselves into proxy alliances, they do not usually 
select themselves into particular relationships with bureaucratic actors (even if the 
domestic contexts suggests they should) because they simply can’t—they are too 
constrained by the institutional arrangements they inherit. 
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In the ensuing empirical chapters I explore some exceptions that prove the rule—
cases where political leaders were willing and able to strategically optimize their 
relationships with various bureaucratic actors. In these cases, political leaders created the 
conditions for their later “smart” institutional decision-making by consolidating power in 
themselves following major tumultuous events (e.g., in Syria, Hafez al-Assad’s coup). 
Typically, the events that allow leaders to consolidate power are exogenous. 100 
Furthermore, these efforts at power consolidation were the products of years of 
significant and costly institutional rearranging (indeed, institutional gutting). 
Nevertheless, in these cases political leaders do enjoy more flexibility to act strategically 
and make decisions about alliance management.  
All together, my theory suggests that a set of related factors account for political 
leaders’ bargaining disadvantages vis-à-vis proxy allies: the twin concerns of maintaining 
plausible deniability and satisfying/anticipating the behaviors of domestic political veto 
players, which together shape leaders’ delegation strategies; and the interests and 
motivations of the various actors to whom political leaders delegate authority for alliance 
management (in particular, the bureaucracies within the security sector). At its core, 
therefore, this is a story about domestic politics and calculations about political survival 
and expediency on the part of the political leader. Therefore, my theory stands in stark 
contrast to the basic logic of the alternative explanation, the interstate alliance politics 
literature, which focuses on non-domestic, strategic, and more structural variables. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Although, interestingly, the Black September debacle and Syria’s bungled attempt to 
rescue Palestinian militants in Jordan in 1970 played a large role in creating the 
conditions for Assad’s coup. This is perhaps the one case where one can make the 
argument that Assad specifically established certain institutional arrangements to mitigate 
Arafat’s ability to draw Syria into further entanglements. 
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Regime Type, State Capacity, and Problems of Delegation 
 In the above discussion, I identified the causal mechanisms through which states 
lack leverage over their proxy groups (delegation decisions, especially due to 
bureaucratic agency loss) and the reasons why states make poor delegation decisions 
(plausible deniability and domestic political veto players). Together, these raise the 
questions: Under what structural conditions should we expect to observe these 
mechanisms? When are problems associated with bureaucratic and domestic politics 
more or less acute? Addressing these questions will provide observable implications that 
can be tested in the ensuing empirical chapters. I argue that variation along two 
dimensions—regime type and the capacity of the central government—constitute the 
conditions under which delegation problems are more or less acute.  
 The universe of cases of proxy alliances is comprised of states of varying 
capacities and regime types. However, while all of these states face broadly similar 
incentives for allying with non-state groups, the strength of the central government and 
whether it is democratic or autocratic shapes the severity of the problems political leaders 
encounter with domestic political veto players and bureaucracies.101 Nearly every state 
confronts problems associated with bureaucratic agency loss or slippage, and almost all 
political leaders are accountable to some (even small) set of domestic political veto 
players. However, the severity of these problems varies, with important implications for 
bargaining power. Furthermore, the causal mechanisms that underlie the theory operate 
slightly differently in autocratic regimes than in democratic ones, for reasons that will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 There is an extensive literature debating the merits of conceptualizing regime type as a 
dichotomous (versus continuous or tricotomous) variable. While this debate is important, 
for the purposes simplicity I employ the dichotomous conceptualization of regime type.   
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outlined below. Finally, for the purposes of hypothesis testing, it is more difficult to 
obtain reliable information about decision-making process concerning delegation in 
autocratic states. 
 State capacity is a broad concept, but for the purposes of this dissertation I focus 
on a very narrow conceptualization of capacity (this distinguishes my argument from 
other arguments in the literature that define state capacity in terms of raw material 
capabilities or power). Specifically, I use the term state capacity to refer to the existence 
of veto players with the capacity to independently support a proxy ally. What matters 
here is the penetration of authority (versus fragmentation), rather than basic indices of 
material strength. When central governments are weak, veto players pose a real threat to 
the political leader because they can run independent policies (in extreme cases, fight 
their own proxy wars) if political leaders don’t play by their rules. Veto players are still 
important when central governments are strong—they can raise the political costs to 
leaders of not following their preferences—but they have a different (and less severe) 
effect on political leader’s calculations and, therefore, their bargaining power. While a 
weak central government has uniformly poor effects on a political leader’s bargaining 
power, the effects of having a strong state with a strong institutional capacity are 
conditional on regime type. This is because of the varying ways in which government 
capacity is centralized. In strong autocratic states, institutional control is highly 
centralized and subordinated to the political leader, and veto players can’t pursue 
independent policies, making the problems associated with grappling with the 
bureaucracies tasked with alliance management minimal. Conversely, in strong 
democratic states, while veto players are not empowered to pursue independent policies 
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(in the United States, for example, while Congress can authorize military action, it is only 
the Executive who can actually run a proxy war), because institutional control is typically 
more decentralized in democracies, democratic leaders have to contend with powerful, 
more independent bureaucratic organizations, making problems of bureaucratic control 
more acute in strong democratic versus strong autocratic states. 
 The effects of poor central government capacity are also conditional on regime 
type. Notably, the balancing act in which political leaders are engaged between satisfying 
domestic political veto players and bureaucracies within the security sector works in a 
qualitatively different way in autocratic states because, most of the time, the 
bureaucracies in the security sector are also the veto players. The security sector in 
autocratic states can literally veto an autocrat’s policies by overthrowing him in a coup. 
In strong autocratic states, this fact is minimally important because the political leader 
has imposed a hegemonic control over the bureaucracy. However, this becomes 
particularly problematic in weak autocratic states. In these cases, veto players (who are 
also the bureaucracies in the security sector) are capable of taking independent action 
(not only because the state is weak, but also because these organizations, by virtue of 
being in the security apparatus, literally have the capacity to fight their own proxy wars), 
and this is exacerbated by the poor penetration of the central government and lack of 
institutional control. Conversely, in weak democratic states, while the existence of veto 
players with the capacity to act independently presents problems for political leaders, the 
fact that these actors are separated from the bureaucratic organizations in the security 
sector to whom the political leader is delegating authority for alliance management 
provides the political leader with some room to maneuver and balance the considerations 
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of each set of actors against the other. Together, the empirical observations that follow 
from the combination of these two structural variables (regime type and state capacity) 
can be organized in a 2x2 table: 
Table 3: Effects of State Capacity and Regime Type 
 Democracy Autocracy 
Strong state Veto players can’t take 
independent action, but 
bureaucratic problems are 
more acute because political 
leaders face independent, 
entrenched bureaucracies. 
Veto players can’t take 
independent action and 
bureaucratic organizations 
are subordinated to the 
autocrat. Problems are least 
acute. 
Weak state Veto players can take 
independent action, and 
political leaders also have to 
encounter independent 
bureaucracies. Problems are 
more acute. 
Veto players and 
bureaucrats are the same; 
they can take independent 
action and are 
independently powerful. 
Problems are most acute. 
 
These expected empirical observations can also be displayed as a spectrum, from most 
acute bargaining problems to least acute as a function of the combination of regime type 
and state capacity, as shown in Diagram 1: 
Diagram 1: Severity of Bargaining Problems by Regime Type and Capacity 
 
 
 In sum, my theory postulates that bargaining power between a state and proxy 
group is driven largely by decisions made by a state’s political leader about alliance 
management, specifically, how much authority the leader delegates to bureaucratic 
organizations (usually in the security sector) and how motivated they are to act in support 
of the proxy group. Leaders make these delegation decisions both to preserve plausible 
Least severe Most severe 
Strong autocracy Strong democracy Weak democracy Weak autocracy 
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deniability as well as respond to or preempt the preferences of domestic political veto 
players. Finally, the theory identifies the structural conditions under which we should 
expect these delegation and veto player problems to be more or less severe, which are a 
function of regime type and government capacity. 
 
Alternative Explanation: The Interstate Alliance Politics Literature 
There is a classic and longstanding literature that explores patterns in influence in 
the context of interstate alliances. While there are different specific enumerations of 
theories that purport to explaining alliance bargaining dynamics, the literature is united in 
identifying two broad variables that account for different outcomes: allies’ relative 
dependence on the alliance, and the comparative intensity of interests at stake. These two 
factors affect leverage by contributing to an actor’s ability to credibly threaten to walk 
away from the bargaining table, or stand firm to achieve a more favorable outcome.    
The ability to credibly reject a bargain (and walk away from the table) confers 
bargaining power because it signals that an actor has less to lose if a cooperative outcome 
is not reached, thus forcing the other side to accept a less desirable agreement. Therefore, 
whichever side needs the alliance more is at a bargaining disadvantage. Put simply by 
Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, the primary source of bargaining power in an alliance is 
one’s “relative dependence on the alliance.”102 Snyder elaborates on this concept, arguing 
that bargaining power is a function of “the amount of harm allies can do to each other by 
deserting the partnership or failing to live up to expectations of support,” or “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Snyder and Diesing, Conflict, 130. 
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opportunity cost of terminating [an alliance].”103 In general, one might expect states to 
have an advantage at the bargaining stage because non-cooperative outcomes—no 
alliance agreement—tend to be more costly for non-state groups. The interstate alliance 
bargaining literature typically operationalizes relative dependence in terms of the 
availability of viable alternatives.104 The absence of available alternatives makes it more 
difficult to credibly threaten to walk away from the bargaining table. Relatedly, the 
promise of specific assets that an ally can’t get elsewhere decreases an actor’s ability to 
reject an offer. Reaching a cooperative agreement becomes more palatable if an ally is 
promising to contribute something an actor values highly, such as a territorial base in a 
geographically important area or a critical weapons system, and can’t get elsewhere.105 
While there are some specific skills non-state groups can provide to states, such as access 
to a denied space, states with significant material resources can promise to provide 
substantial and potentially game-changing assets to proxies. 
In some cases, allies are mutually and equally dependent on one another. In other 
words, they are playing a game of chicken in which the costs of mutual defection (some 
form of alliance failure) are equally high for both parties. In this set of cases, having 
greater interests at stake—the “comparative intensity of [allies’] interest in the issue that 
is the object of the bargaining”—enhances an ally’s bargaining position because it can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 31, 166. 
104 Stephen Walt also notes, “aid is more likely to yield some leverage for the donor when 
the recipient is especially needy and when alternatives are unavailable.” Walt, Origins of 
Alliances, 238.  
105 This parallels James Davis’ argument that promises are most effective when actors are 
operating in a domain of losses. James Davis, Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of 
International Influence (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
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credibly commit to standing firm and force its ally to back down.106 When one ally has 
more at stake, it will “bargain harder to ensure that [its] interests are protected.”107 
Similar dynamics have played out in alliance bargaining between asymmetrically 
powerful states, where “superpower(s)…[have not] been able to prevent client states from 
taking independent action in what clients regard as their internal affairs….The reason is 
simple: such issues are far more important to the client than they are to the patron, 
especially when they are perceived as vital to the survival of the regime itself.”108 In this 
context, a weaker ally gains “bargaining leverage if its situation is so grim that it will 
have to desert its ally—or collapse—unless the [stronger ally] provides greater assistance. 
Vulnerability then can be a bargaining asset, but only if the other needs the state.”109 It is 
often the case that proxies have greater interests at stake than states, because proxies are 
usually fighting for organizational survival.110    
Beyond these two variables, it is worth noting that time horizons have also been 
hypothesized to affect bargaining power, although this is more extensively probed in the 
general bargaining rather than the alliance politics literature. Time horizons, however, are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106  Snyder, Alliance Politics, 171. For a classic discussion of brinkmanship, see 
Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 200. 
107 Walt, Origins of Alliances, 44. 
108 Ibid., 239. 
109 Jervis, System Effects, 195-6. 
110 Importantly, however, at the individuals (rather than the group) level, there might be 
variation in the interests at stake of members and leaders of proxy groups. Some 
individuals may have exit options that do not involve death or other similarly bad 
outcomes. The assumption that proxies usually have greater interests at stake than states 
is of course a broad and general one that may require caveats when applied to particular 
cases.  
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related to an actor’s ability to credibly stand firm and wait for a better bargain. Time 
horizons involve tradeoffs between short- and long-term costs and benefits and are 
function of an actor’s discount factor (patience), subjective value of the good, and how 
far the actor peers into the future.111 Actors who do not discount the future (those with 
considerable patience) are generally hypothesized to have a bargaining advantage 
because they can hold out for a more favorable offer.112 Similarly, the more value an 
actor places on a future good, and the further the actor looks into the future, the more 
willing it will be to sacrifice short-term losses for long-term gains.113 This is why James 
Fearon models bargaining between international actors as a war of attrition; whichever 
actor can hold out longer for a more appealing bargain wins.114 In many cases, states are 
less myopic than non-state groups because the latter are often faced with pressing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Ronald R. Krebs and Aaron Rapport, “International Relations and the Psychology of 
Time Horizons,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (September 2012): 530-1. 
112 The classic claim about time horizons is articulated by Robert Axelrod, who argues 
that a long shadow of the future—the expectation that actors will be bargaining with each 
other in the future—enhances incentives for cooperation in the present. Robert Axelrod, 
The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). However, others have 
noted that iteration rests on the assumption that actors expect to play the same game with 
one another over time. In fact, the game being played can change over time, making it 
difficult to anticipate how cooperation in one game today will affect cooperation in a 
different game tomorrow. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” 
World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 321. Furthermore, the shadow of the future can 
facilitate cooperation only if both actors believe they will be present in future rounds of 
bargaining. Bruce Russett and Miles Lackey, “In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There’s No 
Tomorrow, Why Save Today?” Political Science Quarterly 102, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 
259-272.  
113 Michael C. Horowitz, Rose McDermott, and Allan Stam, “Leader Age, Regime Type, 
and Violent International Relations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 5 (October 
2005): 668. Monica Duffy Toft, “Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist 
Explanations for War,” Security Studies 15, no. 1 (January-March 2006): 65.  
114 Fearon, “Bargaining,” 283-4. 
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immediate security concerns that force them to focus on short-term considerations.115 
Because states and non-state groups interact strategically, time horizons affect bargaining 
power when they are asymmetric; in other words, when the state has a longer time 
horizon than the non-state group, or the reverse.116  
While I do not claim that these factors are unimportant or irrelevant for 
bargaining power, they cannot account for a significant portion of the variation in the 
universe of cases of proxy alliances because, as I will demonstrate, the latter are 
characterized by a unique set of incentives and circumstances not captured by existing 
explanations. 
 
Methodological Approach  
 To test the explanatory scope of my theory compared to that of the alliance 
politics literature, I explore the sources of leverage and the means through which a state’s 
political leaders attempt to influence the behavior of their non-state proxies to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 This is not universally the case. Some non-state actors have considerably long time 
horizons, especially after crossing a critical threshold of organizational viability that 
allows them to focus on long-term objectives. Toft, “Issue Indivisibility,” 56. In many 
instances, however, non-state groups form alliances with states in the initial stages of 
their organizational existence when short-term concerns are paramount. Similarly, some 
states might be so focused on their current security environment or domestic political 
situation that they neglect to consider the long-term costs of allying with non-state 
groups. The literature on diversionary war and gambling for resurrection, for example, 
implies that some leaders are incentivized, due to domestic political vulnerabilities, to 
take extremely risky actions for short-term benefits. George W. Downs and David M. 
Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). H.E. Goemans, War and 
Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
116 Toft, “Issue Indivisibility,” 56. 
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advantage in a series of comparative case studies. Below I discuss the testable empirical 
predictions I derive from the competing theories; issues associated with conceptualizing 
and measuring the dependent variable; and my method for case selection. 
 
Hypothesis Testing  
 The causal logics of the interstate alliance politics literature and my theory 
suggest divergent empirical predictions. Rather than external factors to an alliance (e.g., 
alternatives), I claim that the core drivers of leverage are a state’s domestic politics and 
institutional configurations. In particular, we can derive three testable hypotheses that 
follow from my theory’s causal logic: 
H1: The less oversight and the fewer accountability mechanisms the 
political leader institutes over the actors to whom a political leader has 
delegated authority for alliance management, the less leverage the 
political leader has over a proxy group, conditional on the policy 
preferences of said agents. 
 
H2: The fewer command and control institutions the above agents 
establish to manage a proxy group, the less leverage the political leader 
has over the proxy group.   
 
H3: The greater the number of parties external to the executive and its 
associated security apparatus to whom the political leader (or his/her 
agents) delegates authority for aspects of alliance management, the less 
leverage the leader has over a proxy group, conditional on the policy 
preferences of said parties. 
 
Furthermore, my theory identifies the domestic political sources of these alliance 
management decisions, from which we can derive several additional testable hypotheses: 
H4: When domestic political veto players are more hawkish than the 
political leader and the proxy alliance is secret, political leaders will not 
delegate significant authority for alliance management to secretive 
bureaucracies within the executive.  
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H5: When domestic political veto players are more dovish than the 
political leader and the proxy alliance is secret, political leaders will 
delegate significant authority for alliance management to secretive 
bureaucracies within the executive.  
 
H6: When domestic political veto players are more hawkish or more 
dovish than the political leader and the proxy alliance is an open secret, 
political leaders will delegate significant authority for alliance 
management to secretive bureaucracies within the executive.  
 
Finally, my theory identifies the structural conditions under which these delegation 
problems (and, by extension, problems of alliance management) should be more or less 
severe, from which we can derive four additional testable hypotheses: 
H7: When a central government is strong and autocratic, delegation 
problems should be least acute.  
 
H8: When a central government is strong and democratic, delegation 
problems should be more acute. 
 
H9: When a central government is weak and democratic, delegation 
problems should be very acute. 
 
H10: When a central government is weak and autocratic, delegation 
problems should be severely acute. 
 
The alliance politics literature suggests different empirical predictions. While 
there is no single theory of bargaining power in the context of interstate alliances, as 
illustrated above, there is a foundational causal logic that unites the classic scholarship on 
this topic, namely, that bargaining power in alliances is driven by the relative dependence 
of allies on one another (which is a function of each actor’s access to viable alternatives 
to the alliance), as well as the comparative intensity of interests at stake in the alliance. 
The specific empirical predictions that follow from this logic can be arrayed in a 2x2 
table: 
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Table 4: Empirical Predictions of the Interstate Alliance Politics Literature 
 One proxy Many proxies 
One state sponsor Leverage is driven by the 
comparative intensity of 
interests at stake; proxy 
group should usually have 
the advantage. 
The dependence of multiple 
proxies on one state sponsor 
should confer an advantage 
on the state, which can play 
proxies off against one 
another. 
Many state sponsors The proxy should have the 
advantage because it can 
play its multiple state 
sponsors off against one 
another, while all of the 
states are dependent on the 
single proxy group. 
Neither should have an 
advantage; rather, alliances 
should disband when there 
are disagreements between 
any state-proxy dyad due to 
the multiplicity of 
alternatives. 
 
According to the alliance politics literature, therefore, we should expect to observe states 
and proxies using their access to alliance alternatives as leverage to induce allies to 
comply with their demands; or, in the absence of viable alternatives, attempts to tie hands 
or otherwise indicate commitment to standing firming and refusing to concede on the 
issue at hand. 
 
Measuring the Dependent Variable 
 There are inherent difficulties associated with measuring the dependent variable 
because leverage is unobservable. Rather than measure leverage directly, therefore, we 
can only observe phenomena that we would expect to follow from one side or another 
having a bargaining advantage. In other words, I assume that when one actor has greater 
leverage, it should be more likely to achieve an outcome that is more closely aligned with 
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its own preferences.117 More specifically, a state and proxy group may have differing 
preferences over a given issue. Assuming good information about these ex ante 
preferences, we can approximate which side has leverage over the other by comparing the 
observe outcome with the original preferences and assessing the proximity of the 
outcome to each side’s preferences. For example, states and proxies can have differently 
ranked preferences over whether and how a particular military action should be pursued, 
or whether the proxy and/or the state should accept a political settlement and what its 
parameters should be. If a state preferred a proxy to accept a political resolution to the 
conflict, while the proxy preferred to keep fighting, and we ultimately observe the proxy 
accepting a resolution, then we can infer that the state had leverage over the proxy in this 
case.  
It is important to note that this method of measuring the dependent variable 
(identifying issues over which states and proxies had competing preferences; looking for 
evidence of ex ante preferences; identifying the outcome; and assessing the outcome’s 
proximity to the original preferences) is only applicable when there are specific issues 
over which states and proxies disagree. Therefore, all of the instances in which they are 
in accord are not represented in the case studies. This raises potential issues of selection 
bias if one side does not even bother raising an issue with the other because it assumes 
that its bargaining disadvantage is so great that it has no chance of getting its way. 
However, there is no reason to assume that this would systematically censor the 
dependent variation in one direction or another.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 This implies that there is no uniform measure of the dependent variable across or even 
within cases. In other words, the issue over which actors are bargaining, and actors’ 
preferences orderings, will be different for each case and at different periods of time.  
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Case Selection Strategy 
 To test these competing claims, I select cases that vary according to both the 
structural variables identified as important by my theory (e.g., regime type and central 
government capacity)118, as well the variables identified as important by the alliance 
politics literature (e.g., alternatives and interests at stake) and the dependent variable. 
This ensures considerable variation along multiple dimensions. Furthermore, I 
specifically selected cases in which the alliance politics literature had clear empirical 
predictions—these should have been decisive cases for the alternative explanation—so 
that I avoid selecting cases that are easy for my theory to explain but difficult for the 
alliance politics literature to explain.  
I engaged in a two-stage case selection process. In the first stage, using the 
UCDP’s External Support Data, which contains data on external material support to 
warring parties in all intrastate conflicts between 1975 and 2010, I divided the universe of 
cases into four groups corresponded with the 2x2 table depicted in Table 3: cases where 
one state was sponsoring one proxy group; cases where one state was sponsoring multiple 
proxy groups; cases where one proxy was supported by multiple states; and cases where 
multiple states were supporting multiple proxies.119 Subsequently, for each of these cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 It is difficult to ex ante select cases that vary in political leaders’ alliance management 
decisions because it is nearly impossible to observe decision-making without engaging in 
substantial research. Therefore, for my theory, I select cases that vary according to the 
structural (and, therefore, more observable) variables. 
119 Therése Pettersson, “Pillars of Strength–External Support to Warring Parties,” in 
Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér eds., States in Armed Conflict 2010, Research 
Report 94 (Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet, 2011). 
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I identified the rough empirical prediction of the alliance politics literature, and then 
compared that prediction to the historical record. This provided me with an opportunity to 
select cases against which to test my theory where the alliance politics literature failed to 
predict the outcome as well as where it succeeded (this latter set of cases allows me to 
assess whether, when the outcome corresponds with the prediction of the alliance politics 
literature, we also observe the corresponding causal mechanisms expected by the alliance 
politics literature). To illustrate this process, Table 5 contains all of the cases in the 
UCDP dataset where one state was supporting multiple proxy groups. Therefore, these 
are cases in which the alliance politics literature would generally expect the state to have 
a bargaining advantage, because the state can play multiple groups off against one 
another, while the proxies do not have any other external sources of support and are 
therefore dependent on the one state sponsors. In fact, the predictive power of the alliance 
politics literature is not robust; the historical record often fails to conform to the 
expectations of the alliance politics literature.  
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Table 5: Selected Empirical Predictions from the Alternative Explanation 










Libya should have a 
bargaining advantage. 
Multiple insurgent groups rely 
on Libya for their primary 
source of material support, as 
well as a territorial safe haven.  
Prediction failure: Libya loses its proxy allies as 
previously factionalized groups unite and ally 
with the government against their state sponsor, 
effectively throwing Muammar Qaddafi out of 
Chad and imposing significant costs on the 








Sudan should have a 
bargaining advantage. 
Multiple insurgent groups rely 
on Sudan for their primary 
source of support. 
Prediction success: With Khartoum frustrated at 
the inability of proxies to achieve sustained 
military objectives, Sudan reaches an accord 









Pakistan should have a 
bargaining advantage. 
Multiple insurgent groups rely 
on Libya for their primary 
source of material support, as 
well as a territorial safe haven. 
Mixed result: On the one hand, the fact that 
there were multiple rebels groups among whom 
Pakistan could choose allowed the latter to 
dump the JKLF when it voiced a preference for 
an independent Kashmir. On the other hand, 
over time Pakistani support for Islamist militant 
groups in Kashmir has created a "sorcer's 
apprentice" phenomenon where those groups 
have become politically powerful within 
Pakistan and, while their goals have become 
more maximalist to the detriment of Pakistan's 











Pakistan should have a 
bargaining advantage. 
Pakistan supported multiple 
Sikh groups. However, while 
Pakistan was the only state 
sponsor of the insurgency, the 
Sikhs received support from 
the Sikh diaspora. 
 
Prediction Success: The Operation in Punjab 
was successfully carried out with relatively low 
cost for Pakistan and little risk. The Punjab 
insurgency ended when India erected a fence to 
cut off Punjab from Pakistani support. 













Shiite militant groups in Iraq 
received the primary source of 
external material support from 
Iran, although some groups, 
such as al-Sadr's JAM, had 
independent domestic political 
sources of support.  
 
Mixed result: Apparent success during the Iran-
Iraq war from Iran's perspective. Badr Brigade 
(armed wing of SCIRI), pledged an oath of 
fealty to Iranian supreme leader and was under 
direct command of IRGC/Qods forces. 
However, accounts of the post-2003 
environment in Iraq suggest that Iran is unsure 
of the loyalty of the Iraqi Shiite militias it is 
providing training and support to (they are more 
Iraqi nationalist).  
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Having identified the empirical prediction of the alliance politics literature for 
each case in the UCDP dataset that corresponds to each of four states of the world 
identified in Table 4, I subsequently selected cases that varied on dependent variable 
(e.g., whether or not a state possessed leverage over its non-state proxy), as well as 
whether empirical prediction of the alliance politics literature corresponds to or diverges 
from the historical record.  
In the second stage, from among those cases I identified cases that varied 
according to the two structural dimensions that are important for my theory, regime type 
and central government capacity. All together, this selection process resulted in the 
following six cases, illustrated in Table 6: 















































Strong No Yes U.S., Iran, 
Israel  
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It is important to note that, while both autocratic and democratic states engage in 
proxy alliances, exploring the sources of bargaining power in autocratic regimes presents 
a unique set of problems associated with the quality of information available to 
researchers (indeed, access to information is problematic for all of these cases precisely 
because covert alliances are designed to shield others, including researchers, from 
gaining information about their inner workings). While there is no theoretical justification 
for limiting the analysis to cases of democratic states engaged in proxy alliances, 
empirically the cases involving democracies contain substantially more and better quality 
information about the decision-making processes of political leaders than those involving 
autocracies. Therefore, the qualitative analysis of autocratic states can only test a more 
limited version of my theory and relies on structured, focused comparison rather than 
process tracing. This will be explained in greater detail below. 
The qualitative analysis is divided into two different types of cases: two in-depth, 
longitudinal case studies, and four mini-case studies. The first in-depth case study, the 
proxy alliance between Syria and several Palestinian nationalist groups, represents a case 
in which the historical record diverges from the expectations of the alliance politics 
literature. Namely, while Syria was the primary source of support for several Palestinian 
nationalist groups, it was nevertheless drawn into unwanted conflict escalation with 
neighboring states (Israel, Jordan) and costly interventions (Lebanon). Furthermore, there 
is considerable variation in Syria’s ability to control different Palestinian groups: while 
Syria enjoyed nearly ironclad control over As-Sa’iqa, it was consistently stymied by 
Fatah. The Syria case is also ideal for testing the macro link between the structural 
variables (regime type and state capacity) and bargaining outcomes because it contains a 
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significant discontinuity in the latter of these dimensions. Prior to 1970, a given political 
leader had poor institutional control and authority over the various members of the 
security sector managing the Palestinian proxy alliance, while after Hafez al-Assad’s 
coup in 1970 Assad successful consolidated control over the security sector and, in turn, 
Syria’s proxies. In other words, Syria moved from being an autocratic state with a weak 
central government to a strong central government, and we observe a subsequent shift in 
the bargaining power of the political leadership from one period of time to another. 
However, due to the limitations associated with testing the decision-making hypotheses 
of my theory in the context of closed, autocratic regimes, in this chapter I can only make 
broad claims about the causal mechanisms that link the structural variables with the 
observed outcome. While there is certainly extensive evidence in the case about the 
fragmentation and subsequent consolidation of the security sector and the political and 
ideological motivations of the leaders of those organizations, there is little primary source 
information about the specific delegation decisions the political leadership. 
In contrast, the second in-depth case study allows me to asses both the structural 
conditions under which we would expect to observe a loss of bargaining power, as well 
as trace the delegation decisions made be political leaders and link those decisions with 
bargaining outcomes. The alliance between the United States and UNITA during the 
1980s is a case in which the empirical record largely appears to conform to the 
expectations of the alliance politics literature, therefore affording me with an opportunity 
to engage in extensive process tracing to explore whether, despite the successful 
prediction, the causal logic of the case corresponds to the logic suggested by the alliance 
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politics theory or mine.120 In Angola, UNITA enjoyed the patronage of a variety of 
backers, including the United States, Zaire, and South Africa. Thus, the alliance politics 
literature would expect UNITA, the only rebel group operating at the time in Angola, to 
have considerable leverage over its sponsors. Indeed, the historical record dovetails with 
this prediction: UNITA’s leader, Savimbi, was able to draw the United States into 
increasingly greater commitments to the groups as well as undermine American foreign 
policy initiatives in the region without significant repercussions. However, careful 
process tracing reveals that it was Savimbi’s relationship with the CIA, as well as with 
the Conservative establishment within the United States, rather than his access to support 
from Zaire and South Africa, that buttressed his bargaining power over the United States. 
Indeed, even as Savimbi’s access to alternative sources of external support varied over 
time, the pattern of UNITA’s interactions with the United States remained constant. 
The set of four mini-case studies allows me to take an initial stab at assessing the 
generalizability of my claims, as well as explore four cases in which the alliance politics 
literature failed to predict the outcome. Specifically, I chose one case from each of the 
four states of the world identified in Table 4 in which the historical record does not match 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 For a discussion of process tracing and causal inference see, Stephen Van Evera, 
Guide to Methods for Studies of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997): 64-67. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005): 205-232. David 
Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44, no. 4 
(October 2011): 823-830. 
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Table 7: Case Selection for the Medium-N Chapter 
 One proxy Many proxies 
One state sponsor India-Mukti Bahini alliance 
in East Pakistan (1971) 
India-Tamil militants alliance in 
Sri Lanka (1983-1987) 
Many state sponsors Iran/United States/Israel-
KDP alliance in Iraqi 
Kurdistan (1972-1975) 
United States/Zaire/South Africa-
FNLA/UNITA alliance in Angola 
(1975-1976) 
 
 In the case of India’s alliance with the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan (what would 
become an independent Bangladesh) in 1971, the alliance politics literature would have 
expected the comparative intensity of interests at stake to drive bargaining between allies 
due to the fact that each actor was dependent on the other and lacked viable alternatives. 
This should have advantaged the Mukti Bahini because the rebels had far more at stake—
their survival—than India. However, India was able to use the Mukti Bahini to its 
advantage, sending rebels into East Pakistani territory to bleed the Pakistani Army dry 
until India felt it was sufficiently prepared for a direct intervention. Exploring the 
nuances of the case, however, indicates that an entirely different scenario was plausible 
had India Gandhi failed to change authority for alliance management from the Border 
Security Force to the Indian Army, which exerted far greater control over the Mukti 
Bahini. The case illustrates how the agency to which a political leader delegates authority 
for alliance management, and the distance between the agency’s preferences and those of 
the political leadership, has an important effect on leverage.  
 India’s experience in East Pakistan contrasts greatly with what transpired in Sri 
Lanka the following decade. Even though India sponsored several Tamil militant groups, 
which should have conferred a bargaining advantage, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi found 
themselves unable to contain one particular groups, the LTTE. In fact, even though 
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India’s objective in forming the proxy alliance with the Tamil militant groups in the first 
place was to contain the scope of the conflict and prevent a single group from becoming 
dominant, it ultimately contributed to the rise of the LTTE. LTTE militancy thwarted 
successive Indian efforts to peacefully resolve the Sri Lanka crisis, forcing India to 
intervene in 1987 to fight against its former ally. The LTTE’s close relationship with 
India’s intelligence organization, the R&AW, as well as with local political officials in 
the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, undermined the leverage of the central government. 
 The United States also experienced dramatically different outcomes in its alliance 
with the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan and UNITA and the FNLA in Angola in the 1970s. In 
the former case, despite the fact that the KDP enjoyed external sponsorship from several 
states (Iran, Israel, and the United States), KDP leader Barzani was unable to manipulate 
his external sponsors or cajole them into empowering the KDP to achieve its political 
objectives. In fact, the KDP’s longtime ally, the Shah, signed a secret agreement with 
Baghdad in 1975, abandoning and causing the near decimation of the Kurdish resistance. 
The United States, despite delegating significant authority for alliance management, was 
not drawn into unwanted conflict escalation because the local ally to whom it delegated 
such authority—Iran—maintained a viselike grip over the Kurdish resistance. 
 Finally, the United States’ covert alliance with the FNLA and UNITA in the 
1970s is a particularly interesting case because it serves as the exception that proves the 
rule. The alliance politics literature would expect that, in this case, neither side would 
have an advantage because each had access to multiple alternatives to the alliance: the 
FNLA and UNITA received external support from South Africa and Zaire, in addition to 
the United States, while the United States had two rebel groups between whom it could 
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divide its support. However, the stage was set in this case for the FNLA and UNITA to 
have considerable leverage over the Ford administration. Over the course of the (albeit 
short) duration of the alliance, the CIA continued to provide increasingly larger 
allocations of covert aid, despite the risk of conflict escalation. The case is an exception, 
however, because the alliance was abruptly dissolved when its existence was leaked and 
Congress passed the Clark amendment prohibiting and further covert support to the 
FNLA or UNITA. Thus, it presents an opportunity to speculate on the counterfactual 
scenario of what might have occurred had the program remained secret.        
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Chapter 4  
Syria and the Palestinian Juggernaut 
 
Introduction and Case Selection 
This chapter presents a first step at confirming broad, structural logic of the 
theory, namely, that a state’s regime type and the capacity of the central government 
affect its leverage over a non-state proxy through shaping the level of control a political 
leader has over the bureaucratic organizations in the security sector managing the proxy 
alliance. Problems of information-gathering in cases of autocratic states limit more 
detailed process tracing to substantiate my theoretical claims about the causal 
mechanisms that link structural conditions with decisions about alliance management 
and, in turn, bargaining outcomes. Therefore, in the next chapter (Chapter 5), I provide 
more fine-grained empirical support for my theory’s causal mechanisms, as well as the 
factors that lead political leaders to make certain decisions about alliance management. 
Furthermore, in this chapter I also explore broad motivations for proxy alliance 
formation, illustrating the dynamics discussed in Chapter 2.  
The alliance between Syria and Fatah (which later merged with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, PLO) from 1964 through 1976 is particularly fascinating 
because it exhibits substantial variation over time in the dependent variable, but in a way 
that does not correspond to variations over time across the critical independent variables 
for the alliance politics literature (especially Fatah’s access to alliance alternatives). 
Rather, the critical juncture in the case is Hafez al-Assad’s 1970 coup, the institutional 
changes to the security sector ushered in by that event, and the subsequent effects on 
Arafat’s ability to exert leverage over the Syrian regime by attaching himself to 
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sympathetic members of the security sector. In contrast, other groups over which Syria 
had remarkable institutional control, such as as-Sa’iqa and the PLA, which were formally 
incorporated into the hierarchy of the Syrian Army, displayed consistency in their 
relations with the Syrian regime and the ability of the latter to control the former.121 
These facts points toward the insufficiency of the alliance politics literature for 
explaining the sources of leverage in proxy alliances.  
The Syria-Fatah alliance is puzzling for several reasons. Most importantly, despite 
the fact that Syria was sponsoring a host of Palestinian nationalist groups, and therefore 
should have been able to play groups off of one another in order to control them, it was 
unable to manage its alliance with Fatah. Fatah’s activities dragged Syria into direct 
military conflict with Israel in 1967 and a botched intervention in Jordan in 1970 to 
rescue the group from the Amman’s efforts to destroy it. Furthermore, even during the 
relatively non-violent interludes in Syria’s relationship with its neighbors (especially 
Israel), Syria struggled to restrain and direct Fatah’s military activities; a particular 
source of contention was Fatah’s raids into Israeli territory and its persistent efforts to 
develop autonomous spheres of operation free from Syrian control. It was not until 
Assad’s coup in 1970, which ushered in decades of regime consolidation and stability, 
that the dynamics of the proxy alliance changed. Thus, the case illustrates the central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Henceforth, I will use the term “Fatah” to refer to the group both prior to and 
following its merger with the PLO in 1968. The PLO is an umbrella organization 
comprised of many different Palestinian nationalist groups (including groups more 
closely aligned with Syria, such as as-Sa’iqa and the Palestine Liberation Army). 
However, after Fatah and the PLO merged, Yasser Arafat, formerly the leader of Fatah, 
assumed the leadership of the PLO in February 1969, and Fatah remained the most 
important and powerful group in the organization. See Ghada Hashem Talhami, Syria 
and the Palestinians: The Clash of Nationalisms (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida 
Press, 2001): 91-2.  
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puzzle explored in the dissertation—why and how powerful states, such as Syria, get 
entrapped by their far weaker allies—as well as the conditions under states can begin to 
take steps to reassert their control over proxies. The Syria-Fatah alliance is a particularly 
difficult case because the enormous discrepancy in military capabilities between Syria 
and Fatah, the persistent weakness and fragmentation of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement, and the diversity of Syrian support for various Palestinian groups should 
suggest that Fatah would be a preeminently controllable ally.122  
The unit of analysis of the case study is the Syria-Fatah dyad, rather than the 
Syria-PLO dyad, because the PLO is not a single organizational entity, and the 
constituent groups that comprised the PLO were treated as separate, individual actors by 
Syria (and other Arab states). Prior to the 1967 war, the PLO and Fatah were separate 
Palestinian resistance groups. The PLO was formed by the Arab states at the 1964 Arab 
League summit in Cairo, which was convened to construct an Arab response to Israel’s 
diversion of the Jordan River. In creating the PLO, the Arab states sought to unify the 
Palestinian resistance. However, Ahmad Shukeiri, the first leader of the PLO, was viewed 
as a pawn of Nasser’s Egypt. It was not until the devastating Arab defeat in 1967 that the 
PLO became a true umbrella organization that unified most of the Palestinian resistance 
groups under one front. Fatah (which had begun military activities against Israel in 1965) 
joined the PLO in 1968 and Arafat replaced Shukeiri as head of the PLO (while 
remaining the leader of Fatah) in February 1969. The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Walt, Origins of Alliances, 238. 
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Palestine (PFLP), as-Sa’iqa, and a few smaller groups joined the PLO in 1969, and the 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine joined in 1971.123   
I treat the constituent groups of the PLO as separate organizational entities and, 
therefore, separate potential proxy allies. Although the PLO contains institutional 
structures which technically govern the political decision-making of the organization 
(e.g., the Palestine National Council, which is the legislative decision-making body of the 
organization, and the Executive Committee), all of the groups organized under the 
heading of the PLO retained their own organizational structure, leadership, and armed 
forces. In fact, sub-groups constantly challenged the leadership and authority of the 
decision-making bodies of the PLO (prompting the so-called “Rejectionist Front,” 
consisting of the PFLP and other groups, to break away from the PLO in 1974).124 The 
constituent groups of the PLO also had distinct recruitment patterns. For example, 
fighters for as-Sa’iqa were recruited through a draft imposed by Syria on Palestinians 
living in the country.125 Indeed, Syria’s relationship with different sub-groups of the PLO 
varied considerably. For example, as-Sai’qa and the Palestine Liberation Army (the 
military wing of the PLO) were simultaneously part of the PLO and formally integrated 
in and subordinate to the command structure of the Syrian Army.126 In contrast, Syria 
lacked the kind of command and control over Fatah that it enjoyed over as-Sa’iqa and the 
PLA. As I will demonstrate below, the variation in Syria’s institutional control over its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 John W. Amos II, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement 
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1980): 36-9. Tahlami, Syria, 91-2. 
124 Amos, Palestinian Resistance, 40-2. 
125 Talhami, Syria, 58, 91-3. 
126 Ibid., 86, 91. 
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different Palestinian proxies produced dramatically different results. In fact, Syria 
consistently used as-Sa’iqa and the PLA in its attempts to manage and control its 
relationship with Fatah, playing groups off against each other. The most dramatic 
example of this is Syria’s use of as-Sa’iqa and the PLA to fight against Fatah in Lebanon, 
despite the fact that all groups were members of the PLO.127   
Despite Syria’s alliances with multiple Palestinian resistance groups, in this case 
study I focus on the Syria-Fatah alliance as the unit of analysis for policy and pragmatic 
considerations.128 Because Fatah was the most important group within the PLO and 
Arafat was the most influential leader of Palestinian nationalism, the Syria-Fatah alliance 
it is the most policy-relevant dyad. 129  However, other Palestinian groups play an 
important role in the causal story through affecting Syria’s access to alternative proxy 
groups and, therefore, its dependence on Syria. It’s also important to note that, despite 
Fatah’s military strength, the other Palestinian groups (such as as-Sa’iqa) were viable 
alternatives to the group. At one point, as will be discussed below, as-Sa’iqa’s military 
strength rivaled that of Fatah. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985): 49-54. Hannah Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser 
Rural Notables, and Their Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 296-9. 
128 Nevertheless, when Fatah merged with the PLO and Arafat became head of both Fatah 
and the PLO, it becomes difficult to distinguish empirically between Fatah and the PLO, 
because Fatah was the most powerful subset of the PLO. Therefore, in later sections in 
this chapter I will sometimes use Fatah and PLO interchangeably, and will only 
distinguish between smaller subsets of the PLO and the PLO as an umbrella organization. 
129 Amos, Palestinian Resistance, 43. 
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Historical Background and Alliance Formation  
 The history of Syria’s alliance with Fatah is deeply intertwined with the broader 
history of the geopolitical competition among Arab states, between Arab states and Israel, 
and between Israel and the Palestinians. Prior to the start of the Fatah-Syria alliance, 
Syria provided material support, training, and a territorial safe haven to a number of 
Palestinian organizations following Israel’s victory in the 1948 war. These groups 
recruited among the large and growing population of Palestinian refugees in Syria.130 
Syria hosted the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), founded by George Habash in 1951 
(Habash would later become part of the PLO, and then break away to launch the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP, in 1967).131 Another group, the Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF) was created by Ba’th party and Syrian military elite in 1961 and 
was closely aligned with the state (it was led by Ahmad Jibril and Yousef al’Arabi, both 
of whom were members of the Syrian army).132 Furthermore, Syria also agreed to host 
the Hittin brigade of the PLA, which was the military wing of the PLO created at the 
1964 Arab League Summit in Cairo. Despite the PLA’s ostensible role as the armed wing 
of the PLO, the PLA was formally incorporated into the hierarchy and chain of command 
of the Syrian military. Syria even hosted Ahmad Shukeiri, the leader of the PLO, for a 
period of time, despite Syrian President Amin al-Hafiz’s misgivings about Shukeiri and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Talhami claims there were close to 100,000 Palestinian refugees in Damascus. 
Talhami, Syria, 85-6. 
131 However, due to the Nasserite inclinations of the ANM, the group was in a precarious 
position after the dissolution of the UAR in 1961 and Habash fled Syria in 1964 after a 
failed Nasserite coup (the Ba’th party accused Habash of being a coup co-conspirator). 
Talhami, Syria, 63-4, 93. 
132 Ibid., 86. The PLF later merged with the PFLP in 1967. 
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the PLO’s ties to Nasser and ambivalence about the PLO’s more moderate stance toward 
Israel.133     
 It is difficult to precisely date the official beginning of Fatah (some sources 
identify the group’s organization in Kuwait in 1959 as the formal establishment of the 
organization134), in part because the group’s original founders (Yasser Arafat, Salah 
Khalid, Khalil al-Wazir, and Faruz al-Qaddumi) operated in a number of Arab countries 
before settling in Syria in 1964.135 Prior to basing in Syria, Fatah members approached 
Algeria in search of support but were rebuffed due to Algeria’s relationship with Egypt 
(which at the time was supporting the PLO). Syria, therefore, was particularly important 
for Fatah—making Syria’s inability to control the group even more puzzling.136 Around 
the time Fatah members were rejected by Algeria, members of Syria’s military and 
intelligence organizations, including Colonel Ahmad Suwydani and Lieutenant Colonel 
‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, reached out to Arafat to form a proxy alliance.137 Indeed, even 
prior to the official formation of the alliance in 1964, members of the Syrian military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Talhami, Syria, 63-8, 70. 
134 Ibid., 64-5. As early as 1956 some elements of what would become Fatah organized in 
secret in the Gaza strip; in 1959 al-Wazir (a.k.a. Abu Jihad), one of the group’s founders, 
began to publish Fatah’s official magazine, Filastinuna, from Beirut. See Batatu, Syria’s 
Peasantry, 287; Cobban, Palestinian Liberation, 27. 
135  Amos, Palestinian Resistance, 48. Helena Cobban, Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation: People, Power, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984): 23-4.  
136 Cobban, Palestinian Liberation, 32. 
137 Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv, “On a Short Leash: Syria and the PLO,” in Moshe 
Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional 
Risks (London: Croon Helm, 1986): 193. This mutual seeking out of alliance partners 
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“began to organize, train, and plan missions for Fatah sometime in 1963.”138 Syria 
provided Fatah with weapons and a territorial base from which to train and direct 
operations.139 Fatah (specifically, al-Asifa, Fatah’s military wing) launched its first 
military action against Israel on January 1, 1965, which targeted an Israeli water complex 
(a major point of contention between Syria and Israel). At this time, Fatah possessed only 
26 militants; by the end of 1966 those numbers would reach 500, and grow to at least 
10,000 by the late 1970s.140 
 
Syria’s Motivations for Alliance Formation 
Syria faced three primary, overlapping sources of external threat and competition: 
1) threat from and strategic competition with Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey; 2) 
competition with Egypt, in particular, over which state would be the legitimate 
representative of the Arab world and the Palestinian cause; and 3) conventional material 
weakness relative to its primary competitor (Egypt) and adversary (Israel). Syria’s 
geographical position—situated at the center of the Middle East and sharing open borders 
with Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Israel but, initially, without strategic depth in the 
Levant—made the state particularly preoccupied with security concerns.141 This created a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Amos, Palestinian Resistance, 56-7. 
139 Talhami, Syria, 86-7. 
140 Ma’oz and Yaniv, “Short Leash,” 193. Estimates of Fatah’s numerical strength vary 
considerably and are in part a function of whether the numbers include both active 
combatants and non-military members, or only combatants. The figure reported here only 
takes into account combatants, see Amos, Palestinian Resistance, 57-8. 
141 Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of 
Middle East States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002): 144. 
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strategic context in which Syria would “either be a victim of those neighboring powers or 
[would] attempt to balance them through some combination of internal power 
mobilization and alliance formation.”142 Syria’s embarrassing defeat in the 1948 war 
highlighted the state’s conventional military disadvantage relative to its primary 
adversary (Israel), which would continue to plague Syrian leaders and serve as the 
overriding consideration in Syrian foreign policy making.143 Throughout the 1950s, Syria 
and Israel engaged in minor exchanges of fire across the DMZ and around Lake Tiberias, 
as well as reciprocal military raids and skirmishes in the 1960s.144 Syria was also 
threatened by Iraqi territorial claims and Turkish attempts to intervene in internal Syrian 
politics in the 1950s, which was further exacerbated by the formation of the Western-
sponsored Baghdad Pact in 1955.145  
Syria chose to respond to this external security environment by forming both 
proxy and interstate alliances. Allying with more radical Palestinian groups, including 
Fatah, allowed Syria to counter Egypt’s alliance with the more moderate PLO and claim 
leadership of the Arab fight against Israel.146 More importantly, Syrian leaders believed 
proxy alliances would allow Syria to effectively counter Israel’s conventional military 
superiority. Syria’s disadvantages relative to Israel were reflected in a September 1965 
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144 Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peace? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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internal Ba’th Party memorandum: “taking into account the existence of Israel, its 
growing economic, political and military strength…our present resources are insufficient 
for the requirements of a war of liberation…against the Zionist aggression.”147 To 
remedy this inferiority, some Syrian commanders (notably, General Salah Jadid and 
Hafez al-Assad) advocated immediate guerrilla warfare (using Palestinian proxies) as an 
alternative to direct Syrian confrontation with Israel. In a memorandum around the same 
time, the Ba’th Regional Command pushed for a guerrilla warfare approach: “It may well 
be that, as a state, we are unable, considering our present military capabilities, to liberate 
Palestine, but we are able to kindle the spark.”148 It is important to note that, beyond 
strategic calculations, Syria’s relationship with the Palestinians stemmed from important 
domestic political realities. Syria had to grapple with a large Palestinian refugee 
population following the 1948 war. Unlike in other Arab states, Palestinian refugees in 
Syria had significant political rights (comparable to Syrian citizens), served in the Syrian 
military and government bodies, and were afforded employment and educational 
opportunities.149    
However, while proxy warfare was an important component of Syria’s foreign 
policy, it was not solely dependent on proxies for carrying out its foreign policy 
objectives. Beginning in the mid-1950s Syria formed alliances with the Soviet Union and 
Soviet bloc states, receiving arms transfers and military advisors beginning in the mid-
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1950s.150 Soviet assistance would become increasingly important for Syria over time, 
especially during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.151  
   
Fatah’s Motives for Alliance Formation 
Fatah’s early years were fraught with risk and desperation. Following Israel’s 
expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948, Fatah needed financial support, help with training, 
and access to a base of operations from which to plan and train recruits. Fatah was 
incredibly small at the start of its operations. Fatah’s military wing, al-Asifa, had only 26 
members by 1965.152 Palestinian groups in general were dependent on external material 
support “from the earliest days of the revolution” because they could not seize weapons 
from their adversary, Israel.153 The groups were also highly dependent on the provision of 
external territorial bases because Israeli counterinsurgency operations were sufficiently 
effective to deny to the Palestinian groups safe havens within the Israeli territory. This 
meant that guerrillas “placed great emphasis on the importance of states adjacent to Israel 
as operational bases for conducting their people’s war,” especially after 1969.154 Syria 
was particularly appealing to Fatah as an alliance partner for strategic reasons: 
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For many [Fatah] thinkers, the alliance with Syria was seen then, and 
continued to be seen for some years, as an important strategic principle: 
they considered both Lebanon and Jordan as dangerously exposed to 
Israeli influence both direct and indirect. Syria, located strategically 
between these two states but still in direct contact with Israel, was thus 
seen as providing a pivotal rearguard base.155  
 
Syria was also ideologically attractive as an ally: the state adopted more liberal and 
welcoming policies toward Palestinian refugees living in the state, and took more radical 
stands regarding Israel than other Arab states, as described above. 
 Factors internal to Fatah’s organization also prompted the group to seek out 
external support. In the early years of the group’s formation, it was weak and 
decentralized, and lacked the organizational capacity to extract resources from the local 
population. 156  Fatah “lacked broad support either among Palestinians or the Arab 
masses.” 157  Fatah suffered from “ideological confusion and inconsistency” and an 
“organizational split personality.”158 This meant that resources necessary to carry out 
military operations against Israel had to come from external actors.  
 
Arms and Influence in the Syria-Fatah Alliance 
 The Syria-Fatah alliance allows me to assess the validity of my theoretical claim 
that a state’s regime type and central government capacity affect the severity of its 
delegation problems that, in turn, shape its influence and control over its proxy ally. The 
fact that significant change along one axis (central government capacity) is followed by 
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major change in the dependent variable provides confidence that the basic logic of my 
theory is sound.159 Furthermore, the fact that variation in the independent variables 
identified as important by the alliance politics literature do not correspond to variation in 
the dependent variable casts doubt on the applicability of alliance theory to proxy 
alliances. 
 To test my theory against the Syria-Fatah case, I employ a structured focused 
comparison of the time period prior to and following Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970. For 
each time period, I identify the observable implications of the theory; how the security 
sector (which, as is the case in autocracies, functions as both the veto player and the 
bureaucracy for both time periods) is organized and the level of control exercised by the 
political leader; the political/ideological preferences of the security apparatus; and the 
ensuing outcome. Within each time period under consideration, I identify specific 
instances in which Syria and Fatah had disagreements about appropriate policies over 
which they were bargaining, and then compare the actual outcome to the ex ante 
preferences. I find that, contrary to the expectations of the alliance politics literature, the 
primary determinant of Syria’s inability to influence the behavior of Fatah between 1964 
and 1970 stemmed from persistent and divisive internal power struggles among the 
various Syrian bureaucracies in the security sector (each of which had an independent 
capacity to funnel arms and train Fatah members) and the gulf between their policy 
preferences and those of the political leadership.160 I also find strong support for my 
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claim that these dynamics are sticky and path dependent, and are only disrupted when 
there are major exogenous changes.  
 
Delegation by Default: The Effects of a Weak Central Government 
Between 1964 and 1970, the Syria regime was beset by an extremely weak and 
fragmented central government. Successive Syrian presidents had poor control over the 
various bureaucracies in the security sector, and these organizations were independently 
capable of arming, supplying, and training Syria’s Palestinian proxies; in other words, 
they could run their own proxy wars. Furthermore, many of the leaders of the different 
security organizations were enthusiastic supporters of Fatah, providing support to the 
group even when it went against Syria’s interests and often without the knowledge of the 
political leadership. As predicted by my theory, this severe fragmentation had a 
deleterious effect on Syria’s ability to bargain with and have leverage over Fatah, despite 
Fatah’s extreme dependence on Syria. This lack of leverage is observable in two separate 
instances during this time frame: the lead up to the 1967 war and the Black September 
Crisis in Jordan in 1970. This section illustrates how decisions about alliance 
management operate in a qualitatively different way in weak autocratic states than in all 
other cases because delegation of authority occurs by default, rather than being the 
product of a conscious decision by a political leader.  
The alliance politics literature would expect that Fatah’s dependence on Syria in 
the early years of the proxy alliance would have afforded the Syrian regime significant 
leverage over its ally. Nevertheless, Syria was dragged into an incredibly costly military 
confrontation with Israel in 1967 due, in large part, to escalating Fatah guerrilla 
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operations launched from Syrian territory on Israeli soil. Syria was also drawn into a 
bungled intervention in Jordan in 1970 to rescue its Palestinian proxies. The Syrian 
central government’s extreme weakness—in particular, its institutional fragmentation and 
poor command and control by civilian political authorities over the elements of the 
security apparatus responsible for overseeing Syria’s relationship with Fatah—explains 
these outcomes. During this time period, there was a significant gap in policy preferences 
between different elements of the Syrian regime, specifically over the nature and timing 
of a war against Israel and the role Palestinian guerrilla groups would play. This eroded 
what should have been a Syrian bargaining advantage and provided Fatah with an 
opportunity to continue and intensify its military activities against Israel despite severe 
misgivings by members of the Syrian regime.161  
When the alliance between Syria and Fatah was formed, Fatah had few alternative 
sources of support, while Syria enjoyed access to multiple proxies. Syria was home to 
Fatah’s primary territorial base and was also its main source of support. By the time 
Fatah established a base in Syria in the early 1960s, Syria was already home to numerous 
Palestinian groups (including the PLA, which was conventionally organized and 
incorporated into the Syrian army, and the PLF, which was organized as a guerrilla 
force). Fatah found itself in a position of considerable dependence on Syria: its entreaties 
for a territorial safe haven in Algeria were rebuffed, and it possessed a paucity of 
resources and lacked skilled fighters.162 In 1965, al-Asifa, Fatah’s military wing, had only 
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26 recruits; with Syrian help that number would grow to 500 by the end of 1966. Al-
Asifa, was largely created, funded, armed, organized, and trained by members of the 
Syrian military.163 The Syrian military was responsible for planning, selecting the targets 
for, and leading al-Asifa’s military operations against Israel.164 With Fatah based out of 
Syrian territory, however, Syria became concerned about plausible deniability and Israeli 
retaliation for Fatah’s behavior, so the regime encouraged the group to move from the 
Golan into Jordan to stage attacks against Israel. The military was particularly concerned 
that Israeli reprisals and tit-for-tat confrontations would spiral out of Syria’s control. 
Indeed, the military had reason to be concerned; despite Arafat’s dependence on Syria, 
from the beginning of the relationship he resisted Syrian attempts to control Fatah’s 
activities. In particular, Arafat attempted to circumvent Syrian control over his 
organization’s activities by staging attacks against Israel from the Golan without Syrian 
permission, secretly smuggling unapproved resources into Syria, and assassinating other 
Fatah members with close ties to Syria. In May 1966, therefore, Assad, who had been 
promoted to Minister of Defense, jailed Arafat and a number of other Fatah leaders.165 
Interestingly, Fatah continued this type of behavior even as its more radical activities cut 
the group off from potential alternative sources of support. Nasser, for example, cajoled 
other Arab states into refusing to support Fatah’s more militant approach, thereby 
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denying Fatah alternative territories (in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan) from which to 
launch its raids.166  
Despite Fatah’s dependence on Syria, weak Syrian political leadership and poor 
control of the security apparatus gave Fatah the opportunity to take advantage of Syria’s 
fractious politics. In particular, members of Fatah were able to insulate themselves from 
punishment for rogue activities by cultivating relationships with different powerful actors 
within the security apparatus who shared the group’s political and ideological outlook.167 
This conferred bargaining power on Fatah because it made it difficult for Syria’s political 
leadership, or even other organizations in the security apparatus with a less-than-rosy 
view of the group, to credibly threaten to revoke support for Fatah or otherwise punish 
the group for undesirable behavior.  
Central government weakness and political instability were endemic to Syrian 
political life from the birth of the state in 1946 until the Assad coup in 1970. In 1949, 
Syria experienced three different military coups and was ruled by three different military 
figures: Colonel Husni al-Za’im, Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, and Colonel Adib Shishakli. 
Shishakli was overthrown in 1954 by a coup orchestrated by a group of Ba’thists, 
Communists, and Druze officers. Syria’s brief union with Egypt to form the United Arab 
Republic (UAR) from 1958 to 1961 provided a short respite from the cycle of coups, 
which resumed in 1961 with a September 2 coup to secede from the UAR. Between 
September 1961 and March 1963, a time period known as the Separatist regime, Syria 
was led by four different governments. While civilians technically ran the regime, the 
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Syrian military held de facto political power. Both the military and political leadership 
were divided between those who favored reunification with Egypt and those who 
opposed it. Additionally, civil-military relations were deeply contentious—there were 
four attempted Nasserite coups during the three-year period.168 Throughout this time 
period there was “no consensus among various separatist elites regarding such essential 
issues as the type of regime desired, the internal and foreign policy of the state, and the 
distribution of political and economic rewards among the elites.”169    
On March 8, 1963 a Ba’thist coup ushered in the Ba’th regime that, like the 
Separatist regime, lasted three short years until a Neo-Ba’th coup on February 22, 1966. 
Political and social fragmentation persisted under the Ba’th regime, with pervasive 
divisions between ruling elites within the Ba’th party, between Ba’th and other elites 
(especially Nasserites), and between the Ba’th and other socio-economic groups (most 
notably, the Islamic opposition). While the Separatist regime was technically civilian rule 
(with the military possessing de facto political power), the Ba’thist regime was explicitly 
military rule. The Ba’th party ruled through three institutions: the National Command, 
Regional Command, and the Military Committee. Despite the Ba’thification of the Syrian 
regime in July 1963, political elites remained deeply divided about core domestic and 
foreign policy issues.170 Internal disputes between elites in the Ba’thist regime often 
manifested as quarrels about foreign policy toward Israel. In general, Ba’thist elites in the 
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Military Committee and Regional Command were more hawkish on the Israel issue than 
President Hafiz and the National Command, as reflected in internal Ba’th communiqués. 
President Hafiz preferred to devote resources to building up Syrian (and Arab) military 
capabilities to eventually confront Israel on conventional terms.171 However, the Regional 
Command, especially Jadid (assistant Secretary-General of the Regional Command) and 
Assad (Minister of Defense) preferred to launch an immediate guerrilla war using 
Palestinian militant groups. These views were reflected in a September 1965 Regional 
Command Memorandum: “It may well be that, as a state, we are unable, considering our 
present military capabilities, to liberate Palestine, but we are able to kindle the spark…we 
should not be fearful of losing the battle before we have started it.172 
Conflict between the National and Regional Commands fueled persistent coup 
fears and led to multiple attempts by moderates to sideline more hawkish members of the 
Regional Command.173 Ultimately, the Regional Command overthrew Hafiz in a coup on 
September 22, 1965, but the more hawkish government was shortly overthrown on 
December 21 of that year by Hafiz and the National Command, who promptly disbanded 
the Regional Command.174  
 Persistent and disruptive internal power struggles among elites made conditions 
ripe for outbidding in the foreign policy arena, and the weakness of the central 
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government and the political leadership allowed individuals and bureaucracies to 
cultivate independent relationships with different Palestinian militant groups.175 Forming 
alliances with Palestinian groups was both a means of securing domestic political 
legitimacy as well as a crucial weapon in the elite contest over the Israel issue, with 
different elites in different commands solidifying relationships with different groups.176 
For example, ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, head of the security services, worked closely with 
the PLF, while General Ahmed Suwaydani, at the time head of military intelligence, and 
Assad supported Fatah.177 Specifically, while Hafiz was President of Syria, Assad, who 
was serving as the Defense Minister, secretly funneled military resources to Fatah in 
excess of those approved by the state without the knowledge of the civilian leadership.178 
On February 22, 1966 the Neo-Ba’thists, dominated by Assad and Jadid, launched 
another coup. While Nureddin al-Atasi was installed as the leader of Syria, he had poor 
institutional control over the security apparatus (the very groups that launched the coup 
that brought him to power) and Jadid, who was the assistant Secretary-General of the 
Regional Command, was widely accepted as the actual wielder of power in the state.179 
The Neo-Ba’thist coup did not solve Syria’s problems of a weak central government with 
limited authority over the security sector. Indeed, despite Assad’s decision to throw 
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Arafat in jail in the spring of 1966, General Ahmed Suwaydani, the time head Syria’s 
military intelligence organization, continued funnel support to Fatah without the 
knowledge (or approval) of the political leadership. Fatah’s attacks from Syrian territory 
into Israel continued unabated even after Arafat was jailed. Arafat was able to exploit the 
deepening rivalry between the two most powerful members of the security sector, Assad 
and Jadid, to his organization’s advantage.180 Jadid, who was more hawkish on the 
Palestinian issue, encouraged Arafat’s provocative behavior. Arafat secretly smuggled 
fighters across the border into Jordan, Lebanon, and Gaza, and in general used Fatah 
bases in the Golan to move fighters without the central Syrian government’s approval. 
While Jadid continued to escalate tensions along the Syrian-Israeli border, Assad, who 
was Minister of Defense, was deeply pessimistic not only about Syria’s own capabilities 
relative to Israel, but also about Egypt’s military preparedness and the prospects of real 
coordination between the two states if a conventional war were to break out.181  
The pace and scope of Palestinian military activities against Israel increased with 
the heightened tension between Jadid and Assad, even as Israeli retaliation against these 
attacks revealed Syria’s military weaknesses. Palestinian groups launched 38 guerrilla 
attacks inside Israel prior to the 1966 Neo-Ba’thist group, and 75 between the coup and 
May 15, 1967. During the Neo-Ba’th regime there were also 177 border incidents 
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between Syria and Israel. These often led to reciprocal skirmishes between the Israeli and 
Syrian air forces in which Syria was usually humiliated, including the shooting down of 6 
Syrian MiGs and the flight of Israeli warplanes over Damascus in April 1967. Palestinian 
guerrilla attacks into Israeli territory were major escalatory steps in the lead-up to the 
1967 war, and Syria’s political leaders Syria permitted these to continue from Syrian 
territory through June 1967—even though they knew the state was not prepared to wage a 
conventional war against Israel and that allowing continued guerrilla attacks would most 
likely draw Syria into a war it could not win—because the political leadership had little 
choice in the matter.182 The security sector, with the notable exception of Assad, was 
ardently pushing a guerrilla warfare approach against Israel, which depended on an 
empowered Palestinian resistance. In April 1967, just before the Six Day War, 
Suwaydani said: “Can we hope to overcome [Israel’s] forces on the ground, at sea and in 
the air? Certainly not…we must not, therefore, take the line of conventional warfare…we 
must take the line of popular liberation war.”183 Assad, however, recognized that the very 
strategy of pursuing a war of popular liberation could draw Syria into conventional 
military confrontation with Israel.184 Fatah’s ability to take advantage of the Syrian 
regime’s internal institutional fragmentation allowed the group to overcome its 
dependence on the state and draw Syria into conflict escalation with Israel. Indeed, as 
many in the regime expected, the 1967 war with Israel was extremely costly for Syria. 
Syria not only lost the strategic depth it had enjoyed in the Golan Heights, but also 
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suffered considerable civilian casualties and the disgrace of its military. Israel was able to 
destroy two-thirds of Syria’s air force within an hour of the initiation of hostilities on 
June 5 and, by the end of the war, the Israeli army was stationed only 40 miles from 
Damascus, the capital city was within range of Israeli guns, and Israeli settlers quickly 
began to populate the Golan.185 
Following the Six Day War, Fatah became less dependent on Syria as it cultivated 
other sources of external support (notably, from Egypt and Jordan) and began to gain 
domestic political legitimacy and power after merging with the PLO and taking the helm 
of that organization. Nevertheless, Fatah’s behavior did not change: it continued to 
launch raids into Israel territory and forced the Syrian military to intervene in Jordan in 
1970 to rescue the group following the Black September crisis. This ostensible leverage 
on Fatah’s part, however, cannot, be attributed to Fatah’s decreased dependence on Syria 
because the same behavior was observed during the prior time period when the group was 
deeply dependent on the Syrian regime. Furthermore, Fatah was not able to draw all of its 
external sponsors into intervening in Jordan—only the Syrians came to the group’s 
rescue. This provides strong support for my contention that it was the Syrian regime’s 
problems of weak central government capacity and internal institutional fragmentation, 
which continued in the post-1967 period, that explain the persistent pattern we observe in 
this time period.  
 In the wake of the disastrous Arab defeat in 1967, Fatah merged with the PLO in 
1968.186 Other groups followed in Fatah’s wake: in 1969, the PDFLP, as-Sa’iqa, and a 
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few other smaller organizations became part of the umbrella organization of the PLO; the 
PFLP did not join until 1971.187 Arafat secured the prominence of Fatah within the PLO 
when he was made head of the PLO in February 1969.188 In 1968, Fatah also moved 
some of its bases to Jordan and become more closely allied with Egypt, which had 
previously been wary of the more radical Palestinian groups.189 Thus, Syria had to 
compete for influence with other Arab states.190 Fatah also become less dependent on 
Syria as it gained popular support following its propaganda success against the Israelis in 
the 1968 Battle of Karameh.191 Fatah’s attacks from the town of Karameh, Jordan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of resources argument. I do not claim that resources do not matter. Rather, I argue that 
superior resources in themselves do not confer bargaining power on an actor and are not a 
sufficient explanation of observed outcomes. For example, Fatah possessed a bargaining 
power advantage both when it was weak (1964-7) and when it was stronger (1968-70).   
187 Despite being unified under one umbrella organization, there were still significant 
divisions between various factions of the PLO concerning the relative emphasis groups 
should place on Arab versus Palestinian goals, and the groups’ relations with Arab states 
in general, and the PLO never really turned into a cohesive organization. See Talhami, 
Syria, 92-3; O’Neill, Armed Struggle, 127. Fatah was also internally divided. For 
example, in September 1968 a faction broke away from Fatah to create the Popular 
Struggle Front (PSF). If anything, the Palestinians’ disunity, which contributed to the 
outbreak of the Black September crisis in 1970, inadvertently enhanced Fatah’s 
bargaining leverage because it forced Syria to come to the group’s aid. See O’Neill, 
Armed Struggle, 128-9. 
188 Talhami, Syria, 91-2. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was 
created on December 11, 1967. Initially, the PLF and the Organization of Arab Palestine 
were absorbed by the PFLP, but subsequently split from the PFLP on October 10, 1968. 
The PLF morphed into the Palestine Liberation Front General Command.  Also, the 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) split from the PFLP 
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   116	  
prompted Israel to launch an operation against Palestinian camps there. Palestinian 
guerrilla fought alongside forces from the Jordanian military. While the operation was 
largely successful for the Israelis from a tactical perspective, Arafat construed Israel’s 
withdrawal from Karameh as a major symbolic victory for the Palestinian resistance. 
Karameh was an enormous public relations coup for the group, which proceeded to 
attract many new volunteers and legitimized the claim propagated by Fatah that the fight 
against Israel could be won through armed resistance. The Battle of Karameh prompted 
thousands of recruits to join Fatah, allowing the group to grow significantly from its few 
hundred members in the years prior.192  
The central government’s institutional weakness and the deep divisions within the 
security sector concerning Syria’s Palestinian proxies, especially Fatah, continued 
unabated in the post-1967 environment. Indeed, the elements of the Regional Command 
and the Military Committee who were hawkish on the Palestinian issue prior to 1967 
become even more convinced of the centrality of an empowered Fatah that could fight a 
guerrilla war against the Israelis following Syria’s disastrous conventional defeat in 1967. 
For Jadid and al-Jundi, in particular, the fallout from the 1967 war implied that 
Palestinian guerrilla groups should be given even greater freedom of maneuver in the 
fight against Israel. Jadid funneled even greater resources to Fatah and encouraged 
guerrilla attacks from Syria into Israeli territory; from 1968 to 1970 Palestinian groups 
launched 734 cross-border attacks. Furthermore, the Operations Division of the Syrian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Talhami, Syria, 94-5. Amos, Palestinian Resistance, 57. 
	   117	  
General Staff helped Fatah establish bases in Damascus and near the Jordanian border in 
Dera.193  
But other elements of the security sector, particularly Assad, were increasingly 
concerned about Syria’s inability to manage Fatah and deeply skeptical about the kind of 
leverage groups like Fatah had over the state. These individuals sought to limit the 
influence and leeway of Palestinian groups by subordinating some, such as as-Sa’iqa, 
within the Syrian military. Assad blamed uncontrolled Fatah attacks against Israel for 
Syria’s involvement in the 1967 war. He also knew that Syria’s future was deeply 
intertwined with the Palestinian question—there were between 300,000 and 400,000 
Palestinian refugees in Syria; numerous Palestinian guerrilla groups were organized and 
operating in Syrian territory; and all of Syria’s post-independence wars largely revolved 
around the Palestinians. Therefore, the permissive attitude of some members of the 
regime, such as Jadid, toward the Palestinian groups based in Syria, especially Fatah, 
made Assad particularly worried that the saga of 1967 would be repeated. Assad, along 
with Mustafa Tlas, Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, expended considerable energies 
attempting to bring the various Palestinian groups in Syrian territory under Syrian 
control. It was Assad who spearheaded the move to formally incorporate as-Sa’iqa within 
the Syrian army’s hierarchy, and Assad and Tlas purged the military of officers who 
displayed unwarranted sympathies for the Palestinian groups.194 Over the years, as-Sa’iqa 
consistently proved to be a more reliable and controllable ally than Fatah.195 
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Fatah’s supporters held positions of power within the Syrian security sector. Jadid 
was a powerful member of the Regional Command and al-Juni headed the intelligence 
services. This suggests that Assad’s attempts to control or limit the activities of groups 
like Fatah were most likely rejected as not sufficiently threatening to change Fatah’s 
behavior. Indeed, despite Assad’s attempts to exert control over Fatah, Syria’s continued 
problems of institutional fragmentation continued to allowed Arafat to elude the kind of 
control Syria was able to impose on other group such as as-Sa’iqa. The most notable 
example of this is the Black September crisis in 1970. Although various Palestinian 
groups, including Fatah and the PFLP, had established bases in Jordan following the 
1967 war, they were in considerable tension with King Hussein’s regime because the 
groups effectively established a proto-state within Jordan and refused to subordinate 
themselves to Jordanian control. This led to numerous violent confrontations between 
Jordan’s military and Palestinian groups. While Arafat was more amenable to a peaceful 
compromise with King Hussein, the more radical groups within the PLO refused to 
comply and continued to flout Jordanian sovereignty. The crisis was instigated when the 
PFLP landed three hijacked planes on Jordanian territory in September 1970. In response, 
the Jordanian Army began to carry out military operations against all of the Palestinian 
groups it was housing, which drew Syria into intervening on the Palestinians’ behalf.196  
Syria’s intervention in support of Fatah and other elements of the PLO during the 
Black September crisis revealed the splits within the Ba’th regime concerning Syria’s 
Palestinian proxies. While Syria sent an armored division to Jordan, Assad refused to 
mobilize the air force to provide air cover for the invading troops despite Jadid’s 
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insistence, because Assad wanted to avoid an all-out war with Jordan or providing an 
opportunity for the Israelis to intervene. The intervention ended up in a fiasco: the Syrian 
contingent was met with airpower from the Royal Jordanian Air Force and was forced 
into a retreat without accomplishing its objective—Syria’s retreat allowed King Hussein 
to wreak incredible destruction on Palestinian camps and forced the groups to sign a 
ceasefire. Syria’s poor handling of the Black September crisis created the conditions for 
Assad’s November 1970 coup. Syria’s failure to successfully follow through with the 
mission prompted many in the Ba’th Party, including President al-Atassi, and, certainly, 
on the Palestinian side, to accuse the regime of having betrayed the Palestinians.197  
 
Reasserting Control: Assad’s Coup Ushers in a Strong Central Government  
 Assad’s coup in 1970 dramatically changed the nature of Syria’s institutional 
configurations and, therefore, affected Arafat’s relationship with the regime. Unlike the 
previous time period, when Arafat was able to take advantage of internal splits in the 
security sector and the central government’s poor control over the latter to enhance his 
leverage over Syria, following Assad’s coup and consolidation of power, Arafat was 
denied the opportunity to penetrate the regime. From this point forward, Syria interacted 
with Fatah on its own terms, and even used other Palestinian proxies to punish Arafat 
when he miscalculated and failed to take Assad’s threats seriously. In the post-1970 
environment, Assad consistently worked to undermine Arafat’s autonomy and influence 
on Syrian decision-making through imposing near-hegemony over the Syrian security 
establishment that there was little motive or opportunity to undermine Assad’s 
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preferences. Therefore, while Arafat, as a strategic actor, attempted to escape the Syrian 
stranglehold and doubted the reliability of Syria as an ally, he could not force Assad to 
come to his terms. 
 Arafat was deeply cognizant of the risk of Syrian control over the Palestinian 
resistance movement in the wake of Black September and Assad’s coup.198 Inddeed, 
Arafat saw Assad as “potentially the most lethal of Arab armies, since he could use the 
rhetoric of pan-Arabism not to assist but to curb [the group’s] activities.”199 Fatah, 
therefore, in an attempt to eschew Assad’s efforts to control the group’s activities, 
established nearly all of its training bases and bureaucratic infrastructure in Lebanon, 
which became the primary loci for Fatah’s guerrilla activities.200 However, Assad not 
only consolidated control over the Syrian security sector, but also worked to solidify 
Syrian control over Lebanon, blunting Fatah’s attempts to extricate itself from Syrian 
control.201 Meanwhile, Assad also worked to shore up Syrian control of other Palestinian 
guerrilla groups, especially the PLA and as-Sa’iqa, which were already incorporated into 
the Syrian military’s command and control. Assad also penetrated Fatah’s organizational 
structure and attempted to undermine Arafat’s authority. In 1971 a group called the Free 
Officers of al-Asifa Forces initiated an uprising against the Fatah leadership and Arafat in 
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particular. There were two more uprisings led by Fatah commanders in 1972, one of 
whom had Syrian support, which indicates the extent of Syria’s penetration and 
manipulation of the organization.202 
These changes were made possible by Assad’s coup. The causes of the coup 
stemmed from Syria’s experience during the Black September crisis. Assad feared 
drawing Syria into a war with Jordan, exacerbating rivalries with other Arab states, and 
potentially prompting a response from the United States. However, other members of the 
Ba’th Party, including President Atassi, believed Assad’s failure to send air support to 
Syrian troops entering Jordan, and Syria’s reluctance to follow through with the operation 
and protect Fatah, represented a betrayal of Syria’s Palestinian allies. At a Ba’th Party 
meeting in September 1970 these rifts came to the fore and Syria’s leadership attempted 
to punish Assad, prompting Assad’s coup the following month.203  
Assad was careful to consolidate his rule and ensure his regime would not 
experience the kind of turmoil that marred the previous Ba’th regimes. In March 1972 
Assad established the National Progressive Front, which brought together under one 
umbrella all of Syria’s major political parties, including the Ba’thists, Communists and 
Socialists.204 Assad was able to secure decision-making autonomy through implementing 
a divide and rule strategy among Syria’s many interest groups: “He used support from the 
army to free himself from party ideological constraints; he then built up his jama’a—a 
core of largely Alawi personal followers in command of intelligence agencies and 
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praetorian guard units—to enhance his autonomy of both army and party.”205 Assad was 
able to rely on Syria’s various security services to fulfill his orders, which contrasted 
markedly with previous eras in which different services and institutions within the regime 
were able to pursue their own agendas.206 In particular, the actors responsible for Syria’s 
foreign policy, such as Tlas (who became Minister of Defense), Vice President Abdul 
Halim Khaddam, and Chief of Staff Hikmat al-Shihabi, were all loyal to Assad. 
Therefore, there were essentially no real veto players within the foreign policy 
institutions: 
[Foreign policy] elites were not strong politicians associated with distinct 
views or independent power bases and foreign policy was not decided by 
bureaucratic politics in which actors rooted in the interests of rival 
institutions, bargained over or could veto policy. There were no organized 
dovish or hawkish constituencies on the main foreign policy issue, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  Indeed, the core elite functioned as a consensual 
team from the early 1970s.207  
 
Assad was especially concerned with preventing an unplanned war between Israel and 
Syria along the Golan Heights due to Palestinian attacks from that area, so he put Tlas in 
charge of controlling all Palestinian militant activities along the Golan.208   
 Together, these factors created a bargaining environment favorable to Syria. 
Assad’s domestic political control and the lack of independent authorities within the 
security establishment with the interests in and capabilities to take independent action in 
support of the Fatah in a way that would undermine Assad’s preferences gave the latter 
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free reign to infiltrate and subdue Fatah, as well as to ignore the group when he saw fit.209 
While Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel continued during the period following Black 
September and before the 1973 war, Syria largely coordinated them and ordered their 
cessation when Israeli reprisals became too costly. Assad also ensured many of the raids 
came from Lebanese, rather than Syrian, territory to avoid an overwhelming Israeli 
response.210 Between 1970 and 1973, the two clearest indicators of Syria’s bargaining 
advantage are its failure to intervene to assist Palestinian groups when they were finally 
expelled from Jordan in 1971, and Syria’s planning for the 1973 war with Israel. In the 
first case, while Syria sent troops in what turned out to be an incompetent intervention in 
1970 to assist Palestinian guerrillas against the Jordanian regime, it refrained from doing 
so when King Hussein dealt his final blow to Palestinian groups in Jordan in July 1971.211 
Perhaps more notably, the lead-up to the 1973 war was quite different from 1967. Syria 
was explicitly preparing for a conventional war with Israel in coordination with Egypt. 
Assad chose to keep Arafat uninformed of Syria’s military plans until just prior to the 
initiation of the conflict. It was not until Syria and Egypt had come to an agreement about 
their joint plans for the war that Assad approached Arafat to inform him of Syria’s 
intentions. In other words, Assad did not believe he required Palestinian guerrillas’ 
assistance to pursue Syria’s military aims. Assad was nevertheless able to secure 
Palestinian support; when he informed the PLO Executive Committee of Syria’s plans, 
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the committee offered to contribute two conventional battalions as well as carry out 
unconventional attacks in the West Bank and Gaza.212  
 The outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975, which would continue at 
varying levels of intensity until 1990, was a major exogenous shock for alliance 
dynamics between Syria and Fatah. The eruption of the civil war in Syria’s backyard 
created a high stakes situation for Syria: it raised specter of an Israeli invasion and the 
negation of Syria’s strategic depth to protect against its primary adversary. Palestinian 
interests at stake in Lebanon were also enormously high. Losing Lebanon as a territorial 
safe haven due to the rise of a Phalangist government there would be a potentially fatal 
blow to the organization. Lebanon was the one country where Palestinian militias could 
operate with relative autonomy, due in large part to the endemic weakness of the 
Lebanese government, and the state was home to a population Palestinian refugees 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Operationally, Lebanon was in close proximity 
to Israeli territory and therefore served as a launching point for Palestinian guerrilla 
attacks into Israel.213 Arafat’s behavior during this time period, however, suggests he 
deeply miscalculated the extent to which Assad’s coup undermined the leverage he had 
previously enjoyed over the Syrian regime. Arafat was consistently disappointed by what 
he perceived to by Syria’s failure to help the Palestinians in Lebanon and Assad’s 
commitment to protect Syrian interests at all costs—even if that meant forcibly subduing 
the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon.  
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 The civil war began in the spring of 1975 with tit-for-tat attacks on Maronite and 
Palestinian civilians. The inception of violence on Syria’s doorstep brought to the fore 
two crucial and interrelated foreign policy issues for Assad: Syria’s longstanding conflict 
with Israel in general and its particular goal of reconquering the Golan Heights, and 
achieving hegemony in Lebanon. The activities in Lebanon of the constituent groups of 
the PLO, especially Fatah, directly impacted both Syria’s relations with Israel as well as 
its ability to control the direction of Lebanese politics. Assad believed effectively 
controlling the activities of the Palestinian resistance would provide Syria with critical 
bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Israel: if Syria could credibly claim to control the 
Palestinian groups, Israel would by necessity include Syria in any negotiations over the 
fate of Palestine and the region. Of more immediate concern, Syria was loathe to upset 
the fragile status quo in Lebanon and provide Israel the opportunity to use instability on 
its northern border as grounds for launching an invasion of Lebanon and, therefore, 
posing a strategic threat to Syria.214 In particular, Lebanon could serve as a conduit for 
Israeli forces to reach Syrian political and industrial centers.215 Assad also feared that the 
increasing destabilization of Lebanon would provide other states in the region, not just 
Israel, with an incentive to intervene for their own strategic ends.216  
In the lead up to the Lebanese civil war, Assad embarked on a program to solidify 
Syrian control over the Palestinian resistance and insulate Syria from Arafat’s 
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penetration. Assad was “determined to deprive the PLO of the autonomous Lebanese 
stronghold from which it could evade Syria’s pressures for strategic ‘coordination’ and 
embark on initiatives threatening its strategy and security.”217 Arafat, of course, resented 
Syrian attempts to control Fatah.218 Despite having access to support from multiple Arab 
states, Arafat and the Palestinian resistance operated in Lebanon only under the guise of 
autonomy.219 In the years preceding the Lebanese civil war, Syria was responsible for the 
flourishing of Fatah and PLO bases in Lebanon—Assad prevented the Lebanese 
government from taking action against the Palestinian guerrilla groups there beginning in 
1968. For example, the Lebanese government attempted to curtail Fatah and PLO 
activities through the October 1969 Cairo Agreement and the May 1973 Melkart 
Agreement, but Syrian intervention played an important role in rendering these attempts 
ineffective.220 It is also important to note that, by the start of the civil war in April 1975, 
as-Sa’iqa was nearly as strong as Fatah, providing Syria with a compliant ally to affect 
the position of the Palestinian movement in Lebanon.221  
Arafat’s behavior during the first two years of the civil war suggest he grossly 
underestimated the extent to which Palestinian autonomy in Lebanon was in fact a 
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function of Assad’s willingness to allow the group to operate there.222 It appears that 
cognitive biases or limitations also played a role in Arafat’s decision-making. Arafat 
simply did not believe it was possible that Syria would turn against Fatah or the PLO: “I 
cannot believe that a single Syrian soldier could open fire on an Arab in [Lebanon], and I 
fully believe that it is inconceivable that [Lebanon] and its sister-country Syria…would 
allow a Syrian rifle to shoot at the Palestinian masses.”223 Perhaps this could be attributed 
to Assad’s post-1973 rhetoric, which increasingly emphasized the special relationship 
between Syria and the Palestinians, reigniting the post-Ottoman-era idea of a Greater 
Syria incorporating modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. Assad proclaimed 
in a March 8, 1974 Revolution Day address: “Palestine was indeed the major part of 
Southern Syria.”224 While the idea of a Greater Syria was old, Assad’s only began to 
draw on the concept in speeches following the 1973 war. Rabinovich argues that Assad’s 
“allusions to the existence of a Greater Syrian entity and its contingent claim to a special 
and direct relationship between Syria and Palestine do not represent a continuous policy 
line, but rather, novel elements in a new policy” that only became important after the 
1973 war.225 However, these public pronouncements were not coupled with an internal 
institutional capability to provide support to Fatah and Arafat beyond that which was 
authorized by the political leadership. Thus, Arafat resisted repeated Syrian attempts to 
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make the Palestinian cause subservient to greater Syrian national interests to control the 
activities of the Palestinian groups.226  
When the Lebanese civil war began on April 13, 1975, Assad initially hedged, 
providing support to Fatah, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), and the Maronite 
government. 227  Assad’s primary concern with the outbreak of conflict was the 
maintenance of the status quo ante.228 The LNM was a collection of resistance groups led 
by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt. Phalangist attacks on Palestinian refugees at Tal al-
Za’atar at the beginning of the civil war, especially the death of members of the Arab 
Liberation Front, which was part of the PLO umbrella, forced the Palestinian groups to 
take a stand in the sectarian conflict.229 Yet, while Assad initially supported all parties to 
the sectarian conflict, including the LNM, by the end of 1975 Jumblatt and the LNM’s 
insistence on an uncompromising stance toward the conflict propelled Assad, whose 
primary interest was maintaining stability in Lebanon, to shift away from his alignment 
with the LNM and to bring Syria’s Palestinian allies along with him.230 In January 1976 
Syria sent the Yarmuk Brigade of the PLA as well as as-Sa’iqa ostensibly to assist 
Fatah/PLO and LNM defend against Maronite attacks on Palestinian camps around 
Beirut, although most scholars claim this was an early effort by Assad to control the 
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Palestinians and the LNM and, specifically, to use as-Sa’iqa to force a break between the 
two groups.231 Under Syrian direction, as-Sa’iqa also began to funnel resources, including 
weapons and ammunition, to the Phalangist militias fighting against the Palestinians and 
the LNM.232 
Following Syria’s brief intervention by proxy, Assad pushed for a peaceful 
settlement to the civil war, which was echoed by President Franjiyya in a February 1976 
address calling for a confessional-based democracy.233 Various high-ranking members of 
the Syrian regime and military were sent to Lebanon to arbitrate between the competing 
factions in an attempt to arrive at a peaceful solution to the conflict. Jumblatt and the 
LNM rejected Syria’s proposals and resumed its military activities, prompting Assad to 
fully back the Lebanese government, to the detriment of Arafat, who had aligned Fatah 
with the LNM. Thus, the Palestinian resistance groups were presented with a choice 
between following the compromise path sought by the Syrians or the confrontational path 
sought by the LNM.234 Arafat initially attempted to comply with Assad’s preferences, 
even though the former’s support of a compromise solution to Lebanon led Arafat to 
accuse Syria of selling the Palestinians out and trying to “dominate Lebanon and 
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domesticate the Palestinians.”235 Assad pressured Arafat to terminate his alliance with the 
LNM and joint Palestinian-LNM military activities, threatening Syrian military 
intervention in the conflict. This prompted Fatah to coax Jumblatt into meeting with 
Assad on March 27, but the latter failed to convince the former to cease military activities 
in Lebanon. The following day, Assad met with Fatah’s leaders and, while he could not 
convince them to break their alignment with the LNM, Fatah did agree to refrain from 
fighting. 236  Meanwhile, the situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate with the 
defection of Muslim officers from the Lebanese army, most notably Brig. Gen. ‘Aziz al-
Ahdab, a commander in Beirut, and Lt. Ahmad Khatib. Together they launched an 
unsuccessful coup attempt in Beirut against Franjiyya.237 Around this time period, in late 
March, Syria began the process of intervening directly in the Lebanese civil war against 
the Palestinians.238 Assad sent members of the Syrian military dressed as Palestinian 
guerrillas into Lebanon and positioned armored brigades along the Syrian-Lebanese 
border on April 9.239 On April 15, Arafat met with Assad in Damascus and appeared to 
confirm that he would keep Fatah militarily out of the conflict.240  
Gradually, however, the scope of the Syrian intervention increased and Assad 
began to direct Syrian troops against Fatah and the Palestinian resistance. When the LNM 
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rejected the May 8 election of the candidate favored by Assad to the Lebanese 
presidency, Ilyas Sarkis, Arafat, feeling betrayed by Syria’s failure to support his 
organization, decided to fully throw in his lot with the LNM politically and militarily.241 
Arafat’s rejection of Syria’s attempts to settle the conflict and his choice to align with the 
LNM and continue military activities in Lebanon prompted Assad to cut off all support 
for Fatah, move to decisively back the Maronite government, and intervene even more 
forcefully against Arafat and Fatah, first using as-Sa’iqa and the PLA, and then with the 
Syrian Army on June 1.242 The Syrian intervention against the Palestinian militants 
occurred in three stages from June through October 1976.243 Assad’s action against the 
Palestinians was perceived as a deep betrayal, exacerbated by the fact that Syrian military 
action against Fatah and the PLO provided an opportunity the Phalangists with an 
opportunity to launch a brutal attack against the Tal al-Za’atar refugee camp in the 
summer of 1976.244 Syria’s first military offensives against the Palestinians and LMN 
were met with considerable Palestinians resistance, with Syrian troops performing poorly 
and suffering significant casualties. The Syrian military was “ill prepared for the nature 
of the terrain and the ferocity of the opposition.”245 However, Assad launched a second 
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offensive toward the end of the summer and “in two weeks the opposition was on the 
verge of total defeat” and Arafat was forced to concede.246 
 
Conclusion 
 Syria’s alliance with Arafat and the Palestinian resistance continued well beyond 
Syria’s initial intervention in Lebanon in 1976. However, the usefulness of the case for 
assessing the explanatory value of the theory is diminished beyond this point because the 
alliance shifted to a completely overt one, therefore moving beyond the scope of 
plausible deniability. As expected, with the shift to an overt alliance, Assad and Arafat 
strike a more explicit agreement concerning the nature of Syria’s relationship with Fatah 
and the PLO, the parameters of which were delineated at the Arab League summit hosted 
by Saudi Arabia in Riyadh in October 1976.247 However, the early years of the Syria-
Fatah alliance, as discussed above, illustrate important dynamics of intra-alliance 
bargaining and largely confirm the expectations of my theory. We observe a clear break 
between the alliance bargaining dynamics and the level of state control over the proxy 
group before and after the Assad coup, when Syrian institutions in the security sector 
transitioned from being fragmented and uncontrollable by the political leadership to 
being subsumed under Assad’s hegemonic rule. Moreover, shifts in the explanatory 
variables identified as being important by the alliance politics literature do not correspond 
with shifts in the dependent variable, suggesting my theory offers a more complete 
explanation of the sources of leverage in proxy alliances than the existing literature. 
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Chapter 5 
The United States and the “Open Secret” War in Angola 
 
Introduction and Case Selection 
In this chapter, I move beyond the findings of the previous chapter to explore how 
domestic political veto players inform the calculations of political leaders about how they 
will delegate authority for alliance management, as well as the ramifications of those 
delegation strategies. The United States’ involvement in the Angolan civil war in the 
1980s is an ideal case for testing this aspect of the theory. From 1985 through 1992, 
UNITA ensnared the United States in a long and costly alliance that persisted through 
two Presidential administrations and that undermined U.S.-sponsored peace efforts in the 
country and the United States’ reputation following widespread allegations of human 
rights abuses by Jonas Savimbi’s fighters. This time period highlights how the “open 
secret” nature of proxy alliances coupled with the presence of domestic political veto 
players with hawkish preferences affects how political leaders make decisions about 
alliance management and the deleterious effects on a state’s bargaining power.  
The fact that the existence of the U.S.-UNITA alliance was publicly known 
(despite its provisions remaining secret) meant that Reagan’s alliance with Savimbi 
carried important domestic political consequences. In particular, powerful domestic 
political actors who played a crucial role in Reagan’s election (especially his 
neoconservative base, members of Congress and the think tanks and media outlets that 
reinforced a hawkish message on the Angola issue) had very hawkish preferences on the 
Angola issue, leading Reagan to delegate considerable authority to the CIA in an effort to 
protect the Angola policy from overly enthusiastic Savimbi supporters. However, this 
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policy backfired because the CIA was highly motivated to launch an expansive program 
of covert support for Savimbi and the Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Colby, was 
particularly enamored of Savimbi. Together, these factors hampered Reagan’s ability to 
control Savimbi. The fact that these dynamics persisted through two U.S. presidential 
administrations and was only upended with a major exogenous shock—the enormous 
change in the international system that occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union—
illustrates the path dependent effects of institutions for alliance management.  
Angola also represents a challenging test for my theory because it is a case where 
the alliance politics literature, on its face, appears to explain the outcome of the case. The 
interstate alliance bargaining literature, which focuses on alternatives available to alliance 
partners as well as interests at stake, would have predicted precisely the outcome we 
observe in this case: UNITA, enjoying external support from multiple state sponsors, 
should have had a bargaining advantage due to its lack of dependence on any single actor. 
Indeed, the Angolan civil war drew many regional and international actors into the fray. 
At any given point in time UNITA received support from Zaire, South Africa, China, 
North Korea, the U.S., Zambia, France, Senegal, Rumania, Israel, Uganda, West 
Germany and Tanzania, although some supporters were more significant than others.248 
In particular, the major players on the rebel side in Angola were South Africa, Zaire and 
the United States. Conversely, following the FNLA’s defeat in 1976 (the conflict began 
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as a multi-party civil war), all of these external sponsors had only one rebel group to 
support: UNITA.249  
Aside from the United States, UNITA enjoyed support from both Zaire and South 
Africa, two states that had important and longstanding interests at stake in the outcome of 
the civil war in Angola. In fact, both had begun to support UNITA (and also the FNLA) 
prior to Angola’s independence from Portugal in November 1975. South Africa had 
considerable strategic interests in Angola. The wave of independence movements that 
gripped the African continent during the period of decolonization threatened South 
Africa’s regional position as well as the domestic political stability of the apartheid 
regime. Specifically, the independence of Angola and Mozambique forced South Africa 
to confront a potentially “existential threat.”250 During this tumultuous time, South Africa 
wanted to ensure it was surrounded by friendly regimes, which is why it sought to 
prevent and, later, overthrow the MPLA government in Angola. The MPLA regime was 
providing safe harbor to South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas 
fighting for Namibian independence from South Africa.251 In 1977 the government 
published a Defense White Paper outlining a  “total strategy” to uproot African National 
Congress (ANC) and SWAPO bases in Angola and South-African-occupied Namibia. 
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Proxy warfare through UNITA was the centerpiece of South Africa’s strategy.252 The 
apartheid regime believed supporting UNITA provided a “low cost” avenue for disposing 
of the SWAPO threat and Namibian independence.253 Therefore, Jonas Savimbi in 
particular (less so Holden Roberto, the FNLA’s leader, who received greater support 
from Zaire, as discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter) was largely assured 
of an ally in South Africa due to the latter’s continuing and extremely pressing strategic 
interests in Angola, which should have provided the former with a consistent bargaining 
advantage relative to the U.S. In pursuit of these goals, from the mid-1970s through the 
1980s, South Africa conducted extensive military operations in Angola in conjunction 
with UNITA and, sometimes, FNLA forces. 254  Accordingly, South Africa invaded 
Angola dozens of times during the 1970s-80s, and South African support of UNITA 
allowed the group to pose a serious military threat to the MPLA regime and, later, a 
spoiler of the peace process.255 Similarly, Zairian leader Mobutu Sese Seko had important 
interests at stake in Angola. In particular, the MPLA’s alliance with Katangan separatists 
and their fight for secession from Zaire threatened its territorial intergrity.256 
However, there were points in time when South Africa’s support of UNITA was 
not assured, despite the former’s considerable strategic interests in Angola, which should 
have put Savimbi at a disadvantage in his bargaining with the United States. Just prior to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers, 76. 
253 James, Political History, 152. 
254 Davies, Constructive Engagement, 150. 
255 Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers, 76-7. 
256 Ibid., 77-8. 
	   137	  
the repeal of the Clark amendment and Reagan’s decision to reinsert the United States 
into Angola, domestic political instability in South Africa raised the prospects of alliance 
abandonment for UNITA. Additionally, despite South Africa’s commitment to UNITA, 
the sheer enormity of the resources the Cubans and Soviets were pouring into Angola in 
support of the MPLA government—reaching $2 billion—prompted UNITA to seek out 
support from additional external backers, especially the United States.257 Furthermore, 
Savimbi’s military strategy, which during the mid- to late-1980s revolved around 
defending its base in Jamba, was dependent on potential America support.258  
The defeat of the FNLA in 1976 left UNITA as the sole remaining rebel group in 
Angola. On its face, this might appear to explain why the U.S. lacked leverage over 
Savimbi. However, exploring the case in more detail uncovers the fact that Savimbi did 
not use his access to multiple external supporters as ammunition to bring the United 
States closer to his preferred position; instead, he exploited both Reagan’s domestic 
political vulnerabilities on the Angola issue, as well as his close relationship with Casey 
and the CIA. Therefore, rather than Savimbi’s access to alternative alliance partners, the 
preferences and capabilities of the CIA coupled with pressure from right-wing 
Congressmen explain why Reagan was backed into a corner over UNITA. Perceived 
weakness was an asset for Savimbi—in the fall of 1985 right-wing members of Congress 
claimed that the U.S. “could not allow UNITA to be decisively weakened” in their 
successful bid to repeal the Clark amendment. 259  But this was because important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 James, Political History, 167. 
258 Ibid., 167-9. 
259 Davies, Constructive Engagement, 160. 
	   138	  
domestic political stakeholders and bureaucratic interests were motivated to push for a 
U.S.-UNITA alliance and, at times, were working against U.S. policy on Angola. For 
example, around March 1985 CIA Director William Casey instructed Savimbi to 
continue to take a hard line on peace talks with the MPLA government even as Chester 
Crocker and the State Department were working toward a negotiated settlement to the 
civil war. 260  Similarly, Secretary of State George Schultz privately informed the 
Republican House minority leader that a decision by the administration to provide aid to 
UNITA would undermine peace talks with the Angolan government, who went on to 
publicly disparage Reagan and the State Department’s Angola policy.261 The case also 
presents an interesting strategic quandary: Why didn’t Reagan learn the lessons of the 
United States’ previous involvement in Angola in the 1970s? In this instance, Reagan 
was backed into a corner by powerful neoconservative constituencies and legislators, as 
well as his own CIA director. 
 
Historical Background and Alliance Formation: Reviving an Old Proxy 
Alliance 
The alliance between the United States and UNITA was revived during the 
Reagan administration, ten years after it had abruptly ended in 1976. Congressional 
repeal of the Clark amendment removed the legal restrictions on American covert 
involvement in Angola. There is some circumstantial evidence, however, that the United 
States continued to ensure UNITA received access to external support during the Carter 
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and early Reagan years (despite the Clark amendment), which will be discussed in brief 
below. Nevertheless, the repeal of the Clark amendment and the reinstatement of the 
alliance ushered in a renewed American commitment to Angola that both undermined 
American efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the Angolan civil war as well as 
various outstanding territorial disputes in the region, and forced the United States to pay 
political costs Savimbi’s human rights abuses and its implicit alignment with the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. Because the U.S.-UNITA alliance operated as an open 
secret, the alliance proved doubly dangerous for the United States. First, the statutory 
authorization for the operation fell under the rubric of covert activities, which meant that 
the CIA was endowed with considerable authority and minimal oversight for its activities 
in Angola. Second, Reagan had domestic political interests at stake in the issue due to the 
fact that the existence of the alliance was publicly known, and there were important 
domestic political actors with a strong interest in nearly unconditional support to 
Savimbi. By definition, a publicly known covert operation creates inherent tensions and 
paradoxes. Nevertheless, the confluence of the CIA consistently pushing for an expanded 
mission in Angola and neoconservative members of Congress pressing Reagan for deeper 
American involvement pointed in the same direction: it was incredibly difficult for 
Reagan, and later Bush, to enforce limits on its alliance with UNITA.  
The Angola issue was a critical component of the Reagan Doctrine, which 
focused on aiding so-called “freedom fighters” around the world as part of the American 
effort to combat the influence of Communism. The Reagan Doctrine initially focused on 
Central and South America, but quickly expanded to encompass the rest of the Third 
World, including Africa. The driving logic behind this doctrine was that aiding rebel 
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groups would provide a “low cost” means of “rais[ing] the price of the Soviets’ Third 
World empire.”262 The doctrine was enshrined in Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union.263 
Additionally, some conservatives espoused the idea that Reagan had to “avenge the 
Angolan defeat of 1975-76,” in which the United States essentially allowed a Soviet-
backed government to take the helm of the Angolan state and “lost” Angola to the 
Communists.264  
   
The More Things Change? The Clark Amendment Years 
It is worth spending a few moments discussing the relationship between various 
elements of the executive branch and UNITA during the years in which the Clark 
Amendment was in force, because it illustrates the strong institutional and personal 
commitment by Casey and the CIA to ensure UNITA continued to receive sufficient 
external support to keep the rebellion viable. This provides additional support to the 
claim that the CIA’s institutional interests played an important role in American leverage 
over UNITA. It also illustrates how, despite changes in presidential leadership, there was 
more continuity than change in American foreign policy on Angola. 
Although the passage of the Clark amendment prohibited American involvement 
in Angola, there is significant circumstantial evidence that elements of the United States 
government, in particular the CIA, attempted (and perhaps succeeded) to find ways of 
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circumventing the Clark amendment and facilitating UNITA’s access to external support. 
If any of this evidence is indeed true, it illustrates how the Clark amendment did not 
create a major discontinuity in America’s foreign policy orientation in Angola and that 
the CIA continued to exert its influence wherever possible to continue its relationship 
with UNITA. In other words, it reveals the strong tendency toward path dependence in 
these types of alliances, irrespective of changes in geopolitical factors, presidential 
administrations, or even CIA leadership. The circumstantial evidence strongly suggests 
that the United States, under the Carter and first Reagan administrations, found means of 
channeling aid to UNITA through third parties. As early as 1976, the CIA established a 
means of delivering arms to South Africa, some of which in turn likely made it into 
Angola.265 Wright identifies two instances, October 1977 and May 1978, in which he 
claims the Carter administration attempted to circumvent the Clark amendment by 
pressuring Morocco and China to support UNITA, even though Carter made public 
pronouncements about the United States’ compliance with the Clark amendment.266 In 
particular, the Carter administration arranged for Mobutu to receive aid from Moroccan 
troops during the 1977 Shaba uprising launched by Katangan separtists; this provided 
Savimbi, who was allied with Mobutu, with contacts in Morocco and shortly thereafter 
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King Hassan gave UNITA training, arms and political support.267 Similarly, in early 1978 
France, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Morocco—all American allies—established a $15 million 
fund for UNITA.268 The fact that, during this time, the Carter NSC discussed funding 
UNITA and launched a failed attempt to get Congress to reconsider the Clark amendment 
in 1978 indicates that the Carter administration was interested in aiding UNITA.269  
 There is also evidence that a similar pattern of behavior continued through the 
first term of the Reagan administration until the repeal of the Clark amendment. Between 
1981 and 1985 the United States gave military support to UNITA, claims Wright, 
through countries such as South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Israel.270 Indeed, 
Savimbi claimed he perceived the Clark amendment to be “meaningless” because 
UNITA was able to receive U.S. support through other states.271 Furthermore, Windrich 
claims that the United States held clandestine meetings with South Africa to funnel arms 
to UNITA through Zaire and Israel as intermediaries.272 In fact, Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig reportedly told Savimbi in 1981 that, “ways and means could be found to 
bypass the [Clark amendment] and help [Savimbi] by channeling funds through a third 
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country.”273 This occurred concurrently with visits by senior members of the Reagan 
administration in 1981 and 1982 to Morocco, where Savimbi had a base, at the same time 
that Savimbi was there.274 Saudi Arabia appears to have played a substantial role in the 
alleged violations of the Clark amendment, acting “as a surrogate for the United States in 
providing assistance to UNITA, perhaps as a quid pro quo for arms sales.”275 In 1987 the 
House Subcommittee on Africa launched an ultimately inconclusive investigation into 
whether Saudi Arabia gave military support to UNITA in exchange for AWACS radar 
planes from the United States in 1981.276 The subcommittee also questioned a California 
businessman who claimed he was approached in the early 1980s to serve as a private 
conduit for aid to UNITA through the Saudis, and explored the charge that Saudi Arabia 
gave Morocco $50 million to train and equip UNITA forces in an “informal 
arrangement” and “back channel operation” requested by the United States.277 DCI Casey 
played an active role in facilitating these relationships, not only pressuring intermediaries 
to support UNITA, but also “reportedly arrang[ing] means to finance UNITA and other 
resistance groups around the world through secret Saudi accounts.” 278  In fact, a 
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December 1985 memorandum from a private corporation, GeoMiliTech, to DCI Casey, 
proposed a plan in which the CIA could secretly funnel arms to the rebels in Angola, 
using Israel, China, and a trading company as unwitting intermediaries in a “three way 
trade,” and therefore circumvent the Clark amendment. In particular, the memorandum 
reads that the United States “has at its disposal a large and continuous supply of Soviet 
technology and weapons to channel to Freedom Fighters worldwide, mandating neither 
the consent or awareness of the Department of State or Congress.”279  
It is also possible that there was more direct American involvement in Angola 
during the Clark amendment years. Peleman describes how in 1979 and 1980 American 
pilots flying for a Florida-based company, Globe Aero Ltd., were arrested in Angola by 
the MPLA after having made emergency landings there; making unscheduled emergency 
landings is a common tactic states can employ to get around sanctions or other trade 
restrictions.280 There were also similar reports of an American pilot caught by the MPLA 
in January 1981 in Cuando Cubango attempting to deliver aid to UNITA.281 Windrich 
claims that U.S. trainers were sent to Angola in March 1981 “to assess UNITA’s military 
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needs.” 282  Furthermore, DCI Casey had access to offshore CIA account, private 
corporations and independent arms dealers, all of which could have been used to 
surreptitiously funnel aid to UNITA, including the Enterprise, an offshore CIA account 
used for financing covert operations with negligible oversight, and Southern Air 
Transport, a private company affiliated with the CIA. In 1984, the latter allegedly landed 
in Angola, picked up diamonds from UNITA and dropped off South African weapons.283 
All of this evidence, while circumstantial, suggests a broad pattern of continuity in 
American involvement in Angola and persistent CIA attempts to extend its mandate there 
despite legislative restrictions. 
 
Delegation Decisions: Domestic Political Veto Players and Alliance 
Design 
The alliance between the United States and UNITA in the 1980s operated as an 
open secret: Reagan authorized a resumption of covert aid to UNITA, but it was publicly 
discussed and debated. This gave the alliance a paradoxical status: on the one hand, the 
statutory authorization for the provision U.S. support to UNITA was for a covert 
operation, which minimized reporting requirements by the Executive to Congress and 
gave the CIA considerable discretion and authority to operate; on the other hand, the fact 
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that the existence of the alliance was made public conferred on Congress and other 
domestic political actors the ability to affect the president’s decision-making, activated 
Reagan’s concerns about his domestic political standing, and also gave Savimbi another 
avenue through which he could work to influence policymaking. These competing 
interests, however, pointed in the same direction in terms of Reagan’s ability to influence 
Savimbi’s behavior: both together undermined the former’s leverage over the latter. 
Indeed, Reagan was motivated to authorize American support to Savimbi as a covert, 
rather than overt, program, so that he could shield the Angola policy from very hawkish 
members of his base who were intent on providing nearly unconditional support to 
UNITA. A covert program, with its minimal reporting and accountability requirements, 
would keep control over American aid to Savimbi within the Executive Branch. 
However, this backfired on Reagan because the CIA, tasked with managing the covert 
alliance, was also highly motivated to support Savimbi even when (perhaps, because) it 
undermined efforts by the State Department to achieve a negotiated agreement to a set of 
disputes in the region through Constructive Engagement. Reagan found himself on the 
hook in two respects: to a powerful bureaucracy (the CIA) with institutional and 
ideological interests in a more expansive covert operation in Angola, and to domestic 
political veto players who continued to exert political pressure on Reagan not to abandon 
Savimbi.  
Several factors affected Reagan’s decision to authorize US support for UNITA as 
a covert operation rather than an overt one. As Chester Crocker, Reagan’s Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, points out, there was no political support in the 
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United States for a “substantial U.S. military involvement in Southern Africa.”284 
Furthermore, Reagan preferred a covert alliance to prevent Congress from exerting its 
authority over US foreign policymaking in usurpation of the Executive branch.285 In the 
lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the repeal of the Clark amendment in July 1985, 
Congressional hawks pressured the administration for a large-scale program of overt aid 
to Savimbi’s rebels.286 Conservatives preferred overt to covert action because it would 
allow the United States to mount a greater effort and avoid the limitations associated with 
the latter.287 In the course of this public debate about the question of renewed U.S. 
funding for UNITA, Secretary of State George Schultz wrote a letter to the Republican 
House minority leader privately informing him that a program of overt U.S. aid to 
UNITA, for which Congressional hawks were pushing, would undermine the State 
Department’s active negotiations with the Angolan government. In turn, the congressman 
circulated Schultz’s letter within the House and publicly berated the State Department’s 
policy. Despite Reagan’s insistence on refraining from aiding UNITA while his 
administration was in the process of negotiations with the MPLA government, in 1985 
Congress put forth a series of proposals to aid UNITA.288 Congressmen Pepper and 
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Kemp, for example, proposed a $27 million bill for non-lethal aid to UNITA, while 
Congressman Siljander proposed one in the same amount for lethal aid. Pepper’s bill 
explicitly excluded a role for the CIA or Department of Defense.289 In the Senate, a bill 
was brought forth for $50 million for overt support to UNITA. These proposals were 
coupled with a UNITA-orchestrated media blitz.290 Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the 
House Intelligence Committee, put forward a bill for overt U.S. support for UNITA so 
that it would be public and approved by Congress. Hamilton criticized Reagan for 
engaging in “open talk about covert aid.”291 Congressional pressure forced Reagan’s hand 
and, after a visit by Savimbi to Washington in January 1986—in which Savimbi was 
“received like a head of state”—Reagan announced $15 million in covert US military aid 
to UNITA and also agreed to provision UNITA with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons 
in exchange for ceasing Congressional attempts to supply UNITA with overt aid.292 At 
this point, Reagan could not have kept the alliance secret—it was already a topic of 
public discussion and Reagan himself advocated arming UNITA on the campaign trail. In 
fact, in a comment to members of the press on November 22, 1985, Reagan made a 
public case for covert aid to the rebels, arguing that it “would have more chance of 
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success right now.”293 In this way, says Crocker, it was “Reagan himself [who] blew our 
cover” before covert action had even begun.294 Thus, in choosing a program of covert aid, 
Reagan could keep authority for the alliance within the Executive branch.295 
The scholarly literature on this topic identifies additional motivations for 
authorizing covert rather than overt aid for Savimbi’s forces. Scott, for example, argues 
that, in addition to the desire to prevent Congress from intruding on the executive’s 
prerogative, at an October/November 1985 meeting of the National Security Planning 
Group the administration agreed on covert aid to UNITA to “preserve deniability…and 
enhance the role of the CIA and the defense intelligence establishment.”296 As will be 
discussed below, the CIA under Casey made a big push for covert action in Angola. 
Furthermore, keeping the Angola program covert was important not only to protect the 
prestige of American allies, such as Zaire (a motivation that also existed during the Ford 
administration), but also because open assistance “for an ally to use across its borders or 
transfer to a third party would have been contrary to existing U.S. foreign assistance 
legislation.”297 Finally, Reagan believed overt aid would undermine continuing attempts 
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by the State Department to strike a negotiated settlement to the various regional 
disputes.298  
Why didn’t Reagan learn from the Ford administration’s alliance with the 
Angolan rebels in 1975-76? The Ford administration’s experience in Angola was 
certainly part of public discourse on aiding UNITA. For example, the Cleveland 
newspaper, Plain Dealer, ran an opinion piece warning Reagan not to repeat the mistakes 
made by the Ford administration. In particular, the article drew on the blowback 
surrounding South Africa’s involvement in Angola in the 1970s and the U.S. role in those 
events to argue that the Reagan administration should not resume support for UNITA.299 
One should not necessarily infer that Reagan was a non-strategic actor who merely failed 
to update his beliefs about the costs and benefits of covert aid to Angolan rebels. Rather, 
as the above evidence demonstrates, Reagan was backed into a corner domestically due 
to the public nature of the debate surrounding U.S. involvement in Angola and the 
political power of the neoconservative faction of the Republican Party. While Reagan 
himself shoulders part of the blame for this—he advocated arming UNITA on the 
campaign trail300—neoconservative Congressmen, think tanks, and private organizations 
mounted a large public relations effort to force Reagan’s hand. Reagan devoted the first 
half of his presidency to an entirely diplomatic approach to resolving the Angola/South 
Africa/Namibia issue, known as Constructive Engagement. Because Reagan’s diplomatic 
proposal hinged on South Africa halting its support for UNITA and excluded UNITA 
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from peace negotiations, Reagan was subject to charges by neoconservatives in the 
United States that he was “throwing someone like Savimbi to the wolves.”301 The repeal 
of the Clark amendment, itself a product of a concerted effort by neoconservatives, 
including Congressmen who had traveled to Angola to meet Savimbi, opened up an 
opportunity for lobbyists to launch a massive public relations effort to pressure Reagan to 
fund UNITA, playing up recent MPLA offenses against UNITA positions in Mavinga 
and elsewhere.302 In 1985, UNITA held a ceremony in Jamba with right-wing groups 
from the United States to create the “Democratic International” in an event sponsored by 
the conservative Citizens for America and led by Lewis Lehrman, a candidate for 
governor of New York.303 
Perhaps even more puzzling is why Bush apparently failed to learn from his own 
experience as DCI during the Ford administration following the revelations about the 
U.S. proxy war in Angola in 1975-76. When Bush assumed office following Reagan, he 
continued and even escalated U.S. support for UNITA, even as revelations about human 
rights abuses by Savimbi and his fighters began to surface and despite Savimbi’s actions 
to spoil peace negotiations the U.S. was attempting to mediate between the various 
interested parties. As will be demonstrated below, Bush faced similar pressures as 
Reagan from neoconservative elements of Congress. It was only when those lawmakers 
themselves became disenchanted with Savimbi that Bush had the political capital to 
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bargain more aggressively with Savimbi and eventually cease U.S. support for UNITA. 
He was also working against an already entrenched and powerful CIA, which had a 
continued interest in the proxy alliances with UNITA. 
Thus, when Reagan delegated authority for alliance management to the CIA in his 
attempts to protect the Angola policy from Conservative hawks, the accountability and 
oversight mechanisms already codified in U.S. statutes concerning covert operations took 
effect. This meant that considerable autonomy was given to the CIA to manage the 
alliance with little oversight, especially from Congress. The repeal of the Clark 
amendment allowed the CIA to provision UNITA through its contingency fund, which 
had few accountability mechanisms.304 The initial authorization for the covert operation 
in December 1985 approved $15 million for aid to UNITA through the CIA’s 
contingency fund.305 Furthermore, the National Security Decision Directive 212 outlining 
American policy in Angola was written in vague language that did not include clear 
military objectives and were coupled with private reassurances to Savimbi that the United 
States’ vision for his political role in Angola went beyond that which was written down 
in the NSDD (which focused on “reducing…Soviet and Soviet-proxy influence and 
opportunities in Angola” and achieving a “national reconciliation based on a political 
settlement that is acceptable to all parties”).306 Perhaps most importantly, it was not clear 
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what Savimbi’s intended role was following Cuban withdrawal from Angola and 
achievement of some type of political reconciliation.307 Just as in the 1975-6 alliance, the 
covert aspects of the program included using third parties—both other states as well as 
private entities—to funnel aid to UNITA. For example, in December 1985, following 
Reagan’s authorization of a covert program, Casey traveled to Zaire to arrange for 
Mobutu to serve as a conduit for American resources going to UNITA. Additionally, the 
CIA contracted with St. Lucia airways to transport material from the United States to 
Kamina and Kinshasa. In 1987 alone there were between 4 and 5 weekly C-141 flights 
carrying aid to UNITA, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.308 
 
The CIA’s Interests 
 Unlike the CIA during the Ford administration, whose leadership, as will be 
shown in Chapter 6, was more skeptical about covert action in Angola, Casey was a vocal 
supporter of UNITA and actively worked to undermine the State Department’s position 
on the Angola issue even before the repeal of the Clark amendment. According to 
Crocker, an intelligence officer once told him that, “Casey want[ed] to have at least one 
covert war in each region,” and at the time there was little of note going on in Africa.309 
Thus, UNITA enjoyed the “enthusiastic support of CIA Director Casey and others in the 
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intelligence establishment.”310 As early as March 1981, at a National Security Planning 
Group meeting Casey was an “especially vocal advocate” of arming the Angolan 
rebels.311 Later, in March 1985, Casey informed Savimbi that he should stick to an 
uncompromising position regarding any negotiated settlement to regional issues just as 
Crocker and the State Department were working a major diplomatic initiative to 
peacefully resolve them. 312  This led Savimbi to doubt Crocker’s bona fides as a 
representative of the Reagan administration.313 Casey sent a similar message to South 
Africa, “undermin[ing] the diplomatic initiative by using CIA channels to encourage the 
South Africans to be ‘tough’ and to maintain U.S. contact with Jonas Savimbi.”314 Casey 
also coordinated with South Africa, Zaire, Morocco and Saudi Arabia to ensure UNITA 
had external sources of funding in the absence of direct U.S. involvement.315 
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Casey also played an instrumental role in advocating for and helping to achieve 
the repeal of the Clark amendment.316 Crocker implies that Casey and the CIA not only 
helped stoke the Conservative push to repeal the Clark amendment, but also to 
disseminate information to promote a public perception of Savimbi as a democratic 
freedom fighter and thus meriting U.S. military aid. To that effect, Crocker suggests 
Casey assisted with coordination and logistics for Lehmran and other Conservatives to 
travel to Jamba for the Democratic International, and also helped Reagan craft a public 
letter of support for Savimbi and the Democratic International.317 Furthermore, when the 
Reagan White House initiated a policy review on the question of aiding UNITA in July 
1985, Casey and the CIA pushed for immediate military support to the rebels and a 
cessation of diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. 318  Following the Clark 
amendment’s repeal, the decision by the National Security Planning Group in 
October/November 1985 to approve a program of covert military aid to UNITA was 
motivated in part by the goal of elevating the authority and role of the CIA.319 Perhaps a 
good portion of Casey’s ardent support of a covert operation in Angola stemmed from 
concerns within the CIA that its institutional position was moving toward a precarious 
position. There were concerns within the CIA that Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative 
would divert resources away from the CIA, and also that new negotiations with the 
Soviets would reduce the importance of covert operations. Angola provided Casey with 
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an opportunity to reassert the relevance of the CIA as a crucial tool for executing foreign 
policy. More specifically, Casey advocated covert, rather than overt, aid to the UNITA 
rebels because “overt programs cannot be conducted by a clandestine service, [so] this 
would threaten Casey’s ambition to become the lead policymaker on Angola and the 
benefactor of UNITA.”320 Indeed, by the fall of 1986 Casey was able to secure a tripling 
of the CIA’s secret budget as well as an increase in the number of CIA personnel.321 
Therefore, the CIA’s considerable authority, coupled with Casey’s activism, undercut 
Reagan’s leverage over Savimbi because the latter was assured of the CIA’s support.  
 It is interesting to note that the CIA continued to exert its institutional prerogative 
following Casey’s stroke and subsequent replacement by William Webster as DCI, and 
even after the end of Reagan’s presidency during the George H.W. Bush 
administration.322 Scott attributes this in part to lack of interest from high-level officials 
within the Bush administration about Angola due to events in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 
the Persian Gulf War in 1990; White House neglect, coupled with continuity of mid- and 
low-level bureaucrats at the CIA (despite changes at the upper echelons), “led to the 
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The Power of the CIA in Reagan’s NSC 
 Reagan’s decision-making style in his NSC provided an opportunity for Casey to 
be assertive and carve out a considerable sphere of influence at the expense of the State 
Department. Scott describes how Reagan was “seldom personally involved in 
policymaking, instead relying on advisors and officials in the foreign policy bureaucracy 
to lead his administration’s efforts.”324 Kwiatkowski concurs that the first fear years of 
the Reagan administration beset by rivalries between principals and “marred by 
confusion, strife, distrust, [and] short-timers in some key positions.” 325  Kuperman 
characterizes Reagan’s management style in a similar vein in his discussion of Reagan’s 
decision to provision the Afghan rebels with stinger missiles. Specifically, Kuperman 
claims that Reagan was reluctant to assert his leadership and let subordinates arrive at a 
policy consensus before approaching him. This created a power vacuum that enabled 
inter-bureaucratic fighting. 326  After Reagan’s reelection, changes at the NSC level 
undermined foreign policymaking discipline, according to Crocker, and created even 
more of an opportunity for interagency competition and turf wars.327 It was in this context 
that Casey pushed for a program of covert military aid to the Angolan rebels. 
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 The principal opponent to Casey and the CIA in Reagan’s NSC was the State 
Department.328 The rivalry between the CIA and the State Department produced perverse 
foreign policy outcomes. As Chester Crocker describes, when an administration is 
divided by rival bureaucracies with exclusive sources of information and conflict policy 
preferences, “foreign policy becomes an unprincipled battleground where one power 
center uses its information from and access to foreigners in order to sabotage a domestic 
rival….In [the Angola] case the result…was to encourage a pattern of collusion between 
forces opposed to [the State Department’s] settlement strategy.”329 In fact, according to 
Crocker, this rivalry predated the Angola issue. Crocker claims that Casey “wanted to be 
Reagan’s Secretary of State” and implies that, as DCI, he worked to place himself as a 
“rival foreign minister.”330 At varying points in time, both the State Department and the 
CIA possessed the upper hand in Reagan’s NSC. Prior to the repeal of the Clark 
amendment—perhaps precisely due to the amendment’s continued existence—Reagan’s 
foreign policy posture in Southern Africa prioritized diplomacy, which was spearheaded 
by the State Department. Specifically, the State Department employed the ambitious 
policy of Constructive Engagement, which was authorized in a National Security 
Decision Directive in the Sumer of 1981 and based on the premise that the United States 
could serve as an impartial mediator in the Southern Africa issue and could help resolve 
interstate territorial conflicts, especially pertaining to Namibian independence, as a 
precursor to settling intrastate conflicts. The State Department hoped to achieve these 
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goals through taking a softer diplomatic tone with South Africa; linking Namibian 
independence with the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops; work with other 
states in the region to link the Namibian and Angolan issues; and promote a 
reconciliation between factions within Angola, South Africa and other states.331  
 The primacy of diplomacy, however, was undermined by both events on the 
ground as well as efforts by Casey and the CIA to prioritize a covert, military approach to 
the conflict. Crocker initially appeared to enjoy some diplomatic success as his efforts 
resulted in a February 16, 1984 agreement between South Africa and Angola in Lusaka, 
Zambia, which carved out areas in which SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia and Cubans in 
Angola could not operate and also established a plan for withdrawing South African 
troops from Namibia. However, spoiling on both sides, in particular a counter-attack by 
MPLA forces in mid-1985 in response to the 1983-4 SADF/UNITA offensive in 
Operation Askari, undermined peace efforts.332  
 The diplomatic setbacks coupled with the repeal of the Clark amendment 
provided a fertile ground for pro-UNITA elements of the administration to push for a 
covert military approach to Angola at the expense of the State Department’s efforts 
during a July 1985 policy review by the administration.333 The policy review illustrated 
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the shifting balance of power in the Reagan NSC as Casey’s efforts to prioritize covert 
action over diplomacy proved fruitful in the face of State Department protestations.334 In 
particular Crocker believed covert action “would become a political tool and a 
bureaucratic method of empowering the CIA.”335 It is important to note that neither 
Crocker nor Schultz were opposed to supporting UNITA per se—in fact, they believed 
aid to UNITA could give the United States leverage in its negotiations to secure Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola. Rather, they opposed elevating covert action at the expense of 
diplomacy; Crocker and Schultz saw covert action as a complement to diplomacy.336  
 Reagan’s decision to authorize covert military action in Angola cemented the 
influence and prerogative of the CIA in the NSC. Importantly, this persisted despite 
changes in CIA leadership (stemming from Casey’s unexpected health problems and 
subsequent death) as well as changes in presidential administrations. Similar conflicts 
between the State Department and the CIA surfaced during the Bush presidency and, just 
as during the Reagan years, the CIA and pro-UNITA elements enjoyed the upper hand. 
This meant that Savimbi had “virtually unconditional American support assured.”337 
 
Pressure from Hawkish Veto Players 
 The fact that the U.S.-UNITA alliance during the Reagan and Bush years operated 
as an open secret meant that the president faced paying domestic political costs for failing 
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to support UNITA to the extent desired by the powerful neoconservative factions in 
Congress and the media, despite Reagan’s attempts to protect the Angola policy from 
those actors. Reagan (and, later, Bush) was hamstrung in his ability to effectively bargain 
with Savimbi because political constraints tied Reagan’s hands in the wrong direction. 
Reagan lacked the political capital to reign in Savimbi—a fact of which Savimbi was 
acutely aware and used to his advantage. 
 The Reagan administration was pressured to repeal the Clark amendment and 
provide military aid to Savimbi through multiple channels. Private organizations—right-
wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Security Council, the 
Conservative Caucus and others—distributed resources to UNITA and conservative 
lawmakers, while facilitating contacts between the two and the Reagan administration. 
For example, in December 1982 while the House was considering a measure to repeal the 
Clark amendment, private conservative organizations orchestrated a visit by Savimbi to 
the United States where he met with principals in the Reagan administration. Savimbi 
came away from the various meetings convinced that the United States would ensure 
UNITA received military aid regardless of the Clark amendment.338 While the House 
failed to repeal the amendment in 1982, the concerted effort mounted by conservative 
Congressmen (some of whom, such as Senator Steve Symms, had traveled to Angola to 
meet Savimbi), private organizations, principals in the Reagan administration and public 
relations groups hired by Savimbi successfully repealed the Clark amendment in the 
summer of 1985.339 Immediately following its appeal, Reagan was barraged with pressure 
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from conservative Congressmen to furnish UNITA with military support, as already 
detailed above, as well as a media blitz from the PR firm Black, Manafort, Stone and 
Kelly hired by Savimbi for a $600,000 contract (whose principals had served as key 
members of the Reagan/Bush campaign staff).340 UNITA supporters were buttressed by 
Angolan military offenses against UNITA in the fall of 1985, which allowed them to 
claim that the United States “could not allow UNITA to be decisively weakened.”341  
 Reagan continued to face domestic political costs for failing to adequately support 
Savimbi even after the repeal of the Clark amendment and his decision to launch a 
program of covert military aid for UNITA. At any moment when it appeared that the 
Reagan administration might be contemplating scaling back or otherwise moderating its 
support for UNITA, the right-wing machine would spring into action and publicly and 
privately press Reagan to continue or even escalate U.S. aid. For example, in the spring 
of 1988 the administration was pursuing peace negotiations to resolve the 
Angola/Namibia issues (as part of Constructive Engagement) and excluded UNITA as a 
party to the talks. This prompted Savimbi’s supporters to lobby Capitol Hill and “press 
the administration to hold firm to the commitments that had been made to Savimbi ever 
since the 1980 election.”342 The Senate even blocked Reagan’s request for a $150 million 
appropriation to fund the UN peacekeeping mission in Namibia, even though Reagan’s 
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National Security Advisor, Colin Powell, assured Congress that the United States would 
continue to support UNITA throughout the negotiations.343 At the same time, Jeane 
Kirpatrick published an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times admonishing Reagan not to 
abandon UNITA, arguing, “Jonas Savimbi, the mujaheddin and American defense are 
what Ronald Reagan is all about.”344  
 A similar pattern persisted during the Bush presidency. The right-wing was 
concerned that Bush would be soft on UNITA, despite the fact that Bush had already 
publicly rejected accusations by human rights organizations, such as Africa Watch, that 
UNITA was responsible for large-scale human rights abuses in Angola.345 In fact, in 1989 
Congress passed the DeConcini amendment that ensured continued U.S. support to 
UNITA until the MPLA and UNITA successfully conclude negotiations, achieve a 
national unity government and free and fair elections.346 Around the same time, an 
Angolan counteroffensive against UNITA’s positions in Mavinga in December 1989 
prompted Republican Senators to press Bush to increase support to UNITA.347 
 Savimbi was able to take advantage of both the competition between the State 
Department and the CIA, as well as the political power of neoconservative lawmakers, to 
enhance his leverage over the Reagan administration and ensure continued, substantial 
military support despite engaging in spoiling behavior that undermined efforts by both 
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Reagan and Bush to achieve a negotiated settlement to outstanding disputes in Southern 
Africa (as well as human rights abuses that were politically costly for the United States). 
In general, Savimbi possessed an incredible knack for tailoring his political and 
ideological orientation to conform to the perceived preferences of his patrons. 348 
Furthermore, he was attuned to shifts in political opinion in Washington; in 1988 as the 
United States was mediating peace negotiations on the Southern Africa issues Savimbi 
shifted UNITA’s ideological focus from anti-Communist to pro-democracy to ensure 
continued political support in Congress.349 He also launched tirades in the press against 
Crocker’s efforts to broker a peace deal that excluded UNITA.350 The fact that the U.S.-
UNITA alliance operated as an open secret meant that Savimbi could publicly play on 
domestic political fears, especially within the conservative movement, about U.S. 
credibility and reputation. In fact, Savimbi published many articles in U.S. media outlets 
drawing on images of appeasement and describing Angola as the “Munich of Africa,” 
while at the same time requesting advanced weapons systems from the Reagan 
administration. 351  UNITA’s sophisticated PR machined utilized UNITA’s military 
setbacks as fodder in its media campaign to pressure the Reagan administration for 
increased military aid. In particular, UNITA used any reported (or exaggerated) instance 
of the Soviet Union ratcheting up military assistance to the MPLA government to play on 
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Reagan’s credibility; “any increment in Soviet military assistance for the MPLA was 
regarded as a threat not only to UNITA’s survival but to the prestige of its patron as 
well.”352 
 In addition to Savimbi’s public efforts, UNITA engaged in what Crocker termed 
“underground alternative diplomacy,” using back channel links with high-ranking 
officials in the intelligence community and Congress to influence policymaking in 
Washington.353 Crocker describes what he termed a “UNITA project” that was launched 
in 1983 whereby Americans working for the military intelligence wing of the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) linked UNITA spokespeople with U.S. policymakers to 
shape the latter’s orientation on the Angola issue.354 Savimbi also cultivated personal 
links to CIA personnel and even had a CIA liaison to orchestrate and coordinate his trips 
to Washington.355 
 
The Escalating Commitment to UNITA, From Reagan to Bush 
 The U.S. alliance with UNITA during the 1980s and into the 1990s was doubly 
dangerous for the United States because it operated as an open secret. The Reagan and 
Bush administrations were beset by pressure internally from the CIA—which possessed 
an institutional and ideological prerogative to sustain a large-scale covert operation in 
Angola regardless of UNITA’s behavior in the conflict—and externally from 
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conservative lawmakers and private organizations who saw Savimbi and UNITA as 
crucial elements of American efforts to counter the global reach of the Soviet Union by 
supporting “freedom fighters.” Savimbi’s awareness of these dynamics allowed him to 
capitalize on them and stymie Reagan’s ability to use the provision of military aid to 
UNITA to influence Savimbi’s behavior in the desired direction. In fact, the more the 
U.S. supported Savimbi, the more recalcitrant and less accommodating he became. 
Savimbi consistently acted as a spoiler to each attempt by the Reagan and Bush 
administrations to find a negotiated settlement to the territorial disputes in Southern 
Africa (even as both administrations continued and increased military support to 
UNITA). Furthermore, UNITA’s behavior not only undermined U.S. attempts to 
diplomatically resolve several outstanding conflicts in the region, but its egregious human 
rights abuses also damaged U.S. reputation. 
 Reagan’s initial authorization in 1985 of a program of covert military aid to 
UNITA was for a relatively small and limited venture. Once the Clark amendment was 
repealed, Reagan began a relatively small program of covert aid amounting to $15 
million—which was roughly 15% of the support provided to the FNLA and UNITA 
during the Ford administration, adjusted for inflation.356 On February 18, 1986 Reagan 
informed Congress that he had allocated $15 million in military aid for UNITA, which 
would include the provision of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.357 By the end of the 1980s 
U.S. support had quadrupled.358 Nevertheless, as large as the U.S. program got, it was 
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upped to $18 million and in 1988 to $40 million, see Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 138. 
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never going to be sufficiently large to overthrow the MPLA government or to compete 
with the magnitude of the Soviet Union’s support for the MPLA. In a perverse way, U.S. 
aid to Savimbi empowered him sufficiently to be a spoiler to the peace process, but not to 
achieve political power—and the United States continued to support him.359  It is 
important to note that the interstate bargaining literature, as applied to this case, would 
not necessarily have expected to a bargaining advantage for Savimbi. In particular, during 
this time period there were considerable doubts at several junctures about the willingness 
of South Africa to continue to intervene to support UNITA due to domestic political 
considerations within South Africa. In fact, it was these concerns about South Africa’s 
commitment to UNITA that prompted the group to turn to the United States as a potential 
alternative source of support. The threat of diminished, or even the end of, South African 
support should have placed UNITA at a bargaining disadvantage because the group stood 
to lose its heretofore most important ally.360 Rather, the time frame during which one 
observes a clear advantage for the United States is the period leading up to the formation 
of the alliance; Savimbi was disappointed that it took the Reagan administration 6 years 
to start aiding UNITA, and he was also frustrated that the program that Reagan ultimately 
authorized was covert rather than overt (most likely because an overt program would 
have allowed the United States to give greater levels of assistance).361 However, once the 
alliance began, Savimbi gained leverage over Reagan through the institutional and 
reputational mechanisms identified above. 
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 The interactions between Savimbi and members of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations over the course of diplomatic negotiations to resolve outstanding disputes 
in the region represent the most decisive test of the United States’ ability to influence 
Savimbi’s behavior. Merely observing steady increases in the amount of support provided 
to UNITA does not in itself indicate the kind of leverage the United States had over its 
ally—although it is suggestive of path dependent mechanisms at work. Rather, to draw 
inferences about leverage it is necessary to identify specific instances in which the United 
States and UNITA had different ex ante preferences about a particular policy or issue; 
trace the tactics each side employed against the other to move the outcome closer to one’s 
preferred position; and then assess the ultimate outcome in light of the original 
preferences. Of course, in this case, different bureaucracies and branches within the U.S. 
government had different and often conflicting preferences—a fact which Savimbi was 
able to exploit to his advantage.362 While it is difficult to get direct and unbiased 
information about Reagan’s preferences in Angola,363 Constructive Engagement was the 
centerpiece of Reagan’s foreign policy for Southern African and Reagan had invested 
significant political capital in achieving a negotiated settlement to the issue. Covert aid to 
UNITA not only undermined the diplomatic track pursued by Crocker, but the United 
States was unable to leverage the significant support it provided to Savimbi to convince 
him to adhere to negotiated agreements pertaining to Angola (and, in some cases, to even 
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agree to come to the bargaining table). All of the available evidence clearly indicates that 
Savimbi felt he had little incentive to concede to American bargaining positions because 
he felt assured of U.S. support regardless of his behavior due to his relationships with 
members of the intelligence community and Congress.364 Furthermore, Savimbi was able 
to exploit the ambiguity of the scope of U.S. commitment to UNITA to his advantage (in 
particular, the discrepancies between official U.S. policy and private, informal 
reassurances to Savimbi).  
   The U.S. began covert support of UNITA during a period of relative calm in the 
Angolan civil war. 1986 was a “military lull between two storms” because both UNITA 
and the MPLA government were regrouping from the devastating Battle of Lomba 
River.365 Nevertheless, the conflict began to reheat in 1987 and into 1988 as the Angolan 
government, coupled with Cuban troops, launched an offensive to dislodge UNITA from 
its stronghold in Jamba. At the same time, the United States lay the groundwork to begin 
funneling aid to UNITA through Zaire, which included Stinger anti-aircraft missiles 
(desirable due to their effectiveness against Russian equipment). U.S. aid and 
intervention by South Africa enabled UNITA to defeat the Angolan government forces in 
another offensive at Lomba River.366 The UNITA offensive forced government forces to 
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retreat to Cuito Cuanavale and defend against a joint UNITA-South African siege in 
November 1987. At the same time, the Reagan administration resumed diplomatic 
negotiations with the Angolan government, while continuing to aid UNITA.367 However, 
a major diplomatic push did not commence until 1988 when the stalemate on the 
battlefield forced both parties to the negotiating table at Brazzaville.368 The post-1988 
period was characterized by a series of U.S.-sponsored cease-fire agreements, which 
Savimbi systemically violated while continuing to receive increasingly larger amounts of 
U.S. support. Notably, Savimbi “had the admininstration’s commitment of continued 
military aid” despite his spoiling behavior and despite bureaucratic shakeups in the wake 
of the Iran-Contra scandal and Casey’s untimely death. Reagan’s new NSC staff was 
more amenable to a diplomatic approach to Angola, but at this point the bureaucratic 
interests were too entrenched to prompt a changed in the administration’s treatment of 
Savimbi (even as it publicly worked to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict).369 
U.S. funding of UNITA continued through successive cease-fire agreements even as it 
undermined them. In July 1988 the Angolan government, its Cuban ally and South Africa 
agreed to a principle for peace, which the Reagan administration said it could not accept 
until there was a credibility plan for national reconciliation that included Savimbi and 
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368 James, Political History, 175-7.  
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UNITA, and that it would continue funding UNITA until that was achieved. 370 
Subsequently, UNITA announced it would not support the August 8, 1988 Geneva cease-
fire agreement and continue to fight. Despite this fact and also the fact that South African 
announced it was suspending aid to UNITA, which should have decreased UNITA’s 
bargaining power relative to the United States as it was losing its most important ally, the 
Reagan administration went ahead with an additional $50 million appropriation of 
military aid to UNITA.371 Congressional Conservatives played a large role in ensuring 
UNITA continued to receive military aid despite its spoiling behavior; at one point, they 
attempted (but failed) to pass a bill that would hold up funding of the peacekeeping 
mission in Namibia as leverage to ensure Reagan continued to support UNITA.372 
Another diplomatic push succeeded in achieving a signed agreement, following several 
rounds of negotiations, in New York on December 22, 1988, but Savimbi again acted as a 
spoiler of the peace process and threatened to continue resisting if an acceptable 
agreement between the group and the MPLA government could not be reached; the 
Reagan administration continued to support Savimbi throughout this process.373 
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 Changes in U.S. leadership—the inauguration of George H.W. Bush—did not 
produce variation in the United States’ influence over Savimbi, even though this was met 
with staffing changes.374 One might point to this as evidence of the marginal influence of 
bureaucratic politics on bargaining power in these alliances. However, it actually 
illustrates of the opposite. If a phenomenon is path dependent, then initial power 
configurations play the most important role in shaping future behavior, even as those 
same variables might change over time. Furthermore, bureaucratic interests are 
particularly sticky because they permeate an entire organization, so later leadership 
changes at the top are unlikely to dramatically alter a bureaucracy’s orientation unless 
that is coupled with significant internal overhaul. In fact, the leadership changes that 
followed Bush’s inauguration did not affect U.S. Angola policy. Bush met with Savimbi 
following his election and affirmed that the United States would continue to support 
UNITA until the group was part of a successful national reconciliation agreement, and 
American aid doubled and tripled in amount from the Reagan years, getting as high as 
$60-90 million in 1990.375 Revelations about UNITA’s systemic human rights abuses did 
not stop U.S. support of UNITA—they had “singularly little effect on the U.S. 
government.”376 Even Savimbi’s continued behavior as a spoiler of the U.S.-led peace 
negotiations did not undermine American support of UNITA. In fact, it was Savimbi’s 
assurances of U.S. support that enabled him to be sufficiently confident in military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Wright, Destruction, 142. Here, Wright notes that bureaucratic changes and domestic 
political changes diminished the influence of conservatives. Nevertheless, this didn’t 
immediately produce changes in outcomes.  
375 Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 143. 
376 Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 113. 
	   173	  
strength to continue to challenge the MPLA governmet and spoil the peace process.377 
Scott attributes the Bush administration’s posture toward UNITA to decreasing interest 
on the part of high-level decision-makers on the Angola issue due to more pressing 
security concerns in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War in 1990. White 
House neglect gave wider reign to the mid- and low-level bureaucrats within the CIA 
who were holdovers from the Reagan years, leading “to the continuation of existing 
policies.”378   
 The Bush administration increased aid to UNITA even as there was growing 
concern in Congress that it was no longer necessary because Cuban troops were in the 
early stages of withdrawal from the country, as stipulated by U.S.-led negotiations. In 
April 1989 the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee held hearings on whether continued 
aid to UNITA was justified.379 At the same time, UNITA’s representative to the United 
States, Marcos Samondo, petitioned the Bush administration for an increase in American 
aid to UNITA due to the end of South African support. In particular, UNITA requested 
$45-80 million annual as well as the provision of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA 
claimed the MPLA government was planning a large offensive against UNITA using 
Soviet MiG-25s. The Bush administration knew Savimbi was likely lying about Soviet 
MiGs, but that was irrelevant. The Congressional intelligence committee approved a still-
classified amount of aid to UNITA, and on June 21, 1989 the House intelligence 
committee approved a request for increased aid to UNITA, just one day prior to a 
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ceasefire agreement. The United States ensured the delivery of this support “by airlifting 
military supplies directly to Jamba, with C-130 transport planes.” UNITA’s head of 
military intelligence, Wambu Chindondo, claimed that the group received all it had 
requested from Bush.380 
 Just following the June 22, 1989 ceasefire agreement in Gbadolite, Zaire—to 
which Savimbi consented—UNITA reneged on June 29, 1989 and resumed military 
activities against the Angolan government. Despite UNITA’s violations of the ceasefire, 
the Bush administration pledged to continue military support for UNITA until there was a 
national unity government including UNITA.381 In the leadup to the September summit at 
Kinshasa, Assistant Secretary of State Cohen met Savimbi at Abidjan and pressed him to 
attend the upcoming summit, conveying a message from President Bush that UNITA’s 
participation in the summit would prompt the United States to support multi-party 
elections in Angola. This was coupled with a letter written by President Bush to Savimbi 
urging him to attend. Savimbi refused both entreaties; he could “afford to ‘stand firm’ or 
threaten future disruption of the peace process” because “his American backers were 
providing him with the encouragement to do so.”382 Furthermore, it’s not clear how effect 
Bush believed his carrot to Savimbi could have been, given that U.S. had already been 
supportive of the position that UNITA should be part of a national reconciliation 
government. Indeed, Bush continued to support UNITA despite Savimbi’s failure to 
show up to Kinshasa. Bridgland explicitly ties continued Bush support of UNITA to the 
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influence of the CIA within the Bush administration, creating a situation in which 
Savimbi had “virtually unconditional American support assured.”383   
 Bush was presented with, but failed to seize, an opportunity in late 1989 to 
moderate U.S. support for UNITA. Following a rift between Savimbi and Mobutu, Zaire 
cut off CIA aid to the group, which flowed through Zaire to Angola. Rather than use this 
as leverage to get Savimbi to return to the bargaining table, Bush brought Savimbi and 
Mobutu to Washington to repair relations between them so that CIA aid to UNITA could 
resume.384 Around the same time, in December 1989, the Angolan government initiated 
an offensive against UNITA at Mavinga, prompting pressure by Congressional 
conservatives to increase military aid to UNITA. Bush publicly supported UNITA’s 
efforts against the Angolan government and U.S. support to UNITA increased by an 
order of magnitude in the first quarter of 1990. Even so, Conservative pundits accused the 
administration of not providing sufficient support to the rebels. The peace negotiations 
collapsed in January 1990.385 Guaranteed and increased American aid allowed Savimbi to 
expand its military campaign in the spring of 1990. In fact, reports surfaced in early 1990 
that the United States was substantially augmenting the nature of its military involvement 
in Angola, including devising plans to furnish UNITA with a rudimentary air force and 
installing American military advisors on the ground in Angola. Simultaneously, the 
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Angolan government proposed revise peace agreement terms but Savimbi rejected 
them.386  
 The exogenous shock that created an opening allowing the United States to 
extricate itself from its alliance with UNITA was the end of the Cold War. In particular, 
the Bush administration was beset by newfound pressure to suspend aid to UNITA.387 
Even so, major systemic change did not immediately prompt alliance termination. There 
were still actors with political clout within Congress and the White House pushing for 
continued aid to Savimbi despite the fall of the Soviet Union and, therefore, the marked 
decline in geopolitical significance of the civil war in Angola. An amendment to 
terminate U.S. aid to UNITA failed to garner sufficient Congressional votes to pass; 
however, a second amendment limiting U.S. assistance to UNITA passed but was not 
implemented because Bush vetoed it.388 This event “signaled to Savimbi that he was no 
longer assured of a blank cheque from Congress.”389 Savimbi was finally brought to the 
bargaining table in 1990 because Conservatives in Congress, “reading the handwriting 
left by the 1990 aid cut, told the UNITA leader that negotiations were the only option 
left.”390 Even so, there was still sufficient ambiguity in the signals coming from the Bush 
administration that allowed Savimbi to take calculated gambles to continue to reject 
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successive rounds of peace agreements. While Congress had begun to turn against 
UNITA, the White House was still pushing for increased military aid; in 1990 Bush had 
requested an additional $10-15 million in excess of the $50 that had already been 
appropriated. While the House intelligence committee approved renewed funding for 
UNITA, the passing vote was by a substantially smaller margin. With continued 
assurances from Bush about continued American support, Savimbi announced UNITA’s 
acceptance of the terms of a peace agreement on December 14 during a meeting between 
himself, Bush and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze.391 However, 
in February 1991, the sixth round of negotiations, UNITA rejected an April 15th ceasefire 
date. It was not until May 31, 1991, with the signing of the Bicesse Accords, that the 
warring parties announced an agreed-upon ceasefire with elections scheduled for 1992. 
This marked the end of American military aid to UNITA, although Congress approved 
$20 million in non-lethal aid to Angola, which Windrich implies was intended to help 
UNITA secure electoral victories.392 Wright claims that Bush continued to provide covert 
military aid to UNITA even as the Bicesse Accords were being implemented, 
appropriating money through fiscal year 1992.393 Following the end of the alliance, 
Savimbi’s forces systematically violated the ceasefire agreement and refused to accept 
the results of the 1992 election, again resuming violence against the government.394  
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Conclusion 
 While the alliance politics literature corrected predicted the outcome of the U.S.-
UNITA alliance—that the Regan and Bush administrations would encounter considerable 
difficulties in their attempts to manage Savimbi and control UNITA’s behavior—the 
causal logic of the case does not correspond to that of the theory. In particular, rather than 
strategically use access to multiple sources of external support (of which there is little 
evidence in the historical record), Savimbi exploited his close connections with important 
domestic political actors in the United States, as well as with the CIA, to back Reagan 
into a corner and continue to extract increasingly large amounts of covert aid, all the 
while taking actions that undermined American interests in the region. Additionally, 
changes in the makeup of Savimbi’s external patrons, specifically the loss of South 
African, support, did not undermine his leverage within the United States. In fact, 
American support only increased following UNITA’s loss of South Africa. Therefore, the 
case highlights how open secrets—where the existence of an alliance between a state and 
non-state proxy is known, while its provisions are kept secret—can be particularly 
dangerous for states because political leaders are on the hook in two respects: they have 
to respond to the institutional motivations of the (secretive) security apparatus tasked 
with managing the alliance, as well as the domestic political costs associated with the 
alliance. Furthermore, process tracing clearly illustrates that Savimbi felt assured of 
American support not because he could play the United States and South Africa off 
against one another, but because of his personal connections with groups and institutions 
within the U.S. government. At the moment of alliance formation, Reagan chose to 
structure the U.S.-UNITA alliance as a covert one because he had to contend with a 
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stridently hawkish wing of the Republican Party publicly advocating for an even more 
expansive American arming of the so-called “freedom fighters” in Angola. However, this 
meant Reagan was forced to delegate a lot of authority for alliance management to the 
CIA and its director, Casey, who wanted to ensure the CIA had a covert presence on 
every continent and who was ideologically motivated to support Savimbi. This locked the 
United States into an alliance with UNITA in which the former had little leverage over 
the latter—Savimbi felt assured of American support due to his connects with hawkish 
members of Congress and the CIA, and therefore felt he could take actions that 
undermined American policies in the region without the fear of punishment. These 
dynamics played out over the course of the alliance despite changes in presidential 
administrations and CIA and NSC leaders. The only exogenous shock that was sufficient 
to dislodge the United States from its alliance with UNITA was the end of the Cold 
War—but even here there was considerable lag between the shock and the ability of the 
Bush administration to extricate the United States from Angola. In fact, lest readers 
believe it was the influence of Congressional Conservatives—rather than the CIA—that 
had the overwhelming effect on American leverage over Savimbi, the empirical record 
demonstrates that the White House continued to push for support for UNITA even after 
Congress grew disenchanted with the group.  
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Chapter 6 




In order to have some confidence that the findings from the two in-depth 
qualitative case studies analyzed are generalizable, rather than stemming from 
idiosyncratic elements, I conduct four mini qualitative case studies that vary across the 
explanatory variables deemed important by the alliance politics literature, as well as vary 
on the dependent variable, to take a first step toward assessing the generalizability of the 
my theory. As illustrated by Table 8, I selected four cases in which the alliance politics 
literature has clear empirical predictions: India’s alliance with the Mukti Bahini in the 
former East Pakistan in 1971; India’s alliance with various Tamil militant groups in Sri 
Lanka between 1983 and 1987; the alliance between Iran, the United States, and Israel, 
and the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan between 1972 and 1975; and the alliance between the 
United States, Zaire, and South Africa, and the FNLA and UNITA in Angola from 1975 
to 1976.  
Table 8: Case Selection  
 One proxy Many proxies 
One state sponsor India-Mukti Bahini alliance 
in East Pakistan (1971) 
India-Tamil militants alliance in 
Sri Lanka (1983-1987) 
Many state sponsors Iran/United States/Israel-
KDP alliance in Iraqi 
Kurdistan (1972-1975) 
United States/Zaire/South Africa-
FNLA/UNITA alliance in Angola 
(1975-1976) 
 
Within these four cases, there are also two subsets of paired comparisons: in the East 
Pakistan case, India was able to control its proxy, while in the Sri Lanka case it failed to 
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do so; similarly, in Iraqi Kurdistan the United States was not drawn into unwanted 
conflict escalation, while in Angola it was on the trajectory to do so (but failed for 
exogenous reasons). Additionally, these cases were selected because they hold constant 
other variables that may have affected the outcomes. Specifically, all of these alliances 
occurred during the Cold War in roughly similar time periods, and all involved 
democracies (India and the United States) as state sponsors. While obviously not 
exhaustive of the universe of cases, expanding the scope of the empirical analysis 
provides some confidence that the results of the two in-depth case studies are not 
distinctive or contingent on idiosyncratic factors.    
  
Betrayal: The KDP’s Alliance with Iran, the United States, and Israel 
 The alliance between Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) 
and Iran, the United States, and Israel from 1972 to 1975 presents a challenge to the 
alliance politics literature because the case appears to represent a failed prediction. 
Specifically, the alliance politics literature would have expected the KDP to have 
leverage over its state sponsors due to the fact that it enjoyed support from multiple states 
and, at the time, was the sole rebel group operating in Iraqi Kurdistan.395 Additionally, 
while the United States and Israel had more diffuse interests at stake (Richard Nixon 
wanted to check Soviet influence in the Middle East, and Golda Meir sought to 
undermine Iraq’s ability to challenge Israel’s security), the Iranians felt directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 The number of Kurdish resistance groups has varied over time. However, prior to 
receiving external support from Iran, the U.S., and Israel in 1972, Barzani had 
consolidated his hold over the Kurdish resistance, incorporating Jalal Talabani’s faction 
and his fighters in 1970 so that there was only one effective Kurdish resistance by 1972. 
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threatened by Saddam Hussein’s recent movements against Khuzestan and the general 
challenge Iraq posed to Iranian aspirations for hegemony in the Gulf.396 Despite these 
ostensible bargaining advantages, Barzani was unable to play the KDP’s sponsors off 
against each other (interestingly, Barzani specifically sought out American support 
because he erroneously believed it would serve as a credible guarantee against 
abandonment by Iran397). In fact, the Iranians and Americans colluded in secret to his 
detriment. After Kissinger and the Shah encouraged Barzani to take a more militant 
stance vis-à-vis Baghdad and reject the 1974 autonomy offer, Iran (followed by the U.S. 
and Israel) abruptly withdrew support in 1975 when it signed an agreement with Iraq 
concerning the Shatt al Arab waterway, causing the near-decimation of the KDP. While 
for a period of time in 1974, Iran increased its support for the KDP following Iraqi 
advances (thus paying a higher-than-anticipated price for supporting its proxy), it was 
ultimately able to abandon its ally when the anticipated costs of continued support 
outweighed the potential benefits. 
 In contrast, as my theory would expect, the security agencies and individuals to 
whom political leaders delegated authority in order to preserve plausible deniability—and 
the institutions those agencies established for alliance management—played a critical role 
in determining the balance of influence in this set of alliances. In particular, the central 
role played by the Iranian intelligence organization, SAVAK, in coordinating and 
controlling the flow of resources from both the Iranian government as well as Israel and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State within a State (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2012): 68-70. 
397 Jonathan C. Randal, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with 
Kurdistan (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1997): 150. 
	   183	  
the U.S. to the KDP, and imposing a rigorous set of institutional controls over Barzani 
and the KDP, is the most important factor explaining Barzani’s inability to manipulate his 
external sponsors. In fact, the close interpersonal relationship between Israeli Mossad 
officers operating in Tehran and Iraqi Kurdistan and Israel’s eagerness to continue and 
increase support to the KDP despite the 1975 Algiers agreement between Iran and Iraq 
suggests that, were it not for Iran’s pivotal role as the funnel for the KDP’s other 
sponsors, Israel may have been drawn into more extensive involvement against Iraq.398   
 
Background 
 The KDP, as well as other Kurdish resistance groups, has had a longstanding and 
complicated relationship with its external sponsors. As early as the 1960s, there is 
evidence that Iran and Israel provided covert support to the KDP, and that the group 
petitioned the U.S. for aid (there are debates about which, if any, of these petitions were 
successful). For example, in 1963 Iran is reported to have supported the Kurdish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 One might claim that Israel, Iran, and the U.S. were not in fact true alternatives to the 
KDP, given the centrality of Iran in terms of both the size of Iranian aid relative to Israel 
and the U.S. and its role as a logistical clearinghouse for almost all of the KDP’s external 
support. According to John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Iran supplied up to 90% of the 
KDP’s arms, see John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains: The 
Tragic History of the Kurds (London: Viking, 1992): 138. Nevertheless, Barzani certainly 
believed it would be to the KDP’s advantage if he secured support from states other than 
Iran and that he could use assurances of American support as a bargaining chip to prevent 
the Shah from abandoning him. Additionally, the fact that the Shah was dependent on the 
KDP as his only bargaining chip against Baghdad lends credence to Barzani’s beliefs. 
Moreover, even if we accept the contention that the United States and Israel were not in 
fact alternatives to Iran and, therefore, Barzani was dependent solely on Iran, the alliance 
politics literature in that case would expect that Barzani would still retain the advantage 
because the KDP had far more salient interests at stake in the issue at hand and could 
therefore stay firm and extract a better bargain. In fact, what we observe in the case is the 
delegation strategies chosen by the KDP’s state sponsors blunted whatever advantage 
Barzani may have enjoyed from his access to external support and his interests at stake. 
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resistance following the prospective unification of Syria, Iraq and Egypt after the 
dissolution of the United Arab Republic.399 With the Ba’thist coup in Baghdad in 1968 
and Tehran’s ensuing fears about the Iraqi threat, the Shah increased its covert aid to 
Barzani contingent on Barzani’s agreement to preclude Iraqi Kurdistan from serving as a 
base for support for the Kurdish movement in Iran.400 Similarly, the Israelis began 
supporting the Kurds in the early- to mid-1960s, when Barzani sought out Israeli aid. 
Israel responded by providing Barzani with financial support, arms, and training; in 
return, Israel asked Barzani to bog down Iraqi forces during the 1967 war.401 Both Israeli 
and Iranian support to the KDP increased in the lead up to the 1970 limited autonomy 
agreement between Baghdad and the Kurds in an effort to dissuade Barzani from 
accepting Baghdad’s terms. A March 1970 CIA cable relayed to Washington that 
Barzani’s son, Idriss, had met with Israeli and Iranian handlers in Tehran in early March 
and received promises of support in exchange for suspending negotiations with 
Baghdad.402 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1981): 136. At the time, there were two Kurdish factions of note operating in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, one led by Barzani and the other by Jalal Talabani. By 1972, however, the 
KDP was the sole group operating in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
400 Ibid., 136. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2004): 326. 
401  Ghareeb, Kurdish Question, 142. McDowall Modern History, 331. Marianna 
Charountaki, The Kurds and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Relations in the Middle 
East Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2011): 134. 
402  Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable TDCS DB-315/01044-70, 
Washington, 9 March 1970, Document 267, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 
1969-1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d267. In an illustration of 
an Israeli tactic to ensure plausible deniability, the Israelis suggested to Idriss Barzani 
that the KDP capture a few Iraqi tanks so that the Israelis could use those as cover to arm 
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 The ties between the United States and the KDP prior to 1972 are a bit murkier. 
There is some support in the literature for the CIA’s role in arming the KDP around 
1968-69, but no consensus.403 Before the initiation of covert aid in 1972, various United 
States agencies consistently rejected Barzani’s entreaties for support. For example, as 
early as the summer of 1971, Barzani attempted (and failed) to establish a relationship 
between the KDP and the United States government, seeking “the possibility of U.S. 
support for a Kurdish-Arab insurrection against the Iraqi regime.”404 It was not until the 
Iraq-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed on Aril 9, 1972 and Baghdad’s nationalization of 
the Iraq Petroleum Company on June 1, 1972 that Barzani, through the Shah’s mediation, 
could secure a commitment from the United States for covert aid.405 
 
When Having Alternatives Fails to Confer a Bargaining Advantage 
The story of Iran’s betrayal of the KDP flips traditional understandings of how 
alliance bargaining works on its head. Barzani erroneously believed securing American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the KDP with additional tanks. Notably, this effort failed and Barzani accepted 
Baghdad’s offer of limited autonomy, to his later chagrin. 
403 McDowall, Modern History, 326. Charountaki claims that the U.S. provided Barzani 
with $14 million in August 1969, see Charountaki, Kurds and U.S. Foreign Policy, 135. 
Ghareeb makes the same claim, asserting that American officers associated with the 
Baghdad Pact met with Barzani in the summer of 1949 and offered him aid in exchange 
for Barzani signing a secret agreement including a series of strict provisions, see 
Ghareeb, Kurdish Question, 138-9. But see Douglas Little, “The United States and the 
Kurds: A Cold War Story,” Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 68.  
404 Airgram 222 From the Embassy in London to the Department of State, 16 July 1971, 
Document 292, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1969-1976, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76ve04/d292.  
405 Ghareeb, Kurdish Question, 131-2, 137. 
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support would improve his bargaining position vis-à-vis Tehran and serve as a guarantor 
of Iranian support.406 The amount of covert aid the Nixon administration provided to the 
KDP was “just important enough to comfort Barzani…of a genuine American guarantee 
for the Kurds.” 407  Barzani himself articulated this logic: “We wanted American 
guarantees. We never trusted the Shah. Without American promises we wouldn’t have 
acted the way we did.”408 Barzani’s inability to manipulate the KDP’s three external 
sponsors—the United States, Iran, and Israel—to his advantage is thus surprising from 
the perspective of the alliance politics literature because access to alternatives is posited 
to be a key predictor of leverage.  
 There is some tension in the alliance politics literature between the role of 
dependence versus access to alternatives. On the one hand, the latter is usually 
operationalized as a measure of the former. On the other hand, the Kurdish case suggests 
dependence can occur even in the presence of available alternatives. Indeed, by 1972 
Barzani was more dependent on external sponsorship than in previous years. The Kurdish 
movement felt threatened by the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet treaty, forcing Barzani to seek out 
external support. In particular, the treaty led the Ba’th party to strengthen its ties with the 
Iraqi Communist Party at the KDP’s expense, and Baghdad ceased its subsidy to the 
Kurdish peshmerga. Barzani, in particular, felt personally threatened by Baghdad’s 
moves after an attempted assassination in September 1971.409  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 Ghareeb, Kurdish Question, 140. McDowall, Modern History, 331. 
407 Randal, After Such Knowledge, 152. 
408 McDowall, Modern History, 331. 
409 Bengio, Kurds of Iraq, 66-8. Bulloch and Morris, No Friends, 132-5. 
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However, according to the alliance politics literature, Barzani should have been 
able to overcome these deficiencies through manipulating his multiple sources of external 
support, especially given Iran’s reliance on the KDP as a means of extracting concessions 
from Iraq. In fact, in a July 24, 1973 conversation between the Shah, Iranian Ambassador 
to the United States Ardeshir Zahedi, Kissinger, and other American policy principals, 
the Shah acknowledged Iran’s dependence on the Kurds saying, “our only lever over the 
Iraqi government is the Kurds.”410 Barzani also had access to alternative sources of 
support even beyond Iran, the United States, and Israel. Up to the point that the KDP 
rejected Baghdad’s autonomy offer in March 1974, the Soviet Union was open as a 
source of alternative support to Barzani; the Soviets were trying to get the Kurds to 
cooperate to form an inclusive national government in Iraq.411 In other words, the 
structural conditions were present for the KDP to have a bargaining advantage. What, 
therefore, accounts for Barzani’s inability to take advantage of the KDP’s multiple 
sources of sponsorship?  
Interestingly, the Iranians and the Americans both encouraged the KDP to seek 
out support from other states—something that should have undermined their influence 
over the KDP. The Shah, aware of Barzani’s deep mistrust for him, convinced the Nixon 
administration to provide covert aid to the KDP to placate Barzani into believing the 
United States would serve as a guarantor of Iranian aid.412 In particular, the Shah believed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 24 July 1973, 5-6:40 p.m., Document 27, 
Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-
1976, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d27.  
411 Little, “United States.” 
412 Randal, After Such Knowledge, 150. 
	   188	  
that if Barzani had access to more alliance partners, he would be less likely to seek a 
negotiated settlement with Baghdad. 413  The United States also considered pushing 
Barzani to seek out other sources of support, such as the Saudis or Kuwaitis.414   
 
Interests at Stake 
 Iran, in particular, should have been at a strong disadvantage relative to the KDP, 
according to the alliance politics literature, because Barzani’s access to multiple sources 
of external support was coupled with critical Iranian interests at stake. The fact that the 
KDP’s fate was crucial to the Shah’s foreign policy goals in the region, coupled with the 
KDP’s alternative alliance partners, should have undermined Iran’s leverage over its 
proxy. Specifically, Barzani was ideally positioned to take advantage of the deepening 
rivalry between Iran and Iraq, which was heightened with the Ba’thist coup in Iraq in 
1968. The Iran-Iraq rivalry stemmed from “a conservative, non-Arab Iranian monarchy 
whose ruler was seeking both to preserve his throne and to play a dominant role in the 
region, particularly in the Arab/Persian Gulf, and an Arab nationalist and socialist regime 
aiming at maintaining itself in power, spreading its ideology to other Arab regions, and 
thwarting Iran’s aims in the Gulf.” 415  Iran’s perception of threat was even more 
exacerbated when Iraq signed the 1972 treaty with the Soviet Union, which the Shah 
perceived as a direct challenge to Iran’s hegemony in the Gulf. In this increasingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Bulloch and Morris, No Friends, 138. 
414 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 23 July 1973, Document 24, Volume 
XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, 
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menacing regional environment, Iran wanted to avoid a direct challenge to Iraq; the 
Kurdish resistance allowed Iran to undermine Baghdad’s interests without prompting 
Iraqi retribution. In particular, the Shah did not want Iraq to use Iranian support of the 
KDP as a pretext for fomenting revolt by Arabs in Iranian Khuzistan. The KDP itself, 
however, posted a threat to the Iranian regime. The Shah had a history of mistrust for 
Barzani, especially after the latter’s role in the formation of the short-lived Republic of 
Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan. Iran also did not want the KDP to be so successful that it 
sparked resistance among the Kurdish population in Iran.416 Therefore, Iran wanted the 
KDP to be sufficiently strengthened to undermine Iraqi stability, but not so successful 
that it undermine Iranian interests; or, in the words of the Shah, “I want the fire of the 
rebellion to flicker, but I do not want a flame.”417 
 In contrast to Iran, the United States did not have a specific strategic interest in 
the Kurdish question. Rather, the Kurdish issue was part of the United States’ broader 
regional strategy (the Nixon doctrine), which centered on supporting the Shah of Iran as 
the bulwark of stability in the Gulf; protecting conservative Gulf states against the threat 
posed by a radical Ba’thist regime in Iraq; managing the Arab-Israeli conflict; protecting 
oil interests; and preventing further Soviet encroachment in the Middle East.418 Indeed, as 
Kissinger said in the summer of 1973, “What I want is for the Politburo in Moscow to be 
in a frame of mind not to want to get involved in further adventures in the Middle East. I 
want them to recall that they were run out of Egypt and that Iraq turned out to be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Bengio, Kurds of Iraq, 68-9. Bulloch and Morris, No Friends, 136. 
417 Bengio, Kurds of Iraq, 75. 
418 Ibid., 70-1. Ghareeb, Kurdish Question, 140-1. Charountaki, Kurds and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 136-7. 
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bottomless pit.” 419  From this lens, therefore, the Iraq-Soviet treaty and Iraq’s 
nationalization of the IPC without compensating British and American owners were 
concerning.420 Barzani, through his intermediaries, attempted to play on American fears 
of Soviet expansionism in the region. At a meeting between a KDP emissary and an Iraqi 
desk officer at the State Department in Washington, the former stressed that, “the stakes 
are high and that only the U.S. can, by supporting Barzani either directly or indirectly, 
stem the Soviet tide.” If the Nixon administration fails to help the KDP, then 
“Barzani will be obliged to join the national front [government in Iraq], and the West's 
last opportunity to thwart Soviet designs in Iraq will have been lost.”421 While certainly 
important, the Soviet role alone was not sufficient to change Nixon’s mind about 
supporting the KDP. It was not until the Shah pushed Nixon to support the KDP that he 
conceded, because Iran was the crux of U.S. interests in the KDP.422 It was the Shah who 
organized the first covert meeting between U.S. representatives and the Kurds in the 
spring of 1972.423 When Nixon and Kissinger visited Tehran in late May 1972, they 
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agreed to the Shah’s request to aid the KDP.424 Iranian pressure on the United States 
began to build in March 1972, when a senior SAVAK officer reached out to the CIA to 
discuss the Soviet Union’s role in Iraq and assess the CIA’s interested in supporting an 
effort to undermine the Iraqi regime.425 The Nixon administration, therefore, became 
involved in Iraqi Kurdistan because of the Iranians, not the Kurds; in the words of Brent 
Scowcroft, “The Kurds were derivative.”426 Importantly, neither the Americans nor the 
Iranians wanted to see the KDP establish an independent Kurdistan. The Kurds were 
merely important as a tool to weaken the Ba’th regime in Baghdad.427 
 Israel’s interests in the Kurdish issue were twofold. First, Israel sought to keep the 
Ba’thist regime bogged down in internal conflicts so that it would pose a diminished 
threat to Israel. Second, Israel wanted help getting Iraqi Jews to Israel.428 Interestingly, 
Israel’s desire for the KDP ran in direct opposition to that of Iran and the United States; 
while the latter wanted the KDP strengthened only sufficiently to cause problems for Iraq 
without actually overthrowing the regime in Baghdad, the former preferred the KDP to be 
totally strengthened.429 
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Alliance Management: SAVAK’s Iron Fist  
 The Shah’s management of Barzani and the KDP differed dramatically from that 
of the United States and Israel. While the United States (even more so than Israel) 
delegated considerable authority for alliance management to external actors (namely, 
Iran), the Shah, through Iran’s intelligence organization, SAVAK, inserted himself into 
the decision-making and operations of the KDP. The Shah employed a variety of tactics 
to prevent Barzani from taking actions that would undermine Iran’s interests, including 
controlling the aid the KDP received from its other external sponsors. SAVAK is the 
paradigmatic example of a centralized security apparatus, and the Shah’s authority over 
SAVAK was supreme.430 The Shah’s centralization of authority—both over the KDP and 
American and Israeli efforts to aid the latter—allowed Iran to use the KDP for his own 
ends without conceding on any issue that may have undermined Iran’s interests. 
Iran played a large role developing the KDP’s organization from the early years 
of the group’s formation. In fact, both Israel’s Mossad and Iran’s SAVAK helped the 
KDP establish its intelligence organization, Parastin, which collected intelligence on the 
regime in Baghdad.431 Barzani chafed under Iranian control, but there was little he could 
do to alleviate it. During a conversation between U.S. State Department representatives in 
London and one of Barzani’s emissaries in the summer of 1971, the latter expressed 
frustration with Iran’s substantial involvement in internal KDP organization and 
operations. The Embassy, in an a report to the State Department, conveyed Barzani’s 
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vexation with Iran: “In the past, Barzani received subsidies from Iran but in return Iran 
insisted on maintaining such heavy-handed control over Kurdish activities—including the 
designation of the Prime Minister in the projected government—that it caused the failure 
of the whole revolutionary effort.”432  
In addition to making personnel decisions, SAVAK reorganized the KDP to orient 
itself conventionally against the Iraqi regime, rather than the guerrilla formations it had 
historically employed. Iran also calibrated the pace at which the KDP received arms from 
the regime in Tehran; whenever the group went on the offensive, Iranian support dried 
up.433 Iran decreased aid when the Kurds were ahead and increased it when they were 
behind.434 Iranian forces worked directly with KDP in training camps on Iranian soil as 
well as coordinated operations with the KDP on the ground in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iranian 
forces also maintained command and control over Iranian weaponry employed in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.435 For example, Iran had hundreds of pieces of field artillery, anti-tank 
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missiles, and SAM missiles on the ground in Iraqi Kurdistan, which were maintained and 
employed by Iranian forces.436 Furthermore, because Barzani was in Tehran for much of 
the conflict between the KDP and Iraqi forces in 1974-5, the Shah was able to control his 
movements and communications with KDP forces on the front and prevent Barzani from 
taking actions that might undermine Iranian interests. Even in Tehran, Barzani’s access to 
the Shah was limited and was determined by the latter’s proclivities.437 
Barzani had to inform the Shah of his planned military operations and political 
programs and receive the latter’s approval. There are multiple documented occasions of 
this occurrence. For instance, in a conversation between the Shah and Kissinger, among 
others, the Shah explained to Kissinger regarding KDP activities in Iraqi Kurdistan that, 
“Barzani promised not to do anything without our okay.”438 In the spring of 1974, 
following the KDP’s rejection of Baghdad’s March autonomy agreement, the American 
Ambassador to Iran relayed to Kissinger how the KDP provided the Shah with a copy of 
the group’s proposed declaration of autonomy for the Shah’s approval, and how SAVAK 
instructed Barzani to delay broadcasting the declaration pending Iranian consultation with 
the United States.439 In September of the same year, Barzani submitted plans for 
attacking oil fields in Kirkuk.440   
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As will be demonstrated below, the Shah and SAVAK’s penetration of the KDP 
organization permitted Iran to control the direction of the proxy group’s activities in Iraqi 
Kurdistan and protect Iranian interests. This fact, coupled with Iran’s control over 
American and Israeli resources funneled through Iran to Barzani, undermined Barzani’s 
leverage over all of his external supporters. 
 
Alliance Management: Israel and the United States 
Both Israel and the United States make different alliance management choices 
that could have undermined their leverage over the KDP, were it not for Iran’s critical 
role as the intermediary through which all resources to the KDP were transferred. Unlike 
the United States, which took a hands-off approach to its relations with the KDP, Israel 
had a long history of contact and involvement with the development of the KDP. The 
Mossad not only helped Barzani set up his intelligence organization, but Israeli officers 
also were set as liaisons to advise the Kurds. An Israeli officer, Major Eliahu Kohen, 
served as a permanent liaison to Barzani’s headquarters.441 These decisions could have 
positioned Israel to exert significant leverage over the KDP’s activities. However, 
Mossad agents developed close, emotional relationships with their Kurdish assets that 
became stronger over time and that led the Israelis to support Kurdish requests for 
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additional tanks, artillery, and equipment. This was buttressed by Israeli public opinion, 
which was sympathetic to the Kurdish plight and saw analogies between Kurdish 
aspirations for independence and the Jewish experience. Israel refrained from cutting off 
support to the Kurds even when the latter failed to tie down Iraqi forces, as promised, 
during the 1967 war. The Israelis also interceded to convince Iran to let Israeli agents 
remain in Iran to assist the Kurds after the Shah wanted to expel them following 
Barzani’s March agreement with Baghdad in March 1970.442 
Unlike Israel, which established strong connections with the KDP, the United 
States sought to create distance between the Nixon administration and the KDP to 
preserve plausible deniability. Maintaining secrecy was a paramount concerns for the 
Nixon administration. Nixon worried that overt support would undermine détente and, 
during the depths of American involvement in Vietnam, he speculated that there would 
be little public interest in or support for further foreign entanglements.443 To that effect, 
Nixon provided minimal information about the covert alliance to other branches of 
government and even other bureaucracies within the executive, as well as delegating 
considerable authority for alliance management to Tehran. When Nixon agreed to the 
Shah’s request in the spring of 1972 to provide covert aid to the KDP, Kissinger kept the 
program secret from the State Department, circumventing the 40 Committee as much as 
possible (the committee was informed of the program in a perfunctory, single-paragraph 
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report). The CIA Chief of Station in Tehran was informed to keep information about the 
program secret from the American Ambassador to Iran to ensure the Secretary of State 
did not find out about the program. Nixon used secret, unofficial backchannels to convey 
to the Shah that he had decided to support the KDP, sending his Secretary of the 
Treasury, John Connally, to Tehran in the spring of 1972.444 The funding for the covert 
operation came out of the CIA’s reserve budget, which had fewer accountability 
mechanisms than the CIA’s normal operating budget.445 Despite alleged tensions between 
the White House and the CIA, in a memorandum from the CIA’s Chief of Near East and 
South Asia Division to the Director of Central Intelligence, the former advocated 
providing covert support to the KDP: “The alternative of letting the Kurdish resistance 
die from lack of support…will mean that the Kurds will be compelled to join the Soviet-
sponsored National Front, and the Ba'th will be able unhindered to pursue its offensive in 
the area. On balance it appears better to take the risks of keeping Kurdish resistance 
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alive.”446 Nixon and Kissinger also prevented contacts between the Kurds and senior U.S. 
officials—most of the connections were made in Europe between the CIA and Barzani’s 
people.447 In fact, Barzani persistently pestered Kissinger for a meeting in Washington 
but was constantly turned down.448 Most importantly, the Nixon administration funneled 
its entire covert aid program through Iran. In a meeting with Barzani in July 1972, the 
Director of Central Intelligence stressed the importance of secrecy and the role, therefore, 
that would be played by Iran as an intermediary: “it would be very difficult for the United 
States to provide military equipment directly to Kurdistan without American involvement 
becoming public knowledge…we might have to consider channeling any such aid 
through the [text not declassified] or Iranian governments.”449 
 
Iran: The Fulcrum  
 Iran’s role in serving as an intermediary between Israel, the United States, and the 
KDP undermined Barzani’s ability to take advantage of a structural context in which the 
KDP was sponsored by multiple states. For geographical, logistical, and political reasons, 
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Iran controlled nearly all of the aid Barzani received from Israel and the United States, 
which, coupled with the Shah’s viselike control over the KDP, placed Iran in an ideal 
position to shape the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan to his advantage.  
 Politically, as previously noted, American involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan was 
fundamentally driven by Iranian strategic interests. The Shah had significant leverage 
over Nixon’s foreign policy in the region because he was perceived to be a critical 
defender of American interests in the Persian Gulf under the Nixon doctrine.450 Indeed, 
the Shah was quite aware of this fact; in May 1972 he remarked to his personal secretary 
that Iran is America’s only reliable ally in the region.451 The Director of Central 
Intelligence Richard Helms made clear to Barzani’s representatives at a meeting at CIA 
headquarters in July 1972 that the United States would be following the Shah’s lead 
politically in dealing with the KDP.452 To maintain plausible deniability, American 
officials avoided meeting with Barzani directly, instead channeling everything through 
the Iranians.453  
Relatedly, Iran was indispensible to both the United States and Israel for 
geographical and logistical reasons. If, in the interests of plausible deniability, the U.S. 
could not operate on the ground in Iraqi Kurdistan, it had to funnel resources through 
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American allies in the neighborhood. Helms acknowledged this fact in a June 1972 CIA 
memorandum: “Geography makes Iran an essential intermediary in any arms delivery 
system.”454 Therefore, American money, arms, and ammunition flowed through Iranian 
intermediaries to reach the KDP and that this effort was “fully coordinated and worked 
out through the Iranian intelligence service.”455 Similarly, all of Israel’s small arms, 
ammunition, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft weapons deliveries to the KDP had to be 
transported through Iranian airspace. Furthermore, while Israel trained Kurdish fighters in 
Israel, Kurdistan, and Iran, logistical limitations meant that the vast majority of Israeli 
training happened on Iranian territory.456 
The Shah exploited this advantageous position to ensure American and Israeli 
efforts stayed in line with Iranian preferences; he could do this “because his foreign 
partners either could not or would not stop him.”457 Iran was particularly concerned that 
Israel might give the KDP sufficient resources to actually succeed. Therefore, the Shah 
ensured there was always an Iranian officer to oversee Israeli connections with the Kurds 
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in Iran, and that officer reported to SAVAK headquarters. Sometimes, Iran would 
interdict Israeli arms shipments to the KDP.458 Similarly, American payments to the KDP 
were funneled through SAVAK, “which controlled the aid to Barzani so carefully that 
pesh merga salaries were even paid in Iranian rials.”459 In one incident, in July 1972 the 
American ambassador to Iran requested establishing direct links between U.S. and 
Iranian security officials to jointly manage aid to the KDP, but the Shah insisted that any 
American attempts to contact Iranian security officials had to go through the Shah first 
and also prevented any external parties from coordinating on the KDP issue 
independently of Iran.460  
 
Abandonment of the KDP 
 Iran’s management of its alliances with both the KDP and the KDP’s other 
external sponsors ensured Barzani was unable to use his multiple sources of external 
support to his advantage, and allowed Iran to score a diplomatic coup with Iraq over the 
Shatt al Arab waterway in 1975 while summarily dropping the KDP (and forcing Israel 
and the United States to do so as well) when the group’s usefulness was exhausted. Thus, 
on the two major issues of contention over the course of this alliance—the expansiveness 
of the KDP’s political objectives in Iraqi Kurdistan and the length of the KDP’s alliance 
with external parties—Barzani was unable to get his way.    
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 First, the KDP had more expansive political aims than those envisioned by the 
United States and Iran (although perhaps not Israel) and Barzani wanted his backers to 
not only support those aims but, more importantly, to provide him with sufficient 
resources of achieve them. On both of these fronts, Barzani came up short. While there is 
some debate in the scholarly literature about whether Barzani would have been content 
with viable Kurdish autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan or pushed for overthrow of the Ba’th 
regime, it is clear that neither Iran nor the United States wanted even the more minimalist 
of these objectives.461 At most, the United States was willing to support a Kurdish 
guerrilla campaign to destabilize Iraq, but was not interested in committing the resources 
necessary to overthrow the regime.462 The importance of plausible deniability also 
limited, in the CIA’s view, the quantity and type of resources it could provide to the 
KDP, which the Director of Central Intelligence stressed in a June 1972 memo: “Our 
financial and materiel contributions should be kept on a scale consistent with plausible 
denial. If our assistance goes beyond certain dimensions it will not be possible to 
maintain plausible denial.” 463  Kissinger reiterated this sentiment in a July 1973 
conversation with other American foreign policy principals: “[The Kurds] ought to have 
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enough money so that they can remain a thorn in the side of the government,” but not an 
offensive capability.464 Brent Scowcroft, the Deputy National Security Advisor, perhaps 
articulated this sentiment most explicitly in a backchannel message to the American 
ambassador to Iran in March 1974, right after Barzani rejected Baghdad’s autonomy 
offer: “The Shah, like ourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate situation in Iraq in which 
the Ba’ath government is intrinsically weakened by Kurdish refusal to relinquish its semi-
autonomy. Up to now neither the Shah nor ourselves has wished to see the matter 
resolved one way or the other—either by Kurdish acquiescence or by the establishment 
of an unviable autonomous Kurdish government (particularly one pretending to speak for 
Iraqi Arab sentiment as well).”465 
  Nonetheless, to his detriment, Barzani refused to make concessions to Iraq 
because he felt confident of American and Iranian support; Barzani was “confident in his 
rash belief that the CIA and Iran would stick by him.” In September 1972, Saddam 
Hussein informed Barzani that Tehran would stop supporting the KDP if Baghdad agreed 
to concessions in Iran’s favor concerning the Shatt al Arab waterway. Barzani didn’t 
believe him, however, and rebuffed Baghdad’s request for concessions. 466  More 
importantly, Barzani rejected Baghdad’s March 1974 autonomy agreement not only 
because he felt the terms were not sufficiently favorable to the KDP, but also because he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 23 July 1973, Document 24, Volume 
XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d24.  
465 Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms), Washington, 26 March 1974, 
Document 244, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d244.  
466 McDowall, Modern History, 333. 
	   204	  
believed external support would allow him to achieve more expansionist political 
goals.467 The Shah’s personal secretary acknowledged this fact in a conversation in the 
aftermath of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. 468  Indeed, the Nixon administration 
encouraged Barzani to take a more militant stance and reject Baghdad’s March 1974 
autonomy offer, falsely giving Barzani the impression that the United States would stand 
behind the KDP’s political objectives.469 Barzani thus “staked everything on the support 
promised to him by the USA and Iran” and later opined that “without American 
promises, we would not have acted in the way we did.”470 Barzani’s rejection of the 
autonomy law was politically costly, leading to internal defections.471 Barzani may have 
believed that his rejection of the autonomy agreement would prompt Iran and the United 
States to furnish the KDP with more resources; he was sorely mistaken.472 The Nixon 
administration left the response largely up to the proclivities of the Iranians. In a March 
1974 message from Scowcroft to the ambassador to Iran, the former suggested that the 
administration could provide “token amount” of additional financial support through 
SAVAK and also small arms and ammo through SAVAK. “A combination of these two 
gestures would hopefully signal to Barzani that we are still sympathetic and friendly to 
his predicament and prepared to continue to help on a scale which can be kept covert, but 
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that we cannot play a prime role in the new ballgame.”473 Similarly, the new Director of 
Central Intelligence, William Colby, agreed that Iran should take the lead: in response to 
a letter from Barzani with detailed requests for increased ordnance and heavy weapons, 
the CIA “recommends that further increases in aid to the Kurds be left up to the 
Iranians.”474 
 Second, Barzani was blindsided by the 1975 Algiers agreement and desperately 
wanted (and needed) external support to continue. Barzani’s plans for military conflict 
with Baghdad were predicted on Iranian support, in particular, Iran’s anti-aircraft systems 
to defend KDP headquarters at Hajj Umran.475 Iran, on the other hand, had few 
reservations about dropping the KDP in exchange for Baghdad’s concessions on the Shatt 
al Arab and, even though the United States may have been ambivalent about abandoning 
the KDP and Israel was against it, both were forced to follow Iran’s lead. Initially, it 
appeared that Barzani may have finally drawn Iran into taking a more expansive role in 
Iraqi Kurdistan than the latter preferred. Following Barzani’s rejection of Baghdad’s 
autonomy offer, Baghdad and the KDP commenced military operations. By the fall of 
1974, Baghdad successfully took more Kurdsh territory than it had had since 1961 and 
the KDP’s military weakness and its lack of heavy weapons forced Iran to get directly 
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involved. In particular, Saddam’s forces threatened to take the Shuman Valley, which 
was the main supply route to Iran. Iran sent Iranian Kurds and regular Iranian forces 
(disguised as Kurds) into Iraq, and provided cover for KDP forces from Iranian territory 
using long-range artillery and air defenses, including taking down Iraqi MiGs.476 The 
Shah was hesitant about this level of intervention, however. In a May 1975 retrospective 
prepared in the U.S. Office of Current Intelligence, analysts concluded that, in the wake 
of the KDP’s inability to take advantage of increased Iranian support, “The Shah, 
concerned about the growing possibility of an all-out military confrontation with Iraq and 
the wider implications of such a policy, decided against deeper involvement.”477  
 Thus, while Iran temporarily had to pay a higher than anticipated price for its 
proxy alliance with the Kurds, it ultimately succeeded in using the KDP as a bargaining 
chip to extract major concessions from Baghdad. By the spring of 1975, Iranian 
involvement had pushed the conflict to a stalemate and, without Barzani’s knowledge, 
Iran and Iraq met at the OPEC conference in Algiers in March 1975 to strike an 
agreement that would settle disputed sovereignty claims in the Shatt al Arab waterway in 
Iran’s favor, in exchange for the latter agreeing to suspend all support to the Kurds. 
“[W]ithin hours of the [March 6] agreement Iranian forces were withdrawn and supplies 
to Mullah Mustafa [Barzani] suspended.”478 Barzani remained in the dark about the 
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arrangement; Barzani dismissed rumors about a secret Iran-Iraq meeting at Algiers, 
claiming that the Iranians had told him not to worry.479 
 The United States followed the Iranians lead in the wake of the Algiers 
agreement, despite Barzani’s ardent petitions.480 In fact, even as Kissinger knew the Shah 
was negotiating with Baghdad, he sent encouraging letters to Barzani.481 When the 
Algiers agreement became public, U.S. officials feigned surprise. 482  The Nixon 
administration was concerned that Barzani would go public about U.S. involvement in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, so some pushed for continued aid to keep Barzani quiet. However, U.S. 
deference to Iranian interests ultimately trumped concern for Barzani. Scowcroft, for 
example, in a backchannel message to Kissinger on March 10, 1975 in response to pleas 
from Barzani for support, suggested that the administration continue covert aid to Barzani 
as a payment for staying quiet about American involvement.483 Scowcroft, however, 
acknowledged that, “it would create an impossible situation if we were to be working at 
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cross purposes with Iran.”484 The CIA, State Department, and White House ignored 
messages from agents in the field pressing for continued covert support for Barzani, 
either to avert a massacre of the Kurds or prevent Barzani from going public.485 The Shah 
was “directing the course of events” in Iraq.486 
Barzani found out about the Algiers agreement by listening to the radio at a 
SAVAK safe house in Tehran. Without warning, Iran withdrew all of its troops, weapons, 
and armor out of Iraq, and the Shah waited five days to inform Barzani.487 Even the 
Israelis were shocked by Iran’s decision; Iran had told Israeli agents in Iran that they 
were doing a troop rotation, but then withdrew their units on March 12.488 Back in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, on March 12 the peshmerga debated whether to continue fighting when they 
were met by General Mansourpour, who was sent by the Shah to exhort the Kurds to 
cease its resistance and that Iran would not extend the ceasefire to allow the remaining 
Kurds across the border into Iran (the Shah had allowed feeling Kurds to seek refuge in 
Iran).489 On March 13, just one day following the completion of Iran’s withdrawal, 
Baghdad launched a massive offensive against the Kurds, nearly decimating the KDP.490 
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On March 20, 1975, the Shah rejected Barzani’s pleas for additional time to allow 
Kurdish refugees to cross into Iran.491 The Shah, of course, had never intended to let 
Barzani succeed. As he remarked to his secretary in the days following the Algiers 




This case illustrates how having bargaining conditions identified by the alliance 
politics literature as favorable is not always sufficient to produce a desired outcome. The 
KDP was unable to use its access to multiple external sponsors—Iran, Israel, and the 
United States—or the significant strategic interests of the most important of those 
sponsors—Iran—to its advantage. Instead, the decisions made by all three external 
sponsors about how each would manage its alliance with the KDP hampered Barzani’s 
maneuverings and ultimately resulted in the near decimation of his organization. The 
Shah of Iran, through his intelligence organization, SAVAK, maintained tight 
institutional control over the KDP, including managing the group’s access to other 
external sponsors. Furthermore, the fact that the Nixon administration, in its efforts to 
distance itself from Barzani, therefore delegated considerable authority for alliance 
management to the Shah, with whom Nixon shared a similar foreign policy interest and 
who enjoyed near-hegemonic control over the KDP, meant that the United States was not 
drawn into unwanted involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan. Similarly, while the Israelis had 
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more expansive goals for the KDP than the United States or Iran, the fact that Iran 
controlled Israeli aid to Barzani blunted any further involvement by the Israelis. 
Together, these factors illustrates how decisions about alliance management decisively 
impact actors’ bargaining power in proxy alliances.   
 
The Army Averts Disaster: India and the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan 
 In response to a Pakistani crackdown in East Pakistan in March 1971, Indira 
Gandhi’s government began a secret program to support the rebels in what would become 
an independent Bangladesh. Eventually, India intervened directly to fight a war with 
Pakistan in December 1971. On its face, this sequence of events appears to confirm the 
narrative of the alliance politics literature: because India and the Bangladesh rebels were 
in a mutually dependent relationship, the side with greater interests at stake (in this case, 
the rebels) had the leverage to draw India into intervening directly in East Pakistan to 
help usher in an independent Bangladesh. Upon closer examination, however, this case is 
another example of a failed prediction of the alliance politics literature. Despite having 
their survival at stake, the rebel forces could not entrap India into intervenibg in East 
Pakistan when they desperately needed it—in the spring of 1971—and were forced to act 
essentially as cannon fodder to wear down the East Pakistan Army until the Indian Army 
felt sufficient prepared to intervene in the winter of 1971.  
 
Background 
India neither anticipated the Pakistani crackdown in the spring of 1971 nor did it 
welcome it. When the population in East Pakistan began to protest the government’s 
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failure to recognize the results of the 1970 democratic election, “India wished at that time 
to be very much left alone.”493 India was mired in its own internal rebellions, especially 
the Naxalite rebellion in West Bengal.494 Nevertheless, within days of the crackdown 
officers who had defected from the East Pakistan army headed to the Indian border to 
inform the Indians that Bengalis in the East Pakistan army were revolting rather than use 
force against their co-ethnics.495 These defectors, who came mostly from the East 
Pakistan Rifles and the East Bengal Regiment, initially armed themselves by looting 
Pakistani arms depots and attempted to challenge the army in East Pakistan by fighting 
set-piece conventional battles. This effort, however, was short lived as the Pakistani army 
crushed the incipient rebellion by the first week of April and forced the remaining 
defectors to flee across the border into India.496 Thus, the rebels arriving in India were 
weak, poorly armed, and lacked any significant “organized infrastructure of insurgency to 
sustain a prolonged effort.”497 They had essentially been defeated by the Pakistani army.   
Indira Gandhi’s administration, in the midst of enjoying unprecedented political 
power, began to prepare the Indian military for a large-scale conventional showdown 
with Pakistan in East Pakistan, while at the same time allowing the defecting rebels to 
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establish a base on Indian soil from which they could launch assaults against the 
Pakistani army across the border. Indian provided large-scale, critical support for the 
Bengali rebels, including “arms, training, camps, and safe passage back and forth across a 
porous border.” All the while, India denied its role in East Pakistan, despite the fact that 
“this massive clandestine enterprise was approved at the highest levels, involving India’s 
intelligence series, border security forces, and army.”498  
Maintaining the secrecy of Indian involvement in East Pakistan was of critical 
importance to the Gandhi administration. First, Gandhi wanted to keep its support of the 
rebels hidden from her domestic population out of the fear that Hindu nationalists would 
push her administration into playing an even more expansive role in East Pakistan sooner 
than she preferred. Indian newspapers were stirring the nationalist pot, while “politicians 
of all stripes launched demonstrations, demanded swift action, and denounced the 
government’s spinelessness.” 499  Some retired general publicly castigated the 
administration for failing to take immediate military action in East Pakistan before the 
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Pakistani army had the opportunity to send in reinforcements.500 Therefore, the Gandhi 
administration actively worked to hide from the public the fact that the vast majority of 
refugees fleeing East Pakistan were Hindu, to avoid increasing domestic political 
pressure.501 Second, in supporting secessionists in East Pakistan, Gandhi did not want to 
give a pretext for secessionism in Kashmir.502 Most importantly, Gandhi worried that an 
overt Indian presence in East Pakistan would draw India into a conflict with China over 
Pakistan. India had fought and lost a major war against China in 1962. Gandhi not only 
feared that China might intervene to assist Pakistan in the event of open conflict between 
the latter and India, but she also worried that China would support pro-Chinese elements 
of the East Pakistan rebellion, to the detriment of pro-Indian actors.503 As I will show 
below, Gandhi concerns about being pushed by more hawkish domestic political actors 
into getting more involved in East Pakistan or on a timeline to which she was averse 
affected her calculations about the bureaucratic actors to whom she delegated authority 
for alliance management.  
As part of this effort to maintain secrecy, Gandhi sought to distance India from 
the political activities of the Bangladesh government in exile—even though it was 
operating on Indian soil. In the wake of the March Pakistani crackdown, India was 
careful not to give ardent public support to the Awami League because it wanted to 
“avoid the impression that India would provide material assistance to the East Pakistani 
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‘rebels.’”504 While Gandhi did introduce a measure in Parliament condemning Pakistani 
violence, she refrained from expressly supporting or recognizing the independence of 
Bangladesh.505 Gandhi also “asked the Bangladeshi authorities to keep a lower profile in 
Calcutta and, behind closed doors, urged them to make their joint strategy appear to be 
the plan of the provisional government.”506 
 
The Alternative Prediction and Interests at Stake 
 India and the East Pakistan rebels were in a mutually dependent relationship—
neither side had access to other alliance partners, and each needed the other to achieve 
critical foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the alliance politics literature would expect 
that the comparative intensity of interests at stake would drive the outcome; in other 
words, the actor with greater interests at stake should be able to credibly stand firm and 
therefore have a bargaining advantage. While India certainly had important interests at 
stake, which will be reviewed below, the rebels in East Pakistan were fighting for their 
survival. However, as will be demonstrated, the rebels were unable to leverage their 
stronger interests at stake to draw India into intervening in East Pakistan earlier than 
India preferred.  
 In this analysis, I categorize the rebels in East Pakistan as a single rebel group. At 
first glance this may seem debatable. However, the historical record clearly indicates that, 
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even though the rebels were factionalized, there was no viable alternative rebel 
organization. In fact, India constantly worked to unify the various rebel factions because 
none was sufficiently strong to achieve any decisive outcome on the ground. For the 
Army, “[f]orging these groups into a single, cohesive force was necessary before 
undertaking bigger tasks.” 507  The rebel forces were largely comprised of “small, 
struggling groups” that had defected independently from each other from the Pakistani 
army in East Pakistan; they did not come into Indian territory as a single, coherent group 
and were poorly trained, resourced, and organized.508 Most of the defecting units came 
from the East Pakistan Rifles and the East Bengal Regiment. Together, these units 
formed the Mukti Bahini.509 According to the head of the Border Security Force, K.F. 
Rustamji, the rebels, “lacked everything for carrying on the fight except the will and the 
courage to fight.”510 Additionally, a rebel faction organized and managed by the Indian 
Army, called the Mujib Bahini, conducted mostly guerrilla operations in East Pakistani 
territory.511 Gandhi sought to unify these disparate small groups and coordinate their 
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activities as much as possible to maximize the chance of success. She tasked D.P. Dhar 
with managing the various fighting forces: “This one-man committee was solely 
concerned with the Bangladesh crisis.”512  
The Gandhi administration was under no illusions that the dependence of the 
rebels would automatically translate into Indian leverage. This was captured in 
discussions about the rebels during a meeting in New Delhi, where the Assistant 
Inspector General, Rajgopal, said that while the rebels had no other sources of external 
support and therefore “had a lot of expectation from us,” India could not expect to secure 
“their loyalty or good behavior in the years to come” and should therefore be mindful that 
there is no “implied assurance of feeling obligated to us.” 513  India’s strategy for 
managing the situation in East Pakistan depended on having a viable rebellion that could 
bleed the Pakistani Army dry until India was prepared to intervene directly. The rebels 
were “essential…as the political and military basis for direct Indian intervention.”514 D.P. 
Dhar, one of Gandhi’s inner circle advisors, commented to another advisor that, “This 
resistance must not be allowed to collapse.”515 Gandhi felt even more backed into a 
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corner when her initial effort to marshal the international community to force Pakistan to 
halt its crackdown and come to a political settlement failed.516 
India had important interests at stake in East Pakistan that went beyond its 
humanitarian interests in halting the systemic murder of Bengali citizens.517 In particular, 
India not only supported the emergence of an independent Bangladesh, but it also had a 
strong interest in shaping the political character of a future independent Bangladesh.518 
This made controlling and shaping the trajectory of the rebels critical for Gandhi’s 
administration; India needed a politically moderate Bangladesh that would eschew 
stirring up domestic political tensions in India, especially in West Bengal.519 India was 
especially concerned that the Bengali uprising would take on a more extreme, Chinese-
leaning nature.520 If the rebellion fell under the influence of more radical elements, 
coupled with the strain posed by massive numbers of refugees streaming into India, it 
threatened to spread instability to areas in India that were already experiencing domestic 
unrest. India also needed a functioning government in Dacca so the refugees had a place 
to which they could return.521  
The rebels’ interests at stake, however, should have trumped India’s. While 
Gandhi had important national security and domestic political reasons for caring about 
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the outcome in East Pakistan, the rebels were fighting for survival and, as already 
detailed above, were on the brink of defeat when they crossed into Indian territory.   
 
Institutional Configurations and Bureaucratic Politics in India 
My theory posits that crucial determinants of leverage in proxy alliances are a 
state’s internal institutional configurations and the extent to which power and authority is 
delegated for alliance management. During this period of time, Gandhi centralized the 
decision-making apparatus for the foreign policy arena and was enjoying unprecedented 
domestic political support both among the population and in Parliament. Gandhi 
surrounded herself with a small, largely homogeneous coterie of advisors that oversaw all 
aspects of the situation in East Pakistan. In other words, there was little delegation of 
authority in this case, making it difficult for the rebels to influence the course of India’s 
involvement in East Pakistan to their benefit. Furthermore, when the initial bureaucracy 
tasked with alliance management threatened to prematurely pull India into intervening, 
Gandhi was able to shift responsibilities to an organization more in line with her 
preferences. 
India’s political bureaucracy is organized such that foreign policy decision-
making occurs collectively through the cabinet. Previously, this had empowered 
individual ministers in the cabinet and the bureaucracy as a whole.522 However, during 
her tenure Gandhi eviscerated the independent power of the cabinet and the bureaucracy, 
“reduc[ing] the Cabinet to little more than a committee of ratification.” 523  She 
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undermined the independent power of the cabinet after her reelection in 1971 by staffing 
it with technocrats who had no independent political bloc of support and therefore owed 
their total allegiance to her. Gandhi also “reassert[ed] her control of the Cabinet by taking 
over some important ministries herself, and to consolidate her personal as opposed to 
institutionalized power.”524  
In place of the Cabinet and the sprawling bureaucracy, Gandhi relied on a tight-
knit, small group of informal advisors selected based on their loyalty to her. “[A] small 
group around Mrs. Gandhi operating in a highly informal manner—though within a 
formalized structure—was the key element in decision making on East Pakistan in 
1971.”525 Gandhi ran her foreign policy decision-making apparatus with a tight fist; 
rather than delegating authority, she centralized it. Gandhi “was therefore virtually a 
super-Foreign Minister rather than a head to whom the Foreign Minister reported,” and 
“kept a tight reign on control of foreign policy.” Every minister had to consult with 
Gandhi on all policy questions, major and minor.526 She relied on informal, personal 
relationships with advisors who were only accountable and beholden to her, but also 
“never relied solely on these advisors, accepted only such advice from them as she 
wished to, and by frequent changes ensured that none became close enough or important 
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enough to her to acquire an aura of indispensability.” 527  Indian Army General 
Manekshaw had direct and informal access to Gandhi and D.P. Dhar that circumvented 
his formal subservience to the Defense Minister, who was not in the inner circle and 
whose position on East Pakistan differed from that of the military. Furthermore, the 
Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s intelligence organization, had access to 
Gandhi through the joint intelligence committee, but was excluded from the inner 
circle.528 Together, this meant that, in East Pakistan, “developments in the crisis were 
strictly controlled by Mrs. Gandhi.”529  
 
Delegation of Authority: Border Security Force versus Army 
Initially, the primary authority for managing the rebels who had defected from the 
East Pakistan army fell under the jurisdiction of the Border Security Force (BSF), a law 
enforcement agency, with input from the Indian Army and the R&AW.530 Soldiers who 
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had defected from the army in East Pakistan, upon crossing the border into India, were 
met by BSF forces. Rustamji, head of the BSF, met with the rebels’ second in command, 
Tajuddin Ahmad, and accompanied him to Calcutta to meet with Gandhi in secret. 
During the meeting, the Bengalis were obliquely referred to as “our Friends.”531 There, 
Gandhi committed India to providing material support and training to the rebels, who 
would supply the manpower.532 
The BSF pressed Gandhi for a broad mandate to take whatever actions it wanted 
to in East Pakistan. Even before the Pakistani crackdown, according to the head of the 
BSF, K.F. Rustamji, he asked the government to “please authorize us to act.”533 Gandhi 
was initially supportive, telling Rustamji, “Do whatever you like, but don’t get caught.” 
Rustamji writes, “Nothing was more spelt out as nothing could be foreseen of the rapid 
developments that would follow. The direction gave me the liberty to take steps which 
ultimately produced results”534 Gandhi’s instructions to Rustamji were communicated in 
secret, informally, and with minimal details or constraints. Thereafter, BSF and Indian 
Army leaders launched an effort to arm and train Bengali rebels, coordinate with rebel 
commanders on tactics, and conduct raids into East Pakistan.535  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 Rustamji, British, 299-302. 
532 Bass, Blood Telegram, 95-6; Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 184. 
533 Rustamji, British, 293. 
534 Ibid., 299. Also see Bass, Blood Telegram, 95. This quotation nicely illustrates how 
proxy alliances resemble incomplete contracts—details cannot be specified ex ante 
because “nothing could be foreseen.”  
535 Bass, Blood Telegram, 96. 
	   222	  
 The BSF, in addition to other members of Gandhi’s administration, wanted India 
to intervene immediately and directly in East Pakistan.536 At a March 28 secret meeting 
in an informal location (the Home Secretary’s house), Rustamji pressed Gandhi for “firm 
steps” regarding East Pakistan.537 Major General Wahab, a Mukti Bahini leader, said that 
in a meeting he had with Lt. Col. Megh Sing in the BSF stationed at Bangaon, the latter 
complained about the Indian government’s decision to hold off on direct military 
intervention.538 Additionally, beginning in April, some of Gandhi’s ministers began to 
push her to invade East Pakistan.539 Gandhi herself was initially supportive of the idea of 
a full-scale conventional assault on East Pakistan by the Indian Army. The push for 
immediate war alarmed Indian Army leaders, especially Army Chief of Staff Sam 
Manekshaw. General Manekshaw was convinced that the timing was not ideal for a direct 
assault and that India would be defeated or pay high costs for an intervention in the 
spring of 1971. If India waited until winter, when the monsoon season had passed and the 
snow on the Himalayas would make it difficult for China to send supplies to Pakistan, the 
conditions would be more favorable for a quick and decisive Indian victory. 540 
Furthermore, Pakistan enjoyed a temporary numerical superiority in East Pakistan (3 
infantry divisions to India’s 1 division in West Bengal). India would be forced to relocate 
troops that were patrolling India’s border with China and conducting counterinsurgency 
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operations in Nagaland and Mizoram, and would potentially create an opportunity for 
Pakistan to exploit from the west.541 Instead, the Army preferred to use the rebels to wage 
an asymmetric, guerrilla campaign against the Pakistani Army to wear it down until the 
timing was right for direct Indian intervention.542 Manekshaw was particularly frustrated 
with the BSF for pushing for more aggressive action in East Pakistan. Rustamji claims 
that Manekshaw castigated him: “Do you realize how dangerous the action taken by the 
Border Security Force can be? You are creating a situation where we could easily drift 
into something big in the next few days. And it will not be in an area which would suit 
us.”543 
At a cabinet meeting in late April, Manekshaw had to convince Gandhi of his 
position. Gandhi is reported to have said to Manekshaw, “We don’t mind a war,” but he 
replied, “Are you ready for a war? I am not.”544 While Gandhi was initially annoyed that 
the Army wasn’t ready for direct action in East Pakistan, on April 30 she gave 
Manekshaw the authority for managing all operations in East Pakistan, including training 
and equipping the rebels, which had previously fallen under the jurisdiction of the 
BSF.545 The BSF still played a role in equipping and training the rebels, but was formally 
subordinate to the authority of the Army; the army that set the boundaries on the nature of 
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the relationship between India and the rebels, while the BSF continued to provide 
information, coordination, and local knowledge.546 The BSF was not at all pleased by its 
diminished role. Rustamji complained in May 1971 that the Army refused to give the 
BSF “a few big guns which we needed and which would have changed the situation in 
our favor” and cut off the BSF’s supply of ammunition. Rustamji was “depressed with 
our army staying so completely out of it. Why this belief in neutrality? The Indian Army 
probably had its own reasons. I felt I was fighting a one-man battle with the Pakistan 
Army.”547 Even when the Army took over control of the proxy alliance from the BSF, the 
organization continued to press for a more expansive intervention in East Pakistan. At a 
summer meeting between Gandhi and rebel forces across the border, a BSF leader pushed 
Gandhi on when they would get the green light for direct action.548  
Upon assuming authority over India’s proxy alliance with the Bangladesh rebels, 
the army imposed strict controls on the relationship and the rebels’ activities.549 Indian 
Army officers were in direct command of rebel fighters.550 In the summer, India began a 
program of intense rebel training and “direct involvement in Mukti Bahini activities by 
Indian military personnel.”551 The rebels resented the Army’s efforts to control their 
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activites; a Major in the rebel forces, Shahudul Haque, bemoaned the fact that, 
“command of the Bangaldesh troops was being gradually handed over under direct 
control of the Indian Army.”552 In particular, rebel officers complained that Lieutenant 
General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who was in charge of the Eastern Command, was not 
providing them with sufficient resources. The head of the R&AW, Rameshwar Nath Kao, 
conveyed to Gandhi that there was “a lot of dissatisfaction, discontentment and 
misgivings in the B[angla] D[esh] Army” about the pace and level of arms transfers to 
the rebels. Furthermore, Kao told Gandhi that the rebels chafed against the “constant 
interference in the administration of the BD Army,” especially the fact that the Army was 
inserting itself into decisions about hiring/firing and postings. In particular, a rebel 
commander asked Kao if he could ensure that the Indian commanders did not issue orders 
to rebel troops that contradicted the orders of rebel commanders.553 India also exerted a 
lot of control over the Bangladesh government in exile, setting up a committee on 
September 9 to oversee their political decision-making.554 The chief law officer of the 
BSF wrote the constitution for the government in exile and the BSF chose the place for 
the swearing in ceremony of the government in exile.555 All of this suggests a significant 
effort by India to penetrate the rebel organization. 
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India’s Supremacy 
The Indian Army’s command of the rebel forces allowed India to delay direct 
involvement in East Pakistan until it believed it would have the upper hand, in the winter 
of 1971. According to Rustamji, most of the rebels were convinced that India would 
intervene directly in East Pakistan shortly after Bangladesh declared independence on 
March 27, and were confused and “were crushed when they realized that was not in the 
offing.”556 The rebels pushed for a total war immediately to achieve an independent 
Bangladesh.557 They had to settle for serving as a placeholder while the Indian Army 
readied itself for a conventional assault on its terms.558 As Dhar described, the plan was 
to “create the whole of East Bengal into a bottomless ditch which will suck the strength 
and the resources of West Pakistan.”559  
As the Indian government drew up plans for an eventual war with Pakistan in the 
winter of 1971, the government and rebels “secretly worked hand in glove on guerrilla 
warfare, on everything from recruitment (Rustamji favored university graduates) to 
blowing up bridges (which Tajuddin Ahmad wanted to do without hesitation even if it 
angered locals).”560 Rebels conducted sabotage operations deep into East Pakistani 
territory, launching attacks on police and government infrastructure.561 While the rebels 
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were frustrated with their missions—at one point the Mukti Bahini complained that they 
were being sent on what were essentially suicide missions across the border—there was 
little they could do to remedy their situation.562  
Despite Indian support, the rebels were no match for the Pakistani Army, which 
was “slowly gaining the upper hand.” The rebels pressed Gandhi for more direct Indian 
intervention or, barring that, more material support to even the playing field. In 
particular, the rebels wanted heavy weaponry to counter the Pakistani Army’s superior 
firepower (artillery, anti-aircraft weaponry, anti-tank weaponry).563 An Awami League 
leader, Minajur Rahman Choudhury, complained, “We were assured that the ‘Friends’ 
promised to look after the basic necessities of our men, but the bare truth is that our men 
never get what they require” and they “must not be left to the mercy of the ‘friends’ alone 
though their assistance is most prized.” 564  By October/November 1971 India had 
organized and trained 70,000 Mukti Bahini and was training 30,000 more, but had only 
armed them with a limited stock of old weapons.565 The Mukti Bahini played a crucial 
role in clearing the way for the Indian Army and giving the Army a sense of the Pakistani 
Army’s capabilities.566 
Gandhi did not need the rebels to be successful; she just needed them to hold the 
line until winter. It was not until the fall of 1971 that India began to provide artillery and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562 Wahab, “Mukti Bahini,” 161. 
563 Bass, Blood Telegram, 100, 184. 
564 Ibid., 185. 
565 Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 185. 
566 Singh, India’s Wars, 128. 
	   228	  
sometimes tank and air support to the rebels.567 This was done intentionally to provoke a 
Pakistani response that would give India a pretext for intervening when the timing was 
preferable (in the winter). Indian artillery support from Indian territory led to a significant 
escalation on November 21 around Bagra where Indian and Pakistani troops clashed.568 
Publicly, India justified its escalation by claiming that Pakistan had attacked a rebel base 
in that area that India was coming to its support; Dhar “wanted to be sure that, when [the 
war with Pakistan] came, it detonated out of the civil war in East Pakistan” and that, to do 
so, India had to “furnish an elaborate pretext” for getting directly involved directly in 
East Pakistan.569 Rebel cross-border operations also increased from October-November to 
provoke Pakistan into taking hot pursuit raids close to and across the Indian border.570 By 
early- to mid-November, the Indian army began to move troops into position along the 
border.571 This escalation of the conflict “was right on schedule for India.”572 
The war between India and Pakistan formally began on December 3, when 
Pakistan launched an attack on Indian air force bases, prompting a full-scale conventional 
assault by the Indian military. The Bengali rebels provided crucial support to the 
advancing Indian forces in East Pakistan. The rebel forces “establish[ed] bridgeheads and 
organiz[ed] local transport for the Indian troops. These Bengali rebels, relying on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567 Bass, Blood Telegram, 179. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 212. 
568 Singh, India’s Wars, 123-4. 
569 Bass, Blood Telegram, 261. 
570 Singh, India’s Wars, 123. Bass, Blood Telegram, 258. 
571 Singh, India’s Wars, 49. Sisson and Rose, War and Secession, 213. 
572 Bass, Blood Telegram, 261. 
	   229	  
support of local civilians, sped the Indians’ advance with riverboats, rickshaws, and 
bullock carts.”573 The rebels’ local knowledge was crucial to the Indian Army’s advance. 
India’s strategy was to head straight to Dacca and take it as quickly as possible without 
bothering to take smaller towns along the way. This meant the army had to travel along 
unfamiliar terrain (to avoid highways where they would be obvious targets). The rebels, 
who were deeply familiar with the terrain, guided them through it.574 Thus, India’s proxy 
alliance allowed Gandhi’s government to achieve a decisive and relatively cheap victory 
over Pakistan on the timeline and terms of its choosing—all due to Gandhi’s fortuities 
decision to shift authority for alliance management from one bureaucracy within the 
executive to another.  
 
Conclusion and Assessing the Counterfactual 
 The Bangladesh case provides an opportunity to explore the counterfactual, 
namely, what might have occurred had Gandhi not switched authority for alliance 
management from the BSF to the Army, or had India’s institutional structure during 
Gandhi’s tenure been more decentralized, providing the BSF with greater leeway to act. 
In this hypothesized scenario, my theory would expect the Bangladeshi rebels to have 
greater bargaining power stemming from their links with local BSF commanders, who 
were highly motivated to “go rogue” and provide more expansive support to the Mukti 
Bahini as well as press Gandhi’s administration to intervene on a faster timetable. The 
evidence detailed above strongly suggests that the BSF was interested in more robust 
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Indian involvement and chafed under the restrictions imposed by the Army. With fewer 
institutional constraints, it is likely that, even if the BSF remained unable to convince the 
Indian Army of the merits of the faster timetable for intervention, it could have 
encouraged the Mukti Bahini to take more expansive action that, in turn, may have put 
Gandhi in a position where she would be forced to respond directly. In other words, the 
BSF could have created the conditions for entrapment, forcing India to intervene to 
rescue the Mukti Bahini or setting the stage for an Indian response to some kind of 
Pakistani assault. While it is unlikely that the Army would have acted differently (in 
terms of pressing Gandhi to intervene in the winter when conditions would be more 
favorable), it could have been drawn into acting against its preferences. Specifically, 
Gandhi was initially convinced of the BSF’s position and was skeptical of the Army’s 
claims that it would be more prudent to delay direct military action, so it’s likely that, 
with greater authority, the BSF could have convinced Gandhi to support its position. In 
reality, however, Gandhi’s alliance management decisions allowed India to retain a 
bargaining advantage over its proxy allies, in contrast to the expectations of the alliance 
politics literature, which would have expected the Mukti Bahini to have the advantage 
due to its more salient interests at stake. 
 
Taming the Tigers? India’s Proxy Alliances in Sri Lanka 
 India’s covert support of Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka in the wake of ethnic 
riots and the ensuing government crackdown in the summer of 1983 should have 
provided India with leverage over its proxies. A host of Tamil militant groups was 
operating in Sri Lanka at the time and, while some received nominal support from other 
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sources (but, notably, not from other states), all of the groups were dependent on India for 
resources and sanctuary. Indeed, Indira Gandhi’s administration initiated a program of 
covert aid to all of the Tamil militant groups with the aim, in part, of playing groups off 
against one another and preventing any group from becoming sufficiently strong to 
achieve a decisive military outcome on the ground in Sri Lanka or seceding to form an 
independent state. However, the administrations of Indira and, subsequently, Rajiv 
Gandhi were unable to use their access to multiple proxies to their advantage. They failed 
to reign in the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This proved 
enormously costly for India, which was forced to intervene in Sri Lanka in 1987 and fight 
against its former ally. In the words of the chief of India’s intelligence organization, the 
Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), R.N. Kao, India’s decision to covertly arm and 
train the LTTE “was a disaster.”575 In this section, I show how the hawkish preferences of 
domestic political veto players—most importantly, the Indian state of Tamil Nadu—and 
their ability to act independently of the central government to support the Tamil Tigers, 
affect Indira Gandhi’s calculations about alliance management. Specifically, Indira 
Gandhi chose to give authority for alliance management to India’s intelligence 
organization, R&AW, to protect the Sri Lanka policy from veto players in Tamil Nadu. 
This, however, backfired when R&AW was also highly motivated to support a more 
expansive proxy alliance in Sri Lanka.  
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Background and India’s Objectives 
In July 1983, violent anti-Tamil riots broke out in Sri Lanka in response to an 
attack by LTTE militants on Sri Lankan soldiers, wreaking havoc on the Tamil 
community in Sri Lanka, sending a stream of Tamil refugees into neighboring India and, 
ultimately, igniting the Sri Lankan Civil War. India could not ignore these events because 
it had important security and domestic political interests at stake in Sri Lanka: Tamil 
refugees posed an immediate burden on Indira Gandhi’s administration; the riots 
threatened to spread instability to the state of Tamil Nadu in India; and the situation 
opened to door to meddling by foreign powers inimical to India’s interests.576 First, India 
was directly affected by the riots because, not only were Tamil Indian nationals residing 
in Sri Lanka targeted by the Sinhalese perpetrators of the violence but, moreover, there 
was a risk of spillover violence stemming from the large number of refugees pouring into 
India.577 Second, India was deeply concerned about what it perceived to be Sri Lanka’s 
increasingly closer ties with the West, especially the United States, Israel, Pakistan and 
China.578 In Kao’s words, Sri Lanka itself was not the concern for India but, rather, how 
“Sri Lanka became a seat for outside influences which we consider not very friendly 
towards us.”579 These concerns predated, but were exacerbated by, the 1983 riots. For 
example, in 1963 Sri Lanka signed an agreement with China offering concessions on the 
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passage of ships and cargo, and in 1971 Sri Lanka allowed Pakistani planes to refuel 
there in support of operations in Bangladesh against Indian forces.580 This concern was 
compounded by Sri Lanka’s behavior around the time of the riots; Colombo made some 
overtures to these states and received nominal help from them.581 India was particularly 
worried that Sri Lanka would serve as conduit for the expansion of American security 
arrangements in the Indian ocean through the port at Trincomalee.582 Perhaps even more 
important than the regional security concerns stemming from the riots were their 
domestic political implications. By July 1983, Indira Gandhi was already aware of Tamil 
training camps that Tamil militant groups had established within India in the Indian state 
of Tamil Nadu with the blessing of state officials. Furthermore, R&AW informed Gandhi 
that this support threatened India’s physical integrity because it threatened to bring about 
the creation of a greater Tamil Nadu comprised of secessionist Tamils from Sri Lanka 
and India.583  
Indeed, when the riots broke out, Indira Gandhi was under significant pressure 
from Tamil Nadu to do something to alleviate the situation in Sri Lanka.584 Furthermore, 
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the fact that Tamil Nadu officials were already supporting various Tamil militant groups 
placed Indira Gandhi in a quandary. She did not want the former encouraging the latter to 
take actions that might lead to Tamil secession from Sri Lanka and potentially from India 
itself. Therefore, she had to choose between forcing Tamil Nadu officials to cease 
supporting the Tamil militants (by dismissing the government of M.G. Ramachandran, 
the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu), or assuming control of the operation herself to 
manage India’s role in Sri Lanka. However, the former option was politically unfeasible. 
Ramachandran’s government was popular, and India Gandhi had already dismissed a 
different government leader from a different southern state. Furthermore, Indira Gandhi 
was politically dependent on the southern states for her recent electoral victory.585  
These factors led Indira Gandhi to initiate a covert program to arm, fund, and train 
Tamil militants, in other words, “to take over a task which was already being done by the 
state government of Tamil Nadu. The strategy was presented as a damage limiting 
exercise.”586 The objective was to control Tamil militancy and prevent the situation from 
spiraling out of India’s control.587 Tamil “militancy had to be contained in order to take 
the Sri Lankan Tamil movement away from the path of separatism and make it seek a 
political and negotiated solution of the Tamil issue within the framework of unity and 
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.”588 Specifically, Indira Gandhi sought to use the 
militants to force Colombo to agree to a political settlement to the conflict that would be 
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favorable to Indian interests.589 The idea was that, if India could control the militant 
groups, it could use them to “raise the costs of ethnic warfare for the Jayewardene 
government [in Colombo] and thus…[pressure him] not only to desist from seeking a 
military solution to the ethnic crisis, but also to accommodate India’s regional security 
concerns arising out of Sri Lanka’s policy toward the West, China and Pakistan.”590 
 
The Alternative Prediction  
The alliance politics literature would expect India to have considerable leverage 
over its Tamil proxies. The Tamil insurgency was divided between dozens of different 
groups, but was dominated by five primary ones: LTTE, People’s Liberation 
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), 
Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF), and Tamil Revolutionary Organization of 
Students (EROS), although there were actually dozens of smaller groups as well.591 
Indian support was critical for the Tamil militants as they carried out their struggle 
against the government. Militants would retreat to Indian territory to regroup and 
resupply, and then re-infiltrate Sri Lanka.592 All of the Tamil militant groups were 
dependent on India; “[t]hey all considered India a crucial factor in the game which could 
be disregarded only at their peril and wanted India’s support and help for their fight.”593 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 Ghosh, Ethnic Conflict, 75. 
590 Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 72. 
591 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention, 135-6. 
592 Ibid., 17. 
593 Hellmann-Rajanayagan, Tamil Tigers, 101. 
	   236	  
In fact, Indian decision-makers believed this situation provided an optimal environment 
for to manipulate the Tamil militants to its advantage. Indira Gandhi tasked R&AW with 
supporting all of the relevant Tamil militant groups so that it could “isolate one group 
from another by creating rifts and exposing differences among them.”594 The idea was for 
the R&AW to provide covert support to all of the Tamil militant groups so that it could 
keep “all options open.”595 India actively worked to cultivate Tamil dependence; India 
gave Tamil groups the impression that India would intervene militarily in Sri Lanka in 
support of their cause in order to “make the militant groups rely more on India.”596  
There were various attempts to unite the different militant groups, but they were 
short-lived and usually meaningless. In August 1982, the various Tamil militant groups 
formed the Committee for Eelam Liberation (CEL) to coordinate operations, but each 
group retained its own organizational structure and command.597 The R&AW made 
another attempt in April 1984, creating the umbrella organization, the Eelam National 
Liberation Front (ENLF), comprised of EPRLF, TELO, and EROS (LTTE joined in April 
1985). The objective was to provide India with a forum for better managing its proxies, 
but the groups did not carry out any operations through this front. Additionally, the 
groups retained their organization and chains of command, and strategic and tactical 
decisions pertaining to military operations on the ground were completely separate.598 
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While many of the Tamil militant groups had access to some support from other 
foreign actors, including international and transnational organizations operating in states 
such as Libya, Syria, Nicaragua, North Korea, and Zimbabwe, and also the PLO, and 
connections to international arms dealers, none received support from other states and 
none of the support was significant in comparison to that received from India. Vastly 
more important were the resources provided by different elements of the Indian 
government, including from the center (through R&AW), and from Tamil Nadu.599 
 In this environment, where one state is supporting multiple proxy groups who in 
turn do not receive support from any other states, the alliance politics literature would 
expect to observe the state consistently enjoying a bargaining advantage over its proxies. 
In fact, India’s involvement in Sri Lanka complicates this narrative. While India was able 
to control some of its proxies, it found itself stymied by LTTE and ultimately drawn into 
intervening in Sri Lanka in 1987. 
 
India’s Alliance Management 
As my theory would expect, India lacked leverage over its proxies, despite an 
ostensibly favorable environment, for two related reasons. First, the institutions India 
established for alliance management gave significant leeway to R&AW, the intelligence 
organization tasked with managing the covert relationship, and R&AW had a 
bureaucratic interests in continuing and ramping up support to Tamil militants. Second, 
the Indian state was fragmented on the Tamil issue; the central government could not 
control the behavior of the state of Tamil Nadu, which was running its own operation to 
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support the Tamil militant groups despite the central government’s attempts to do so. In 
fact, it was this latter problem that propelled Indira Gandhi to delegate authority to 
R&AW in the first place.  
India’s strategy for managing the Sri Lanka situation was contained three 
elements. First, the Third Agency (a supra-intelligence organization largely staffed and 
run by members of the R&AW) would covertly arm, train, and fund the Tamil 
insurgency. Second, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s office 
would run an overt political program to push Colombo to arrive at a political solution to 
the Sri Lanka issue. Third, the Ministry of Defense, together with the Indian Army, Navy, 
and Air Force, would focus on protecting India’s South.600 Covert militant aid to the 
Tamil militants, therefore, was a critical component of India’s policy and was deeply 
intertwined with its overt political efforts. The idea was to use the Tamil militant groups 
instrumentally to bring about a political resolution that would be to India’s liking in Sri 
Lanka—to use Tamil violence as bargaining chips to force Colombo to make 
concessions. However, R&AW was not the only body within India providing military 
support to the Tamil groups—leaders from the state of Tamil Nadu played a prominent 
role in hosting and supporting various groups as well. It was this “proliferation of 
channels and autonomy of action granted or acquired by a given agency of the 
Government of India” that would “undermine [India’s] leverage by making the policy 
process complex and uncontrollable.”601 India’s proxy war entailed a massive effort 
involving extensive training camps in the state of Tamil Nadu, which by 1986 had trained 
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20,000 Tamil militants.602 As described by a state official in Tamil Nadu, the training 
camps run by the R&AW were quite extensive: “In their full bloom, there were around 30 
camps….Every militant group had its own camps in Madras and in 10 other districts. 
Most of the leaders of the groups had free access to the central policy makers and 
Intelligence chiefs in Delhi.”603 
 
The Research and Analysis Wing 
The R&AW was the primary organization tasked with managing India’s covert 
support of Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka. However, the institutional landscape is a bit 
complicated. When Indira Gandhi assumed office in 1980, the R&AW’s role in Sri Lanka 
was subsumed under the rubric of a de novo supra-intelligence organization, the Third 
Agency. During the previous administration, under Moraji Desai, R&AW was 
completely gutted (giving added imperative to R&AW to “prove” itself and push for a 
rebuilt and more capable organization when Indira Gandhi took over). Therefore, because 
the R&AW had to be reconstituted, Indira Gandhi initially created a Third Agency that 
was responsible for the Sri Lanka Operation. When Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 
1984, the Third Agency was disbanded and its authorities were transferred to R&AW. 
Per Indira Gandhi’s orders, the Third Agency was be provided with “virtually unlimited 
resources,” and was run and managed by Kao, who was also in charge of R&AW. 
Furthermore, the Third Agency was largely staffed by officers and personnel from 
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R&AW.604 Indira Gandhi also tasked G. Parthasarthy with working with Kao to manage 
the Sri Lanka covert operation. Parthasarthy had a close relationship with R&AW and 
“had a reputation for depending more on RAW reports than on Ministry of External 
Affairs reports.”605 Kao, however, played an outsized role in foreign policy making and 
was generally the point person for the R&AW’s secret program in Sri Lanka. Indira 
Gandhi allegedly told Kao that he should “repeat the success of the Bangladesh operation 
in Sri Lanka.”606 
 Plausible deniability was a paramount concern for Indira Gandhi’s administration. 
The Sri Lanka Operation was a “top secret exercise.” In fact, when the program was 
initially developed and implemented, only 6 people in the Prime Minister’s office and 10 
other people in the entire government, including in R&AW, knew about it. Even senior 
officials at the Ministry of External Affairs were kept in the dark. Furthermore, R&AW 
structured the program so that some of its own officers participating believed that the 
Tamil militants were doing their own arms procurement and training. Even after Indira 
Gandhi was assassinated, only some parts of the program became public.607 R&AW was 
an ideal bureaucracy for handling the proxy alliance because of its “unique position in the 
Government of India. On administrative and financial records, [R&AW] is non-existent. 
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It is a top secret organization only responsible to the Prime Minister of India.”608 This 
extreme secrecy meant the R&AW was given “considerable leeway for operating with 
the militants.”609 Indeed, the Indian government gave RAW a “mandate” to support the 
Tamil militant groups, with the central government’s approval often tacit and informal.610 
Specifically, RAW “lacked accountability or many of its acts of omission and 
commission while supporting and monitoring the activities of militant groups or setting 
them up against each other.”611 Furthermore, the R&AW did not keep records of the 
number of militants it trained or of the arms with which it furnished the, allowing the 
groups to build up massive stockpiles.612 In turn, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi’s governments 
depended on information from R&AW for their decision-making.613 
 R&AW had an active interest not only in promoting the Tamil cause, but also in 
ensuring its organization would be abundantly resourced in the wake of the 
organizational dismemberment that occurred during the Desai administration. There were 
even some elements in R&AW who “wanted the creation of a separate Tamil country in 
Sri Lanka” and were “particularly contemptuous of [Sri Lankan leader] Jayewardene.”614 
Institutionally, R&AW “suffered from a paranoia. [R&AW] had its own institutional axe 
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to grind. The Sri Lankan situation was perceived as one way [R&AW] could be close to 
the Executive, and therefore, [R&AW] exaggerated the reports they received from 
Colombo and from the debriefings of their agents to the effect that Sri Lanka was 
becoming ‘a pawn of the US and other western powers.’”615 
These motivations are made abundantly clear by R&AW’s behavior. R&AW 
played an active role in convincing Indira Gandhi to initiate the covert operation in the 
first place, exaggerating the role played by foreign powers in Sri Lanka and convincing 
her of the necessity of ensuring the Tamil militants were not defeated. It was the R&AW 
that proposed the idea of covertly aiding the Tamil insurgents. Domestically, R&AW 
claimed that if the Tamils were allowed to be defeated, it would undermine the central 
government’s relationship with the Tamil Nadu state. Regionally, R&AW argued that if 
India let the Tamils be defeated, it would be a victory for the external actors meddling in 
Sri Lankan affairs.616 R&AW, coupled with the Tamil militants, propagated “exaggerated 
and inaccurate reporting” on the risk of Sri Lanka “becoming a satellite of the US and the 
rest of the West” to the Prime Minister’s office and defense establishment. This raised a 
“terrible fear” among decision-makers about the threat to India stemming from the south. 
Tamil militants and the political wing of the Tamil movement (TULF) constantly stressed 
to India the expanding role of external powers in Sri Lanka and the danger that posed to 
India. R&AW claimed that the conflict between Colombo and the Tamil militants 
threatened to become internationalized as part of the broader Cold War competition.617 
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R&AW told Indira Gandhi that Israel’s Mossad and the United States’ National Security 
Agency were advising Colombo, and that Sri Lankan leader Jayewardene offered the port 
at Tincomalee to the US and was “beginning to step out of non-alignment.”618 It was this 
“disinformation, coupled with what was actually happening in Sri Lanka, [that] made 
India take a hawkish policy towards Sri Lanka,” in particular, “by multiplying [India’s] 
covert assistance to the [Tamil] militants.”619  
At the same time, when the riots broke out R&AW was “already planning India’s 
policy vis-à-vis Sri Lanka.” It secretly reached out to a prominent Tamil politician to 
begin collecting information on the Tamil militant groups and scout out potential proxy 
alliances, keeping this effort secret from India’s other intelligence organizations.620 In 
particular, R&AW had a special relationship with the LTTE. Members of the intelligence 
organization had “come to adore and admire the LTTE and its charismatic leader 
Prabhakaran to such an extent that [R&AW] treated the LTTE in a very special way.”621 
Furthermore, R&AW penetrated the other Tamil militant groups in a way that it never did 
with the LTTE.622  
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Tamil Nadu  
In addition to R&AW, Tamil militant groups cultivated close ties with officials 
and politicians from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, a fact that tied the central 
government’s hands and undermined its ability to control the scope of India’s 
involvement in Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu had deep, longstanding cultural and political ties 
to the Tamil community in Sri Lanka in general, and to Tamil militant groups in 
particular. In fact, it was Tamil Nadu’s preexisting support for Tamil militant groups 
even prior to the 1983 riots that boxed in Indira Gandhi and affected her decision to begin 
a covert alliance, which involved delegating considerable authority to the R&AW for 
alliance management, in the first place. By the time the riots broke out in the summer of 
1983, Tamil militant groups were already receiving support from both the incumbent 
AIADMK political party in Tamil Nadu, led by Ramachandran, and the opposition DMK 
party, and Tamil militant groups were operating in training camps in Tamil Nadu.623 
Additionally, as already discussed above, Indira Gandhi felt she could not publicly 
pressure Tamil Nadu officially to cut off support for the Tamil militants in July 1983 
because AIADMK and Ramachandran were critical allies to the Congress Party and for 
maintaining the coalition government that brought Indira Gandhi to office. 
Ramachandran in particular “became vitally important to the central government in 
determining the Indian reactions to the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis.” 624  In turn, 
Ramachandran claimed he could not shut down the Tamil training camps because it 
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would give a political advantage to the opposition party.625 The LTTE, in particular, was 
closely connected to AIADMK and Ramachandran, while TELO was linked to the 
opposition party.626 The LTTE used Ramachandran’s financial support to purchase 
weapons, beginning in the early 1980s.627 Of course, it was to the LTTE’s advantage to 
have established close interpersonal relationships with the more powerful actors within 
the Tamil Nadu government.  
Under most circumstances, a state should benefit from training proxies on its own 
territory, rather than in a third location, because it provides the state with an opportunity 
to collect information about and monitor the behavior of proxy groups, and penetrate 
proxies’ organizations. However, this case is unique because the vast majority of Tamil 
training camps, while established on Indian soil, were operating in Tamil Nadu, where 
the central government had considerably less control. 628  Even after the central 
government began its covert program, Ramachandran and the AIADMK party (and Tamil 
Nadu’s associated administrative organs and police) controlled access to the militant 
groups.629 Together, all of these factors left the Indian central government unable to reign 
in Tamil Nadu and, by extension, the LTTE.630 
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Untamed Tigers and India’s Intervention in Sri Lanka 
India began a program of covert military aid to the Tamil militant groups to 
control the situation in Sri Lanka, prevent the emergence of a powerful group that could 
lead to Tamil separatism, avoid direct Indian intervention. Given that a primary goal was 
to ensure that not a single Tamil militant group became sufficiently strong to dominate 
the other or to take actions inimical to Indian interests, the emergence of the LTTE as the 
overwhelmingly powerful group “was a major failure.”631 Rather than manipulate its 
various proxies and play one off against the other, India created a sorcerer’s apprentice 
that ultimately refused to comply with its preferences (even while most of the non-LTTE 
groups maintained an allegiance to India and were used by India to fight against the 
LTTE beginning in 1987).632  
Over the course of its proxy alliance with the Tamil militants, India pursued a 
dual-track policy of seeking a political settlement to the Sri Lankan issue while also 
keeping up pressure on the government in Colombo through supporting Tamil 
militants.633 This strategy was predicated on good control of the Tamil militant groups. 
However, India generally overestimated its leverage over the Tamil militant groups, 
especially the LTTE.634 While most of the non-LTTE Tamil groups toed the line and 
publicly accepted Indian attempts to achieve a negotiated agreement to the civil war, the 
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LTTE consistently displayed a pattern of “pressure, acceptance and rejection;” in other 
words, when India pressured LTTE to come to the bargaining table and accept some 
political settlement, the LTTE would make some feints about accepting it, but would 
always end up rejecting it.635  
 Even as it became increasingly clear that India was losing control over the LTTE, 
especially after Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, R&AW continued to and increased 
support for the Tamil militants. When Rajiv Gandhi assumed office, he sought to change 
the direction of Indian policy and more aggressively pursue a conciliatory tone with 
Colombo, thus hardening his stance toward the Tamil militant groups.636 Nevertheless, 
R&AW continued to push for continuing India’s covert proxy alliances with the Tamil 
militants, arguing that stepping up Tamil violence would force the Sri Lankan 
government to offer a political resolution to the conflict. Indeed, R&AW provided 
logistical support to increasingly violent LTTE attacks, and punished groups such as 
PLOTE that “refused to carry out similar massacres.”637 The Rajiv Gandhi administration 
attempted, but failed, to arrive at a political settlement during a series of summits 
between Colombo, the Tamil militants, and New Delhi, including at Thimpu in 1985 and 
Bangalore in 1986.638 In a lead up to the Bangalore summit with Jayewarene, Rajiv 
Gandhi was told that, “India was losing control over the militants. The militants in 
general, and the LTTE in particular, were not responsive to India, and were charting their 
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own plan of action.”639 This prompted K. Mohandas, the Deputy Inspector General of 
Police, to present Rajiv Gandi with a plan to trick the militants into disarming, but he 
stressed that R&AW could not be told about it. The idea was that they would tell the 
militants to lock up their arms to keep them safe during the talks in Bangalore, and then 
the Indians would storm the caches, confiscate the arms, and bring them to the closest 
police station. Then, Rajiv Gandhi would convey this information to Colombo to get 
Jayewarene to offer concessions. However, Ramachandran ordered that the weapons be 
returned to the militants, specifically to the LTTE, “which received even the arms seized 
from the other groups.”640 
Even as Rajiv Gandhi was becoming increasingly frustrated with the Tamil 
militants in general and the LTTE in particular, the foreign policy hawks at R&AW 
“made a comeback, and the involvement of the Indian Prime Minister’s office in the Sri 
Lankan matter diminished.”641 While Rajiv Gandhi was desperately working to find a 
political solution to the crisis, R&AW increased its support to the militant groups: “the 
militants were receiving arms, ammunition and other supplies in increasingly large 
quantities.”642 R&AW, coupled with private mercenaries, helped the Tamil militants, 
especially the LTTE, step up attacks in Sri Lanka, including in Colombo.643 R&AW was 
“play[ing] a double game;” on the one hand, it was helping Rajiv Gandhi facilitate 
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political negotiations between Indian and Sri Lankan officials, while on the other hand it 
was “financing, training, and arming Sri Lankan Tamil militants.”644 Rajiv Gandhi was 
also under pressure from political leaders in Tamil Nadu, who in 1986 called on New 
Delhi to intervene directly in Sri Lanka, in particular to stop the bombardment of the 
rebel stronghold in Jaffna.645 
Thus, by early 1987, Rajiv Gandhi was placed in a difficult position. He sought a 
political solution to the Sri Lanka issue, but realized he could not get Prabhakaran to 
accept one. India had increasingly less control over the LTTE, to the point that the group 
was involving itself in Indian domestic politics and threatening the unity of the Indian 
state.646 Meanwhile, Indian diplomacy continued apace. In a meeting with high-level 
Indian officials, Jayewardene agreed on March 13, 1987 to commit to the December 19 
proposals that had emerged from the 1986 Bangalore summit, and declared a unilateral 
ceasefire for April 11-21. LTTE took the opportunity to regroup and launched an attack 
on April 17 on a bus going from Habarana to Trincomalee, which killed 127 civilians. 
The attack “by the LTTE trapped India. For [R&AW], this was a way of applying 
pressure on Colombo to find a political solution….The Indian establishment, powerless 
before [R&AW], knew that LTTE was doing wrong.” Colombo responded violently to 
the attack, which undermined New Delhi’s attempts to get Colombo to reject a military 
solution to the conflict and pursue a political one. In other words, LTTE, supported by 
R&AW, acts as a spoiler to the political process and undermined India’s interests. In 
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response to this increased military action by Sri Lanka against the LTTE, R&AW and 
Ramachandran again increased support to the group.647 
 In response, Sri Lanka launched Operation Liberation on May 26, 1987, a 
massive military assault to retake the Jaffna peninsula.648 Rajiv Gandhi was essentially 
backed into a corner, forced to choose between providing even greater military aid to the 
Tamil militant groups (the strongest of which, the LTTE, he could no longer control and 
which would most likely result in an outcome inimical to India’s interests), letting Jaffna 
fall, and intervening directly with Indian troops. Ultimately, Rajiv Gandhi chose the 
latter, announcing a humanitarian operation in June 1987 to provide relief supplies to 
Jaffna. To his great embarrassment, his relief flotilla was turned away. R&AW, 
consulting with Ra, but was turned away, embarrassing Rajiv Gandhi greatly. 
Ramachandran pressed Rajiv Gandhi not to relent, allegedly telling him, “Do not allow 
the LTTE to fall in Jaffna. The LTTE must be saved.”649 On June 4, India launched 
Operation Poomalai, in which Indian planes breached Sri Lankan airspace and dropped 
food.650 This dramatic maneuver forced Colombo to the bargaining table, leading to 
secret negotiations with New Delhi that culminated in the Indo-Sri Lankan According, in 
which Colombo would agree to a set of political concessions to the Tamils (including the 
devolution of power) in exchange for the militant groups giving up their arms to Indian 
peacekeeping forces (IPKF), which would be sent into Sri Lanka to oversee this effort. 
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It’s interesting to note that officials in the R&AW “who had worked closely with the 
militant groups, particularly the LTTE, resented the Accord because it was worked out by 
the Indian [Ministry of External Affairs] and the [Prime Minister’s office]….Until the 
last moment, the Indian intelligence agencies which intimately knew the behavior, the 
characters and the features of these groups much better than the bureaucrats sitting in 
New Delhi, were not consulted.”651 Essentially, R&AW was cut out of the process. 
All of the Tamil militant groups were flown to New Delhi prior to the 
announcement of the accord to meet with Rajiv Gandhi to address their objections. 
Notably, Rajiv Gandhi held two separate meetings: one with the LTTE, and one with all 
of the other non-LTTE groups. The non-LTTE groups issued a joint declaration 
supporting the accord. Prabhakaran, however, was more ambiguous in his response. A 
key component of the accord was the surrender of all Tamil arms to the IPKF. Initially it 
appeared as though the LTTE would comply. However, this ended up being a feint; the 
LTTE ultimately rejected the accords and resumed fighting.652 Finally, LTTE forces 
turned on their patron, attacking IPKF forces on October 10, 1987, and IPKF response 
was “swift and ruthless.”653 India also used other Tamil groups in its attempt to subdue 
the LTTE, specifically the EPRLF, PLOT, and TELO.654 India’s intervention proved to 
be extremely costly for the state. 
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Conclusion 
 Despite having the advantage of supporting multiple Tamil proxy groups in Sri 
Lanka, India found itself unable to manage its alliance with once group in particular—the 
Tamil Tigers. This was because Indira Gandhi, in a policy upheld by her son Rajiv, 
delegated considerable authority for alliance management to R&AW, which not only had 
a bureaucratic interest in ensuring a robust problem of covert aid to the Tamil insurgency, 
but was also staffed by individuals who had strong political and personal motivations to 
empower the Tamil Tigers, in particular. Moreover, the fact that an important domestic 
political actor—politicians in the state of Tamil Nadu—were willing and capable of 
providing more expansive support to the Tamil Tigers put the central government in a 
bind. The government made decisions about supporting the Tamil militants taking into 
account its fears of what Tamil Nadu might do if left unchecked. Ultimately, however, 
these decisions were counterproductive because they empowered the R&AW and the 
central government was nonetheless incapable of stopping Tamil Nadu. Thus, India was 
drawn into intervening in Sri Lanka to crush the recalcitrant proxy that it had 
inadvertently strengthened. 
 
The First American Covert War in Angola: The Quagmire that Could 
Have Been 
Prior to the Reagan administration’s involvement in Angola in the 1980s, the 
United States was enmeshed in a covert war there a decade prior, drawn to the region for 
similar motivations. In 1975 the Ford administration began a program to provide covert 
military aid to two of the three rebel groups operating in Portuguese-controlled Angola, 
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the FNLA and UNITA. Ford gave the CIA and Henry Kissinger significant authority to 
act in Angola, setting the stage for the United States to potentially become drawn into 
increasingly greater involvement in the civil war. However, the covert program was 
abruptly leaked to the public (most likely by members of the State Department’s Bureau 
of African Affairs), prompting Congress to pass the Clark amendment in 1976 banning 
any American covert aid to the rebel groups. Therefore, the case represents an exception 
that proves the rule: the Ford administration was not drawn into Angola due to exogenous 
events. Nevertheless, the very fact that the existence of the alliance was leaked imposed 
political costs on the Ford administration, to the point that Henry Kissinger, the architect 
of the covert program, expressed reservations about having initiated the proxy alliances 
in the first place. During a January 1976 telephone conversation with Brent Scowcroft, 
Kissinger remarked, “Maybe we should just not have started that operation [in 
Angola].”655 Furthermore, the case illustrates how political leaders make calculations 
about delegating authority for alliance management in anticipation of how more dovish 
domestic political veto players (in this case, Congress) might act.   
The Angola case also provides an interesting caveat to my theory because there 
was significant tension within the CIA over the covert operation in Angola. The available 
evidence indicates that the Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, was more 
reticent about getting the CIA involved in a risky covert operation due to fear of further 
Congressional investigations, while other mid- and lower-level bureaucrats were more 
ardent about Angola. Prima facie, Colby’s circumspection runs counter to the expectation 
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that bureaucrats tasked with carrying out a proxy alliance will push for an increasingly 
larger mandate. However, closer analysis of the case reveals that Colby’s behavior 
stemmed from the same motivation that would normally push an individual in his 
position to act in the opposite manner, namely, to protect his institution. The Angola 
operation took place at a time of unprecedented Congressional investigation into the 
CIA’s operation, dubbed the “year of intelligence.” In perhaps a different political 
environment, Colby would have eagerly pushed for a large-scale covert operation in 
Angola. Furthermore, while Colby was initially hesitant about the operation, as predicted 
he consistently pushed for greater resources once it was initiated. 
Furthermore, the causal logic of the case does not corroborate the expectations of 
the alliance politics literature (although, notably, the predictions for cases in which both 
states and proxies have access to multiple viable alternatives are a big vague and 
ambiguous). In general, the alliance politics literature would expect that when both a 
proxy and state have access to other sources of support, alliances should terminate upon 
major disagreements because actors can easily seek out other allies. However, this did not 
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test of the competing theory and more of an exploration of a case that is an exception that 
proves the rule for my theory. Moreover, the empirical prediction in the alliance politics 
literature for cases in which each actor has access to multiple alternatives is not as clear 
as the other scenarios, so it is not clear whether there is any case that would serve as a 
true test of the theory’s claims.  
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Background: American’s History with the FNLA  
  While the 40 Committee under President Ford authorized a program of covert 
military aid to the two rebel groups, the FNLA and UNITA, contesting the MPLA’s 
claim to Angola in January 1975, the United States’ relationship with one of the two 
groups—Holden Roberto’s FNLA—actually began more than a decade earlier.657 The 
CIA had begun supporting the FNLA in 1962 during the Kennedy administration, 
although the historical record is not consistent regarding the nature of the support 
(whether it consisted of both arms and money, or merely the latter); whether it began in 
1961 or 1962; whether the money was for Roberto personally or his organization; and for 
how long the aid continued.658 However, the program did not amount to any large-scale 
covert aid. While there was certainly fear within the Kennedy administration that failure 
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Roberto’s FNLA. The MPLA also actively sought out U.S. support; Agostinho Neto 
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seeking out “progressive forces” in the West with whom he could be aligned. Wright, 
Destruction, 9. John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. 
Press, 1978): 14-6. 
658 Wright claims the Kennedy administration’s support consisted of both arms and 
money. Wright implies that the support ended around 1963-4 when Roberto successfully 
secured external support from China, prompting the US to reject a plan to provide covert 
support to Roberto, and that it was nonexistent during the Johnson administration because 
the majority of resources was devoted to Vietnam. Wright, Destruction, 37, 47-51. 
Marcum, however, states that Roberto received covert aid from the CIA between 1962 
and 1969, which was funneled to him through third parties. Marcum, Angolan 
Revolution, 17. Minter claims the CIA began covert aid to Holden Roberto in 1961 and, 
in response to Portugal’s disapproval, ratcheted down to providing him with “low-key 
support…as a contingency measure for the future.” Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, 144. 
Rodman argues that the Kennedy administration initiated a program in which the CIA 
intermittently furnished Roberto with a $10,000 stipend. Rodman, More Precious than 
Peace, 167. Finally, as Guimarães points out, it is unclear precisely how much money the 
United States gave to Roberto in the early 1960s, or when the first phase of support 
ended. Specifically, there is conflicting evidence concerning whether it ended in 1970 
because of Portuguese, or continued to 1975. Guimarães, Origins, 180. 
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to support decolonization in Africa would provide an opening the Soviets could exploit, 
there were more important strategic interests at stake that trumped those concerns. The 
Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense convinced Kennedy to refrain from any 
meaningful covert activity in Angola so that Portugal would not revoke U.S. basing rights 
in the Azores, which was the “single most important base” for NATO operations.659 
Specifically, threats by Antonio Salazar, Portugal’s prime minister, to suspend 
negotiations with the United States over the lease of the Azores bases (which was up for 
renewal) prompted Kennedy to put a stop to any significant aid to Roberto.660  
 Interestingly, interpersonal relationships appear to have played some role in the 
formation of the alliance between the United States and the FNLA, although their 
significance should not be overstated.661 Roberto enjoyed extensive personal contacts in 
the United States going back to the 1950s, and his brief relationship with the Kennedy 
administration was sufficient both to block the MPLA from receiving support in the 
1960s and also made the FNLA the prime contender for American support during the 
Ford administration.662 When Neto set out in 1962 to secure support from the United 
States, he was rejected by the Kennedy administration not only because of his 
organization’s Communist affiliations, but also because Roberto had already formed 
connections with policymakers in the United States and was viewed as being the primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Guimarães, Origins, 177-8, 182. Also see Marcum, Angolan Revolution, 23-4. 
660 Wright, Destruction, 42-3. 
661 Interpersonal relationships also played a role in Congo’s support of the FNLA, 
especially Roberto’s relationship with Mobutu. See Marcum, Angolan Revolution, 66, 
132-3; James, Political History, 43-5. 
662 Guimarães, Origins, 18. 
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representative of Angolan nationalism—even though Roberto was socialist-leaning.663 
Nevertheless, Roberto’s contacts were not sufficient to secure decisive support from the 
Kennedy administration or trump the strategic concerns associated with basing rights in 
the Azores.664 However, Roberto’s prior relationship with the United States did lay the 
groundwork for a significant covert alliance in 1975—but it could not preclude UNITA 
from also receiving support.665  
 
Rebel Access to Alternative Sources of Support 
There were three rebel groups operating in Angola in the lead up to and wake of 
Angola’s independence from Portugal, two of which, the FNLA and UNITA, received 
support from the United States. However, in addition to covert aid from the United 
States, both the FNLA and UNITA received critical support from Zaire and South Africa 
(among other states). South Africa’s interests in Angola were discussed extensively in 
Chapter 5. Zaire had both strategic and interpersonal interests in undermining the stability 
of the MPLA government and supporting Roberto’s FNLA and, later, UNITA. When 
Mobutu overthrew Moises Tshombe in 1965, the FNLA was given permission to 
establish a base of operations in Zaire.666 Roberto was Mobutu’s brother-in-law. More 
importantly, the MPLA was supporting Katangan separatists seeking to secede from 
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664 Guimarães, Origins, 18. 
665 Ibid., 183, 185-6, 192. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 64. 
666 James, Political History, 45. 
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Zaire.667 Thus, when the FNLA suffered military setbacks against the Cuban- and Soviet-
backed MPLA forces in the spring of 1975, Mobutu sent his elite 4th and 7th commando 
battalions into Angola to prop up the FNLA. This decision ended up being costly for 
Mobutu—the Zairian and FNLA troops could not beat back MPLA advances and were 
forced to retreat.668 While the stakes were considerably high for both the FNLA and 
UNITA during the first time period—their organizational survival was on the line, and 
failure to secure reliable alliance partners ultimately allowed the MPLA to rout the FNLA 
and force UNITA to retreat to the bush and regroup.669  
 
American Interests at Stake in Angola 
The Ford administration’s decision to begin a program of covert support to the 
FNLA and UNITA is puzzling given the relatively minor strategic interests at play in 
Angola. In fact, a State Department paper from September 1970 described how “material 
U.S. interests in Angola are small though growing,” and Angola enjoyed “miniscule” 
U.S. investment.670 These nominal economic interests were centered on the oil fields in 
Cabinda and, more broadly, the imperative to secure friendly regimes in southern Africa 
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669  Fernando Andresen Guimarães, Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign 
Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict (New York: St. Martins’ Press, 1998): 195. 
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of 
Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 237. 
670 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, September 1970, Document 
93, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Portuguese Africa, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976. 
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to protect oil shipping routes from the continent.671 Rather, as Senator Dick Clark said 
during a Congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, the United 
States lacks any inherent strategic interests in Angola, but “what is at stake…is our 
credibility.”672 Specifically, the Ford administration, and Henry Kissinger in particular 
(who was serving as both the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor), 
believed supporting the Angolan rebels would be an effective and relatively cheap signal 
of U.S. commitment to its allies in southern Africa, especially Mobutu’s Zaire, as well as 
a general signal of resolve to the Soviet Union. The preferences and security concerns of 
Zaire and Zambia played a crucial role in Ford’s decision to fund and arm the FNLA and 
UNITA. In fact, both Mobutu and Kaunda approached the CIA and petitioned for support 
for the two rebel groups.673 As early as August 1974, in a conversation between a 
representative from Zaire and Kissinger, the former asks for U.S. support for Roberto’s 
FNLA.674  In response to this request, Colby informed Kissinger in September 1974 that 
the CIA planned to increase its support to Roberto and that the payments would be “very 
low but high enough to assure President Mobutu that we are sympathetic to his concern 
about the future regime of an independence Angola.”675 Zaire was the United States’ 
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closest ally in Africa, and the Mobutu regime had significant interests at stake in Angola. 
Mobutu’s close relationship with Roberto meant that a decision by the United States to 
support the FNLA would serve as a signal of U.S. commitment to Zaire.676 Indeed, in a 
June 1975 memo Kissinger postulates that Mobutu feels abandoned by the United States 
and that it is imperative for the administration to reassure American allies in Africa. The 
objective in Angola, therefore, would not be to attempt a “total victory a la Vietnam” but, 
rather, to show that the United States stands by allies such as Zaire in a way that “makes 
the U.S. least pregnant, but most decisive.”677  
Cold War considerations also affected Ford’s calculations regarding Angola. 
Supporting the Angolan rebels, reasoned Ford and Kissinger, would signal American 
resolve to the Soviets Union. Just at it was applied to other areas of the periphery, domino 
theory logic was used to justify American intervention in Africa. As Kissinger said in a 
December 20, 1975 letter to the Shah of Iran, “Our interests in Angola per se are only 
marginal, but it is the Soviet challenge which is uppermost in our mind.”678 In particular, 
Kissinger believed that covert aid to the FNLA would signal U.S. resolve at a historical 
moment—American withdrawal from Vietnam—in which it was perceived to be in 
doubt.679 Kissinger highlighted these concerns in a statement to the Subcommittee on 
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African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 29, 1976 after 
the Angola operation had already become public: “If the United States is seen to 
emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention, 
what will be the perception of leaders around the world as they make decision concerning 
their future security?”680 The Soviet Union’s support of the MPLA provided a framework 
for justifying American support to the Angolan rebels.681 At a 40 committee meeting in 
June 1975, Kissinger echoed this logic when he proclaimed that the United States could 
not let the communists win in Angola.682 On July 16, 1975, President Ford expressed 
similar sentiments when he surmised that, “if we do nothing, we will lose southern Africa 
[to the Soviets].”683 Similarly, at a meeting on December 18, 1975, after the revelations 
about the CIA’s covert operation in Angola threatened to force the United States to halt 
all activities there, Kissinger surmised that U.S. withdrawal from Angola would show 
Europe that Vietnam was not an aberration and give Russia a blank check to operate 
anywhere in the world.684  
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Individual policymakers, especially Kissinger, had personal interests at stake in 
Angola that strongly influenced their decision-making. Kissinger wanted to prove that the 
United States could still conduct extensive covert operations in the wake of Watergate, 
withdrawal from Vietnam and Congressional investigations of intelligence activities.685 
In a conversation on December 18, 1975, Kissinger worried that, “no one will ever 
believe us again if we can’t do [an operation in Angola].”686 Interestingly, this motivation 
appears to have developed during the Ford administration. In National Security Study 
Memorandum 39, which Kissinger presented to President Nixon in January 1970 and 
which shaped America’s position on Portugal and Angola until the Portuguese military 
coup in 1974, Kissinger argued that the United States should refrain from providing aid 
to any Angolan nationalists.687 Colby also had personal motivations for “proving” that the 
CIA could conduct covert operations in a context of intrusive Congressional 
investigations into CIA activity in the “year of intelligence.” In his autobiography, Colby 
discusses how the Congressional investigation did not deter him from approving risky 
covert operations: “I did it in part to show our people that the Agency would not pull its 
horns and only undertake safe and easy operations just because it was under pressure.”688 
  The fact that the United States lacked significant strategic interests in Angola 
should have enabled it to have leverage over its proxies there. However, as will be 
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discussed in further detail below, the bureaucratic and personal motivations of the actors 
to whom Ford delegated authority for alliance management in “proving” that the United 
States could still conduct covert action created the conditions for the United States to get 
drawn into an escalating commitment to its Angolan proxies.  
 
Plausible Deniability, Domestic Politics, and Delegation Decisions 
 Plausible deniability played a critical role in shaping Ford’s alliance management 
decisions. In internal deliberations, Ford administration policymakers highlighted the 
importance of maintaining the secrecy of the operation.689 Perhaps Kissinger himself best 
articulated the role of secrecy in the Angola operation in a statement delivered to the 
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
January 29, 1976: “The Angola situation is of a type in which diplomacy without 
leverage is impotent, yet direct military confrontation would involve unnecessary risks. 
Thus it is precisely one of those gray areas where covert methods are crucial if we are to 
have any prospect of influencing certain events of potentially global importance.”690 
Policymakers wanted to keep the United States’ role in Angola hidden from both 
domestic political and international actors. The Angola operation commenced during a 
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particularly tumultuous time domestically for foreign policymaking. Chastened by the 
withdrawal from Vietnam, the American public was wary of direct military intervention 
of far-flung reaches of the globe for obscure strategic rationales. According to John 
Stockwell, who was a CIA case officer at the time, a July 14, 1975 40 Committee options 
paper presenting various options for Angola identified concerns about American 
involvement in Angola being revealed to the public and the ensuing domestic political 
reaction.691 Stockwell claims that the Angola operation was  “a direct contradiction of our 
public policies, making it essential that we keep the American public from knowing the 
truth.”692 Similarly, at a 40 Committee meeting on September 13, 1975, DCI Colby 
worried that the Angolan operation would inadvertently be made public and “there would 
be a great uproar about CIA getting involved in a war.”693 Therefore, U.S. involvement in 
Angola had to be carried out below the radar of domestic public opinion.694 Indeed, the 
Church Committee Report, which was the result of Congressional investigations into CIA 
activities, discusses how the Angola operation began in secret: “[A] large-scale covert 
paramilitary operation in Angola was initiated without any effort on the part of the 
executive branch to articulate and win public support for its overall policy in Africa.”695 
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 1975 was also a difficult year for the Ford administration and the CIA due to 
Congressional hearings on controversial CIA activities both domestically and abroad, 
which came be to known as the “year of intelligence.” The 1974 Hughes-Ryan 
amendment required the president to report to Congress concerning covert operations, 
and the Church and Pike committees were established to investigate the CIA. 696 
Therefore, principals in the Ford administration were particularly concerned Congress 
would attempt to involve itself in CIA operations in Angola and restrict the freedom of 
the executive to carry out covert operations. A June 1975 NSC paper clearly illustrates 
the administration’s apprehensions about Congress: while reporting on increased Soviet 
support for the MPLA, the paper states that, “it can be assumed…that there would be 
strong Congressional opposition to any U.S. involvement [in Angola.]”697 At an NSC 
meeting in the same month to discuss the policy options presented in the June 1975 
paper, Colby was especially concerned about “leakage and scandal,” and that any 
escalation of involvement on the part of the CIA in attempts to counter Soviet activity in 
Angola would raise the risk of the U.S role being revealed.698 While the administration 
would still have to inform a select group in Congress about the CIA’s covert activities in 
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Angola, a covert operation allowed it to avoid open sessions in which both houses of 
Congress could weigh in on its activities. Therefore, concerns about more dovish 
domestic political veto players literally vetoing Ford’s Angola policy prompted the 
president to give significant leeway to Kissinger and the CIA to run the covert operation.  
 A clandestine approach to Angola was also important to protect American allies 
in Africa, especially Mobutu’s Zaire.699 As already detailed above, Mobutu was a critical 
U.S. ally in southern Africa. In fact, the U.S. embassy in Kinshasa noted in a July 1975 
telegram relayed back to Washington that conversations with Mobutu stressed the 
importance of secrecy.700 Additionally, the United States would face a major political 
liability if it were revealed that it was operating on the same side as apartheid South 
Africa.701 Therefore, the administration took great pains to distance itself from South 
Africa’s role in Angola, at one point denying any collusion with the apartheid regime’s 
November 1975 offensive into Angola in conjunction with rebel forces.702 
 
Secrecy and Alliance Design  
 The secrecy imperative directly affected how the proxy alliance was designed and 
managed, which in turn created the conditions for bargaining problems over the course of 
the alliance. The authorization for the Angola mission left considerable discretion to 
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Kissinger and the CIA; information about the operation was kept secret from other 
members of government as much as was legally possible; the funding for the operation 
was sourced in a way that would minimize accountability and traceability; and that 
resources were employed through intermediaries (both mercenaries and other states) to 
distance the United States from the operation. The presidential finding of July 18, 1975 
authorizing the CIA task force in Angola was written in a manner that was “deliberately 
vague and unspecific.” 703  Additionally, even though Colby briefed the appropriate 
members of Congress on the covert operation in Angola—Colby, in his autobiography, 
described how he was required to report the CIA’s activities in Angola to 8 different 
Congressional committees as stipulated by the Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974704—
information-sharing did not extend beyond that which was legally required. For example, 
discussions during a July 1975 meeting of the 40 committee revealed that the U.S. Consul 
General in Angola was not being made aware of U.S. covert activities there.705 Similarly, 
in an August 7, 1975 memo from the CIA to the State Department concerning the nature 
of its activities in Angola, the agency downplayed the extent of its operations there as 
well as the political objectives.706 In furtherance of the imperative to ensure secrecy, T 
Kissinger specifically stated, “I would prefer to keep paper to a minimum,” and Colby 
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replied, “Yes, so would I.”707 To that effect, the CIA did not keep any direct transcripts of 
the working group meetings tasked with shaping and executing Angola policy.708 In turn, 
the CIA did not engage in much accounting of its operations in Angola; in particular, it 
did not maintain lists of the FNLA or UNITA chains of command and the arms provided 
to U.S. allies.709 
 The clandestine nature of the Angola operation also affected how it was funded. 
On the one hand, the requirements associated with maintaining secrecy implied that the 
United States could not mount a fully resourced effort in Angola because it would reveal 
the U.S. role. On the other hand, these resource constraints made incremental increases in 
U.S. commitment more palatable and likely, which meant that the U.S. was both too 
constrained to be sufficiently effective on the ground, but that the program became too 
big over time to maintain the original goal of secrecy.710 Regardless, the mechanics of 
funding the operation stemmed from the need for secrecy. U.S. support to the Angolan 
rebels was financed through the CIA’s contingency reserve fund that, according to the 
Church Committee, funds covert CIA activities in an “unwritten, post hoc nature” and in 
a manner that prevents Congress from observing the flow and employment of 
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resources.711 Furthermore, oversight in general by the executive, specifically the 40 
committee, of the CIA’s covert operations was minimal and pro forma.712 
 To distance the United States from the activities of its proxy allies, the Ford 
administration had to rely on intermediaries both to funnel U.S. aid to the FNLA and 
UNITA as well as operate on the ground. American resources were not directly 
transferred from CIA coffers to rebels in Angola. Rather, the CIA operated through third 
party states to channel support to the FNLA and UNITA. In particular, Zaire played a 
crucial role in serving as the conduit for both American and Chinese aid to the FNLA 
and, later, UNITA, but Mobutu had a much more salient interest in supporting the 
Angolan rebels than the United States.713 A June 1975 memo unpacked the mechanics of 
using Zaire as an intermediary to distance the United States from the Angolan rebels: 
Mobutu would transfer arms and other materiel from Zaire’s stock directly to the FNLA 
and UNITA, and the CIA would replenish his supply.714 The CIA’s Chief of Station in 
Kinshasa, Stewart Methven, managed this flow of resources to Mobutu, although the 
CIA’s Directorate of Operations in Africa, James Potts, had difficulty controlling 
Methven. Methven, in turn, was loathe to reign in Mobutu, who hoarded CIA supplies 
and gave old and worthless equipment to the FNLA.715 Mobutu’s role in Angola in many 
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ways is analogous to the role (and power) of the pivot in the alliance politics literature.716 
By devolving authority to a local actor (Mobutu) with significantly greater interests at 
stake in the outcome of the Angola conflict, the United States empowered an additional 
actor over whom it would have difficulty exerting control and further decreased its 
influence over the Angolan rebels. Zaire was placed in an ideal position to control the 
flow of both information and resources to and from the United States and the Angolan 
rebels.  
 The United States also had to employ mercenaries to work on the ground in 
Angola because involving U.S. nationals would undermine plausible deniability.717 
Therefore, the CIA recruited Portuguese mercenaries to assist the FNLA and French 
mercenaries to help UNITA on the ground.718 To further distance the United States from 
the Angolan rebels, the CIA delegated authority for hiring and managing the French 
mercenaries to UNITA.719 Efforts to eschew direct American involvement did not always 
work out as planned due to deliberate lack of oversight by the CIA. At one point in 
December 1975, Roberto, who had been hiring mercenaries for the FNLA independently 
of those the CIA had contracted for him, hired American and British nationals. When the 
CIA leadership realized what had occurred, it pressed the CIA station in Kinshasa for an 
accounting of the funds that had been dispersed to Roberto, but the initial CIA 
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authorization for the project had been written in such a way that “accountings would not 
be required.”720 
 As illustrated above, the need to maintain plausible deniability and distance the 
United States from perceived involvement in Angola affected the level of direct control 
the Ford administration, both directly and through the CIA, was able to exert over its 
proxy war in Angola.  
 
The CIA’s Conflicted Prerogative 
 One might expect that the theory would predict that the CIA would be at the 
forefront of pushing the Ford administration to initiate a covert operation in Angola and, 
once it had secured presidential authorization, to continually press for increasing the scale 
and scope of the CIA’s role there. In many ways, this prediction is borne out in the case. 
DCI Colby consistently pushed for more resources for the CIA during 40 committee 
deliberations about Angola policy. Furthermore, many lower level bureaucrats ardently 
supported a covert operation in Angola. However, Colby also evinced deep reticence 
about getting involved in Angola in the first place. Colby was circumspect about the 
merits of initiating another covert war concurrent with intrusive Congressional 
investigations into CIA activities. While these divisions within the CIA and, indeed, 
within Colby himself, might appear to count against the explanatory reach of the theory, 
in fact they illustrate the importance of the bureaucratic impulse to protect one’s 
institution. During this particular time period, the same desire to advance one’s 
bureaucratic interests produced crosscutting behavior.  
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 Colby, as DCI, had to strike a careful balance between advancing the CIA’s 
interests in continuing to serve as the agency to which the president could turn when he 
wanted to carry out relatively cheap and surreptitious operations in pursuit of American 
interests around the world, and protecting the CIA’s mandate from a prying Congress.721 
On the one hand, this resulted in Colby being more willing to cooperate with 
Congressional investigations and resisting pressure from members of the Ford NSC, 
especially Kissinger, who were more militant on the Angola issue. On the other hand, 
once the 40 committee decided on a covert operation in Angola, Colby pushed for a fully 
resourced effort. Colby’s cooperation with Congress stemmed from a clear bureaucratic 
imperative. Writing in 1978, Colby said he “realized that in 1975 the center of political 
power had moved to Congress and saw that CIA’s survival depended on working out 
satisfactory rather than hostile relations there.”722 During a June 1975 meeting of the 
NSC, Colby expressed concern about “leakage and scandal.”723 The following month, at 
a 40 committee meeting Colby said, in reference to the Angola operation, specifically 
whether the CIA should provide both arms and funding to the rebels or just the latter, 
“I’m scared of Congress on this,” to which Kissinger replied, “I’m scared of losing.”724 In 
addition to pressure from Congress, Colby was “no eager participant in the growing 
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Angola involvement” because he was “burdened by earlier controversies about his 
Vietnam activities.”725 This resulted in Colby dragging his feet during 40 committee 
meetings in the lead-up to the decision to initiate the operation, much to Kissinger’s 
consternation. At one point in July 1975, Kissinger gave Colby an ultimatum to produce a 
plan on which the president could act to fund the Angola operation through the CIA’s 
contingency fund.726  
 However, at the same time that Colby exhibited misgivings about a potential 
Congressional response to a covert CIA operation in Angola, he also pushed for a well-
resourced operation and an expansion of the CIA’s mandate. As early as June 1975 
Colby, at a 40 committee meeting, advocated CIA support for both the FNLA and 
UNITA, which was an enlargement of the original plan to provide aid only to the 
FNLA.727 Further, Colby consistently expressed anxieties that the operation would not be 
sufficiently resourced—in his estimation, the CIA would need a $100 million 
authorization for the operation.728 By September 1975, even though Colby had previously 
expressed concern about the effects in Congress if the CIA were to provide both arms and 
financial resources to the Angolan rebels, he pushed for an expanded mission at a 40 
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committee meeting saying, “what we’d like to do is send arms,” and, “we’ve got to give 
them some training.” In fact, in a reversal of roles, it was Kissinger who worried that CIA 
training by Americans would be too risky.729 
 In contrast to Colby’s initial hesitance, lower-level bureaucrats, especially 
members of the DO’s African division, were very supportive of a covert CIA operation in 
Angola. Perhaps this is what Guimarães meant when he wrote: the “CIA led the United 
States into the Angolan mess.”730 The evidence at least suggests that the CIA initiated the 
plan for covert support of the FNLA even prior to the 40 committee’s approval of a 
covert operation, even if there was some disagreement within the agency about its 
merits.731 While morale at the top was damaged as a result of the Congressional 
investigations and the ignominious withdrawal from Vietnam, it was relatively high 
among the staff as a whole.732 In fact, many in the CIA were frustrated with what they 
perceived to be Colby’s submissive approach to Congressional investigations into the 
CIA.733 In the wake of the withdrawal from Vietnam, the CIA had an abundance of 
“operational leadership;” Angola provided a justification for continued funding of CIA 
covert operations as well as an outlet for underutilized staff. In other words, the CIA was 
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the “hungriest foreign affairs bureaucracy.”734 Involvement in Angola was part of a 
standard CIA template—waging war by proxy in the so-called Third World against 
perceived Communist encroachments—that allowed for appropriating resources from one 
arena to another.735 Furthermore, the CIA already had connections in Angola stretching 
back to its previous funding of Roberto during the Kennedy years. In fact, Stockwell 
claims that the CIA began funding Roberto in 1974 without explicit authorization from 
the 40 committee.736 The CIA station staff in Kinshasa and Lusaka, in particular, pressed 
for a covert operation in Angola. The two CIA stations worked together in the spring of 
1975 to develop a viable plan for a covert CIA operation in Angola, even as Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis’ interagency task force 
recommended against covert aid to rebels.737 Further, James Potts, the head of the CIA’s 
Africa Division, was a vocal supporter of aiding the Angolan rebels because “Angola 
offered fresh terrain and a new mission.”738 Even after the 40 Committee approved the 
covert operation in July 1975, the following month the Kinshasa station pushed to expand 
the scope of the operation to include CIA observer teams on the ground to assist the 
rebels.739 The local CIA stations also pushed for significant operational leeway; the chiefs 
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in Kinshasa and Lusaka sought to control the flow of money and resources from the CIA 
to the FNLA and UNITA740  
 Following revelations in the media about the CIA’s covert operation in Angola, 
Ford fired Colby in November 1975 and replaced him with George H.W. Bush.741 
Despite the change in leadership, Bush acted in a manner similar to Colby, most likely 
because he was subjected to the same bureaucratic pressures. Congressional prying into 
CIA activites only increased once the Angola operation became public, resulting in the 
Senate voting in December 1975 and the House in February 1976 to pass the Tunney 
amendment, halting all funding of CIA operations in Angola.742 To the same extent as 
Colby, if not more, Bush worked to accommodate Congressional demands, to the 
consternation of both local CIA stations in Africa and other members of the Ford NSC.743 
The threat of a Congressional investigation and auditing of CIA activities prompted Bush 
to instruct all CIA stations to halt spending on the Angola operation. Nevertheless, not all 
subordinates immediately complied; the Kinshasa station continued to airlift rations to 
Savimbi forces.744 Kissinger was frustrated with Bush’s perceived obsequiousness to 
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Congress. At a March 12, 1976 meeting of the Operations Advisory Group (which had 
replaced the 40 committee), Bush pushed back against continuing to provide arms to 
Savimbi in the wake of the Tunney amendment. In response, Kissinger expressed 
frustration that the CIA couldn’t deliver arms to Savimbi through Mobutu using DoD or 
CIA aircraft.745 The fact that a change in the CIA’s leadership did not produce a 
significant change in the DCI’s behavior illustrates the powerful role played by 
bureaucratic motivations. 
 
Power and Influence in the Ford NSC 
While bureaucrats will almost always take advantage of agency slack to advance 
their own interests, they are not always given the opportunity to do so. The extent of 
decision-making authority granted to particular bureaucracies determines their ability to 
use their power in furtherance of their own objectives. In this case, the balance of 
political power in Ford’s NSC—the relative power and preferences of individuals such as 
Kissinger—shaped the CIA’s ability to successfully push for a larger mandate in Angola. 
The combination of Kissinger’s fervent advocacy of supporting the Angolan rebels, his 
ability to influence presidential decision-making, the marginalization of more dovish 
individuals within the NSC, the support for covert action by many elements within the 
CIA, and Colby’s ultimate advocacy of a more expansive mission in Angola set the stage 
for the United States to get drawn into an expansive covert operation in Angola.  
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Kissinger wielded significant power and influence in Ford’s NSC. Upon acceding 
to the presidency after Nixon, Ford left the Nixon NSC intact, which meant that Ford 
“was the only new member of the foreign policy team.”746 Ford literally inherited his 
entire foreign policy establishment from the previous administration. This created an 
opportunity for Kissinger to play a particularly dominant role. Despite Ford’s own 
confidence, the president did not have much experience in foreign affairs, allowing 
Kissinger to have unparalleled influence over the president’s decision-making in this 
realm.747 Initially, Kissinger held two cabinet-level positions simultaneously: that of 
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. It was not until November 1975, after 
the 40 committee had already authorized covert action in Angola, that Ford reorganized 
the structure of the NSC so that the position of Secretary of State would be separated 
from the National Security Advisor, and appointed Brent Scowcroft to the latter position. 
Nevertheless, this reorganization “did not represent a demotion for Kissinger and did not 
diminish his influence.”748 In particular, because Scowcroft was formerly Kissinger’s 
deputy in the NSC, foreign policy decision-making “continued to be dominated by 
Kissinger.”749  
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Kissinger effectively used his influence with Ford and over other members of the 
NSC to push for a more expansive American role in Angola. Transcripts of 40 committee 
meetings, as well as conversations between Ford and Kissinger, illustrate this dynamic. In 
a June 1975 conversation between Kissinger and other members of the national security 
team on Angola, Kissinger expresses frustration with the circumspection of some 
policymakers who sought to distinguish between arming and funding the Angolan rebels 
saying, “I don’t understand the difference in virginity between giving money and giving 
arms,” and preferred a “substantial” operation involving both arms and money.750 
Kissinger also expressed reluctance about limited political objectives in Angola: “If we 
do it at all, we should try to win.”751 Kissinger reiterated this preference for a more robust 
operation at a June 1975 NSC meeting, where he discounted a policy of neutrality or 
diplomacy in favor of a covert operation.752 Despite objections by Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger about the military capabilities and command and control of the 
Angolan rebels, and DCI Colby’s concerns about maintaining the secrecy of the 
operation, Ford appeared to agree with Kissinger, noting that “it seems to me that doing 
nothing is unacceptable.”753 In a subsequent conversation between Ford and Kissinger in 
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July 1975, Ford concurs with Kissinger’s claim that “if [Angola] is worth doing, we 
should do it right.”754 Only a month after Kissinger secured 40 committee authorization 
for the covert operation, at a 40 committee meeting on August 8 he pushed for expanding 
the scope of the operation above Colby’s protestations, asking at various points during 
the meeting: “Is this enough?” “Should we send more aid?” “Should we send in some 
advisors?”755   
Kissinger’s influence within the NSC meant that he could effectively sideline the 
impact of individuals within the State Department who expressed reticence about covert 
action in Angola. State Department bureaucrats opposed funding of the FNLA but lacked 
the power to impede the 40 committee’s decision.756 Specifically, even though Davis was 
tasked with composing an options paper on Angola to present to the president, his 
opinions on Angola carried little weight in 40 committee deliberations. In the June 13, 
1975 options paper, Davis voiced skepticism about the merits of a program to aid the 
Angolan rebels, arguing that, “At most we will be in a position to commit limited 
resources, and buy marginal influence.”757 In his memoirs, Davis noted that in the lead-up 
to the 40 committee’s decision to approve a covert operation in Angola, he questioned the 
CIA’s claims it could be kept secret and argued that the CIA was downplaying the risks 
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associated with exposure abroad.758 Davis also felt that the CIA was overstepping its 
bureaucratic bounds and trying to expand its role to encroach on arenas traditionally 
occupied by the military or State Department.759 Other State Department bureaucrats also 
expressed skepticism about a covert operation in Angola. At a meeting of the 40 
committee in July 1975, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco and 
INR Director William Hyland expressed the view that a covert operation in Angola 
would not be in U.S. interests and that allying with Roberto was risky because he was 
weak. In particular, Hyland argued that, “if you do go in [to Angola], you can’t use a 
program that will fail. That means massive intervention, and I do not think we can stand 
the heat in Africa.”760 Even though State Department bureaucrats took a stance against a 
covert operation in Angola, Kissinger’s influence with the president allowed him to 
override their objections as well as Colby’s. Furthermore, the fact that there was a 
confluence of interests between Kissinger and the CIA bureaucracy—irrespective of 
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Escalation of U.S. Commitment in Angola 
The imperative to maintain plausible deniability for the United States, in 
conjunction with the bureaucratic preferences of lower-level officers in the CIA and the 
balance of power within Ford’s NSC, created the conditions for the United States to 
become locked into an increasingly expansive commitment to the civil war in Angola. In 
fact, up until the revelations about U.S. involvement and the subsequent passage of the 
Tunney and Clark amendments that legally prohibited further involvement in Angola, the 
CIA, with significant prompting from Kissinger, constantly expanded the scope of the 
Angola operation. Furthermore, the FNLA and UNITA’s military weaknesses only 
heightened the push within the Ford NSC to increase the CIA’s mandate in Angola.  
 In the lead up to the July 1975 decision by the 40 Committee to initiate a program 
of covert military support to the Angolan rebels, the United States had already committed 
itself to Angola, albeit at a relatively low level. The CIA began funding Roberto during 
the Kennedy administration, providing the FNLA leader with a token amount of financial 
support. 761  Nevertheless, the CIA’s nominal support of Roberto provided an easy 
template onto which 40 committee members could latch. As early as September 1974, in 
response to a request from a Zairian representative for U.S. support for Roberto, Colby 
informed Kissinger that the CIA, which had already been disbursing small payments to 
Roberto, planned to increase the level of its support. Specifically, Colby stated that the 
CIA “intend[ed] to keep these payments very low but high enough to assure President 
Mobutu that we are sympathetic to his concern about the future regime of an independent 
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Angola.”762 This may have only amounted to a $1,000 per month stipend to Roberto.763 
Ultimately, however, the CIA’s program of nominal support turned into a more extensive 
covert program as the agency attempted to match the resources being poured into Angola 
by Cuba and the Soviet Union and prop up their militarily weak allies.  
 The CIA’s involvement in Angola was characterized by consistent escalation up 
to the point that Congress voted to cut off all funding for the covert program. This 
dynamic of a widening in scale and scope of American involvement in Angola was 
spurred on by CIA requests for additional resources to carry out its covert operation; 
pressure from Kissinger; and the perceived weakness of and threats to both the FNLA 
and UNITA. Counterintuitively, military reverses proved to be an effective tool for the 
FNLA and UNITA to secure more U.S. support; MPLA advances were consistently 
followed by advocacy by the CIA for more resources to be allocated to the Angola effort 
The first significant ratcheting up of U.S. involvement in Angola occurred in January 
1975 when the 40 committee approved $300,000 in covert political aid for the FNLA 
(while rejecting, at the time, a proposal for $100,000 for UNITA). It was the CIA that 
raised the prospect of increasing aid to the FNLA during a January 1975 meeting of the 
40 committee. While the money was a token signal of support from the United States and 
was not sufficiently large to have a decisive impact on the ground, the fact of increased 
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CIA support emboldened Roberto, who launched an offensive to take Luanda the 
following month.764 
 This rather nominal amount of support, which itself represented a significant 
increase from the even smaller amount Roberto had been receiving, nevertheless set the 
stage for even larger sums of money that would be poured into Angola in the summer and 
fall of 1975.765 Davis, in his autobiography, notes that soon after he assumed office in 
April 1975 and after the $300,000 to Roberto had already been approved, the CIA again 
raised the issue of increasing support for FNLA and also supporting UNITA.766 Indeed, 
the spring of 1975 marked a decisive turning point in the U.S. role in the conflict. Colby 
describes how the 40 committee’s initial authorization of $300,000 for political support 
for the FNLA would not be sufficient to achieve the administration’s political objectives 
in Angola. Specifically, major increases in Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA in 
the spring of 1975 signaled to the CIA and members of the 40 committee that “unless 
something more were done, the Marxist-oriented MPLA would gain full conflict after 
independence [scheduled for November 11, 1975] and put Angola under Communist 
domination.”767 Thus, the FNLA and UNITA’s apparent weakness prompted the 40 
committee to approve military aid to both the FNLA and UNITA in June 1975. In fact, 
the CIA so quickly rushed arms to and initiated a training program for its rebel allies in 
Angola that Colby claims they were able to put the MPLA on the defensive in Luanda. 
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This advantage was short-lived, however, when the MPLA received a massive airlift 
from the Soviets and more Cuban troops and was able to again threaten the position of 
the FNLA and UNITA. At this point the funds that had been authorized by the 40 
committee had already been exhausted, so Colby requested additional resources to be 
allocated to the Angola operation.768 
 July 1975 marked another significant escalation of U.S. aid to the FNLA and 
UNITA. At a meeting of the 40 committee, Sisco and Hyland voiced skepticism about the 
merits of covert action in Angola, noting that there wasn’t much at stake for the United 
States and that Roberto was weak. Kissinger responded that the FNLA was weak because 
the U.S. was not sufficiently supporting him, saying, “we will never know if we don’t 
try.”769 At the same time, a July 24, 1975 telegram from the U.S. embassy in Kinshasa 
requested additional resources to be approved so that the operation could have a more 
meaningful effect on the ground.770 In mid-July, President Ford authorized $6 million in 
military support for the FNLA and UNITA, and an additional $8 million on July 27.771 
 Between July and November, the U.S. dispersed $32 million in military aid to its 
rebel allies, as well as an additional $16 million worth of surplus weaponry from the 
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Department of Defense.772 By early August 1975, the U.S. covert operation in Angola 
was working in high gear.773 That month, the CIA helped coordinate an ultimately 
unsuccessful offensive against the MPLA carried out by South Africa, Zaire, UNITA, the 
FNLA and mercenaries.774 At the same time, the CIA continued to press for an expanded 
role in Angola. An August 8 cable from the CIA station in Kinshasa requested 15 CIA 
observer teams to be inserted into the conflict.775 Colby again pushes for more funding at 
an August 20 meeting of the 40 committee, saying during his briefing that the CIA was 
running short on funds and that “this is the first time we have run out of funds in the 
Reserve in all our experience.”776 Kissinger appeared to be supportive of Colby’s request 
saying, “our only concern if that we do what is necessary to win. It is a mistake to 
consistently try to see how we can get by with the minimum expenditure.”777 
 As the number of Cuban troops and extent of Soviet financing in support of the 
MPLA continued to increase into the fall of 1975, the U.S. again escalated its 
involvement in Angola. By September/October 1975, the covert program enjoyed 
“remarkable support from diverse US government and military offices around the 
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world.”778 At a 40 committee meeting on September 13, 1975 Colby again pushed for 
greater CIA involvement, calling for arms and training: “what we’d like to do is send 
arms,” and “we’ve got to get them some training.”779 In particular, in an apparent move 
away from concerns about U.S. exposure, Colby suggested funneling American weapons 
to the U.S.-allied rebels and did not want to be “too parsimonious with U.S. arms.”780 In 
fact, in this particular meeting it was Kissinger who voiced concerned about Colby’s 
requests, noting that American trainers might unduly reveal the U.S. role in Angola and 
place the U.S. on the path to another Vietnam.781 During the same meeting, Colby also 
advocated expanding the nature of the U.S. role in Angola to include providing support to 
Cabindan separatists, who were also fighting against the MPLA saying, “we need to stop 
an MPLA takeover. We can straighten things out after we stop the MPLA.”782 
 In the lead-up to and immediately following Angolan independence on November 
11, 1975 the war was characterized by a “seesaw of escalation” in the involvement of 
external parties to the conflict.783 Cuba, in Operation Carlotta, mounted a major airlift on 
November 7, 1975 while the Soviet Union sent tanks, arms and rocket launchers to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
778 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 161. 
779 Memorandum for the Record, Washington, 13 September 1975, 9 a.m., Document 
125, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Portuguese Africa, Foreign Relations of the 




783 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 162. 
	   288	  
MPLA in response to an “urgent request” by the group.784 Zaire and South Africa also 
become more involved in the days preceding Angolan independence, intervening directly 
to assist the FNLA in a push to take Luanda, with Mobutu deploying the elite 7th and 4th 
commando battalions.785 In perhaps a reversal of roles from the months preceding the 40 
committee’s decision to approve a covert intervention, the CIA responded to the 
dynamics on the ground by taking the lead in 40 committee deliberations and pushed for 
greater and more direct U.S. involvement to help propel the FNLA and UNITA to 
victory. Even though the FNLA and UNITA, propped up by Zaire and South Africa, had 
the upper hand in the battle for Angola, the CIA pressed for a significant influx of U.S. 
resources to ensure Luanda didn’t fall to the MPLA—a proposal the Angola working 
group rejected.786 Stockwell further claims that the CIA placed paramilitary forces on the 
ground in Angola to assist the FNLA and UNITA even though such activities were not 
sanctioned by the 40 committee, and that the CIA provided operational assistance to the 
rebels through helping to orchestrate key engagement, such as the Battle of Lobito.787 
Despite the FNLA and UNITA’s temporary advantage, the MPLA successfully repelled a 
joint FNLA-Zairian offensive to take Luanda on November 11, repulsing the forces at 
Quinfangondo and forcing the FNLA to retreat to São Salvador.788 Thus, on the day on 
Angolan independence, with control of the capital the MPLA declared itself the 
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legitimate government of Angola. These developments again pushed the CIA to take a 
more activist stance in 40 committee deliberations. On November 14 DCI Colby 
requested additional funding and resources for the operation, including transferring 
redeye missiles to the rebels and taking “a direct approach.”789 Colby, in bolstering his 
case, pointed to increased Soviet involvement in Angola and the fact that “we’ve not had 
the impact of the Cubans yet.” Scowcroft, frustrated with the CIA’s request for more 
resources, pushed Colby on the fact that he was appealing for resources beyond those that 
had already been allocated and spent. Nevertheless, Colby advocated for “an option to 
put the CIA into an action role.”790 
 These significant FNLA and UNITA losses ultimately pushed the 40 committee 
to approve much of the resources for which Colby and the CIA had petitioned. A 
November 28 memo approved more money for the CIA, as well as redeye and TOW 
missiles if the committee could not secure SA-7s and French anti-tank missiles.791 These 
additional appropriations were not sufficient to allow the FNLA and UNITA to halt the 
MPLA’s advances; the MPLA essentially destroyed the FNLA in December 1975.792 The 
defeat of the FNLA and growing evidence of a significant and large-scale Soviet and 
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Cuban effort to propel the MPLA to victory—one that dwarfed aid committed thus far by 
the United States—prompted the NSC to “[order] the CIA to outline a program which 
could win the war.” The Angola working group considered implementing a major 
escalation of U.S. involvement, including putting U.S. advisors and army units on the 
ground in Angola, and even contemplated an “overt military feint at Cuba itself.”793 In 
fact, during a December CIA briefing of the Angola working group, it became apparent 
that the CIA had already placed military advisors on the ground, but at that point the NSC 
was unperturbed because was supportive of an expansion of the U.S. effort.794 The CIA’s 
Kinshasha station advocated an even greater (and politically costly) role for the U.S. in 
Angola—a joint operation with South Africa.795 To these ends, Ford attempted to secure 
$28 million that would be re-appropriated from the Defense Department’s budget, but 
failed to receive Congressional approval.796 
 
American Withdrawal 
 Attempts by the Ford administration to expand the scope of the U.S. role in 
Angola had the counterproductive effect of revealing the existence of the proxy alliance 
to the American public and, more importantly, Congress. Kissinger, constantly frustrated 
with State Department staffers, was convinced that it was members of the State 
Department’s Bureau of African Affairs who leaked the existence of the covert war in 
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Angola to the press.797 Colby’s testimony to the Senate on the covert program in Angola 
was first leaked to the New York Times on December 13, 1975.798 The revelation created 
an enormous political liability for Ford because he had effectively aligned the United 
States with apartheid South Africa.799 Furthermore, as already anticipated by the Ford 
administration and reflected in his decisions to go covert in the first place, in the 
aftermath of Vietnam the American public was not interested in paying the price 
associated with another costly intervention in the developing world.800 On December 19, 
1975 Congress rejected Ford’s request for additional appropriations for the covert 
operation in Angola and on December 20 the Senate passed the Tunney amendment to 
the 1976 Defense Appropriations bill, which suspended all U.S. aid to the Angolan 
rebels. Congress followed the Tunney amendment with the Clark amendment, which also 
prohibited the U.S. from providing any aid to the Angolan rebels and also set restrictions 
on the president’s ability to carry out covert operations in the future.801 Congressional 
legislation forced Ford to cease Angola operations and this, in conjunction with the 
withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and the suspension of French aid, 
solidified the MPLA’s victory and resulted in the total defeat and disbanding of the 
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FNLA and prompted what was left of the UNITA organization to retreat to the bush.802 
The CIA was forced to totally withdraw from Angola when Ford signed the Tunney 
amendment on February 9, 1976.803 
 
Assessing the Counterfactual 
While the Ford administration serendipitously avoided further entanglement in 
Angola, it is important to assess the counterfactual of what might have occurred had the 
Ford administration successfully kept the U.S. role in Angola a secret and/or Congress 
failed to pass the Clark amendment. The existing evidence strongly points to even further 
American escalation in Angola. In the weeks leading up to the legislation prohibiting 
further funding for the covert operation, as described above, both the CIA and members 
of the NSC were searching for ways to augment U.S. involvement there. Furthermore, 
even during Congressional deliberations on Angola and following the passage of the 
Tunney amendment, the Ford NSC continued to search for means of getting aid to the 
rebels. During a December 18 conversation between members of the Angola policy team, 
Kissinger contemplated various ways the U.S. could get additional funding to the rebels, 
including whether Saudi Arabia could give money to the CIA to circumvent Congress.804 
Kissinger was especially concerned that Congressional limitations on the executive 
would hamper the president’s ability to carry out foreign policy and also undermine U.S. 
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credibility, saying, “no one will ever believe us again if we can’t do this.”805 In a 
December 20 telegram to the U.S. Ambassador to Zaire from the Kissinger, Kissinger 
maintained that the administration still possessed the funding to keep the covert operation 
afloat until January and perhaps later than that. Thus, Kissinger urged Mobutu to 
continue supporting the Angolan rebels. 806  Additionally, the Saudis, Iranians and 
Egyptians agreed to continue providing aid to Zaire (which presumably could be funneled 
to the rebels).807 At a December 22 NSC meeting, Ford instructed Colby to spend every 
dime he legally could to continue the Angola operation.808 When Bush assumed office as 
DCI, the CIA continued to push for stretching out the Angola operation for as long as 
possible. At a February 3, 1976 40 committee meeting the CIA proposed that even as the 
U.S. disengages from Angola, it should “continue to support UNITA and the FNLA until 
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they collapse.”809 Even after Bush instructed all CIA stations to stop the covert operation, 
the Kinshasa station organized an airlift of rations to Savimbi’s forces in the bush.810  
 
Problems of Information 
The case suggests the importance of factors that go beyond my theory, but do not 
amount to a contradiction of it. In particular, information asymmetry between a states and 
its proxy ally were prevalent throughout the time period under consideration and affected 
the ability of the Ford administration to manage its relations with its ally. In the lead-up 
to the 40 committee’s initial decision to provide lethal aid to the FNLA, some members 
of Congress (who were legally required to be informed about the operation) were 
skeptical about the administration’s knowledge of how the FNLA would employ U.S. 
aid.811 Indeed, throughout the course of the alliance the CIA and the administration 
displayed a lack of intelligence about the preferences and behavior of its allies. This was 
due, in part, to the CIA’s failure to open up a station in Angola until March 1975; up until 
then, Roberto was the CIA’s primary source of intelligence on Angola.812 Roberto of 
course had the incentive to use information strategically to ensure continued U.S. 
support.813 The CIA also lacked good information about Savimbi. For example, in 
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September 1975—at the height of the CIA’s operations in Angola—Savimbi sought out 
the MPLA to see if the group would be amenable to a negotiated settlement. The CIA 
discovered this through reading an article about the event in the news.814 Even months 
into the alliance, at a February 3, 1976 40 committee meeting, principals displayed little 
knowledge of UNITA/FNLA intentions. Saunders, addressing the issue of how the CIA 
should allocate the remaining resources dedicated to the covert operation, asked: “Should 
we spend the money for general operations to try to sustain UNITA/FNLA? What would 
they do?” Ellsworth replied, “Who knows?” Decision-makers similarly speculated about 
what Savimbi might do and whether he would be willing to accept an American strategy 
for the conflict going forward.815 These information asymmetries reflect the unintended 
consequences of attempts to keep a proxy alliance secret. 
Specifically, the causal mechanisms undermining American influence diverged in 
important ways from the traditional narrative about how bargaining and influence works 
in interstate alliances. In the first case, despite having the advantage in interests and the 
choice of alliance partners, the Ford administration placed the United States on a 
dangerous path in Angola. The case represents the exception that proves the rule because, 
while the institutional mechanism were set up to lock the United States into a 
disadvantageous relationship with the FNLA and UNITA, the alliance was never allowed 
to reach that point because American cover was blown and Congress moved to suspend 
all U.S. aid to Angolan rebels. Considering the counterfactual in this instance—what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 193. 
815 Memorandum for the Record, Washington, 3 February 1976, 4 p.m., Document 173, 
Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Angola, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-
1976. 
	   296	  
might have happened had the secret alliance continued—strongly suggests the United 
States would have lacked significant leverage over the FNLA and UNITA due to the 
CIA’s institutional motivations in the wake of the withdrawal from Vietnam to continue 
to carry out covert operations in the developing world (despite Colby’s misgivings), 
coupled with the inordinate power accrued by Kissinger in Ford’s NSC and his personal 
interests in proving that the executive branch had the prerogative to launch covert 
operations anywhere in the world to counter perceived Soviet expansion. 
 
Conclusion 
 Together, these four cases provided additional empirical support to my theoretical 
claims, as well as provide a first step toward assessing the generalizability of the theory. 
Additionally, almost all of these cases represent an example in which the interstate 
alliance politics literature had a clear empirical prediction, but where the actual historical 
record failed to conform to those expectations. In contrast, the causal logic of the stories 
provides convincing support for my theory. Additionally, comparing the outcomes and 
causal logics of these four cases yields interesting and further insights. 
 Secrecy played a prominent role in shaping the decision-making of political 
leaders across these four cases. Nixon, Ford, and Indira and Rajiv Gandhi all had 
incentives to keep important domestic political actors ignorant about the proxy alliances 
in which the United States and India was engaged, but for different reasons. These 
leaders were also operating in very different institutional contexts. Comparing and 
contrasting the Angola and Kurdistan cases illustrates the importance of the substance of 
the preferences of the actors to whom political leaders delegate considerable authority for 
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alliance management. Nixon and Ford faced similar institutional environments (indeed, 
Ford literally inherited Nixon’s foreign policy establishment) and domestic political 
contexts—an American public increasingly skeptical during the Vietnam era about a vast, 
extended American presence abroad, an vocal and active Congress intent on limiting the 
powers of the Presidency and the intelligence establishment. In both cases, the proxy 
alliance was kept entirely secret—there was no real public debate about aid to the KDP or 
the FNLA and UNITA. This, coupled with the existence of more dovish domestic 
political veto players, presented Nixon and Ford similar incentives—to delegate a lot of 
authority to other actors. But, crucial for the outcomes in these two examples, in the 
Angola case Ford gave significant leeway to the CIA and Kissinger (who had their own 
bureaucratic and personal motivations to secure a more expansive U.S. role in support of 
the Angolan rebels), while in the Kurdistan case Nixon conferred considerable authority 
on the Shah of Iran, who had already imposed tight controls on the KDP leader, Barzani, 
and had centralized power through SAVAK. In some ways, the KDP case is an exception 
that proves the rule. The United States was largely interested in the KDP due to its 
interesting in supporting its ally Iran, so Nixon deferred to Iranian interests and decision-
making when it came to managing Barzani. Israel, similarly, had to defer to Iran for 
logistical reasons—even though the Israelis may have been more committed to Barzani, 
Israel was hamstrung by the fact that its support to the KDP flowed almost exclusively 
through Iranian territory. Therefore, concordant with the predictions of the alliance 
politics literature, Barzani could not play Iran, Israel, and the United States off of one 
another because Iran essentially had a monopoly over the KDP’s access to external 
support. Nevertheless, the case still illustrates the mechanisms of my theory—Iran’s 
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monopolistic position was created in large part by the delegation decisions of the Nixon 
administration.  
 Comparing the Angola and Sri Lanka cases also provide fruitful insights. The 
Angola case is essentially the inverse of the Sri Lanka case. In the latter example, the 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu was a powerful veto player that can incentivized to act 
independently to support the Tamil militants, especially the LTTE, if Indira or Rajiv 
Gandhi were unwilling to do so. In the former example, Congress was a powerful veto 
player (deeply circumspect about the utility of covert alliances in Angola) that could 
block the Ford administration from supporting the Angolan rebels through legal, covert 
means. Furthermore, in the Sri Lanka case, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi found themselves in 
a particularly difficult situation because both the bureaucracy to whom they had 
delegated authority for alliance management (R&AW) and a crucial veto player (Tamil 
Nadu) shared the same hawkish inclinations on the Sri Lanka issue, leaving Indira and 
Rajiv with little maneuverability to limit the damage to India posed by its alliances with 
the Tamil militants.   
 The Bangladesh and Sri Lanka cases are also ripe for comparison because they 
involved not only the same state (India) but, also, the same political leader for much of 
the time (Indira Gandhi). Furthermore, the domestic political context was rather similar—
in both cases, there was significant public debate about the extent to which India should 
intervene to support the rebels in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and in both cases this debate 
leaned toward the hawkish side. In the Sri Lanka case, however, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi 
had to contend with a powerful domestic political veto player that was already capable of 
acting independently to support the Tamil militants, even if this ran counter to the central 
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government’s preferences. This informed India’s delegation strategy and, thus, the 
outcomes differed considerably. In Bangladesh, India intervened on its own terms and 
essentially used the rebels as cannon fodder to wear down the Pakistani Army until the 
Indian Army felt prepared in the winter of 1971. In Sri Lanka, India was unwillingly 
drawn into intervening and had to forcibly subdue its erstwhile allies, the LTTE. The 
crucial difference between these two cases was the fact that, in Bangladesh, Indira 
Gandhi was able to switch authority for alliance management from the BSF (to whom 
jurisdiction for managing the alliance with the Mukti Bahini natural fell) to the Army, 
and this was due to how she had centralized authority for foreign policy decision-making 
in the years prior to the crisis in East Pakistan; in Sri Lanka, however, Gandhi delegated 
considerable authority to the R&AW in an effort to keep Tamil Nadu leaders away from 
Sri Lanka policymaking, and this ultimately undermined India’s position because R&AW 
was also highly motivated to support the Sri Lankan militants. 
Further empirical exploration beyond these four cases is obviously warranted to 
have greater confidence about the generalizability of the theory, including examining 
cases in the post-Cold War environment as well as greater variety of states and regions. 
However, the fact that each of these four cases exhibited similar patterns of political 
leaders making decisions about alliance management in response to their domestic 
political constraints, institutional environment, and concerns about secrecy and the 
revelation of information, provides confidence that the theory offers robust predictions 
across a range of cases. 
 
  





 In this dissertation, I have begun to answer the question: Why and when do 
systematically weak non-state proxies succeed in manipulating their far stronger state 
sponsors, dragging them into unwanted conflict escalation and intervention? This 
question is puzzling because it challenges basic conceptions about how power and 
material capabilities affect relations between political actors in international politics, and 
also because states appear to be making decisions that often end up being 
counterproductive. I further claim that the existing literature that explores patterns of 
influence in the context of interstate alliances does not sufficiently account for variation 
in leverage across state-proxy alliances because it does not take into account the factors 
that distinguish proxy from interstate alliance. Specifically, I argue that the very factors 
that prompt states to choose to engage an adversary through covert and indirect means—
and the decisions about alliance management that states have to make to ensure plausible 
deniability—makes it difficult for states to exert leverage over their proxies. Through a 
series of qualitative case studies, I show that, even in cases where the alliance politics 
literature successfully predicted the outcome of a case, the causal logic observed in the 
empirical record does not match up to the causal mechanisms suggested by the theory. 
Rather, the cases demonstrate how decisions about alliance management—how and to 
whom states delegate authority for overseeing proxies—are the overwhelming 
determinant of their ability to influence proxies at later stages in the alliance. I also show 
that these decisions are often shaped by the strategic calculations political leaders make 
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about how they can protect their policies and political futures in the face of domestic 
political veto players with very different preferences, but that these efforts often backfire. 
 In the case of Syria’s alliance with Fatah, we observe a critical disjuncture in the 
state’s influence over its proxy between the pre- and post-Assad coup years. In the first 
time period, when Syria was rife with domestic political instability, individuals and 
organizations in the security sector were empowered to take independent and autonomous 
actions vis-à-vis Fatah that ran counter to the preferences of the political leadership. This 
was incredibly costly for Syria, which was drawn into crisis escalation and, eventually, 
war with Israel in 1967, as well as a botched rescue attempt to save its Palestinian proxies 
in 1970 during the Black September Crisis in Jordan. These outcomes are puzzling from 
the perspective of the alliance politics literature because, at the time, Fatah was incredibly 
dependent on Syria for external support, while Syria had a variety of proxies among 
which it could choose to support. After Assad’s coup in 1970, however, the various 
bureaucracies in the security sector were reigned in and subordinated to Assad’s 
hegemonic control. This allowed the regime to reassert control over Fatah and intervene 
in the Lebanese civil war on its own terms—even if this meant taking action that 
contravened Fatah’s interests and even using other Palestinian proxies and the Syrian 
Army to forcibly subdue Fatah.  
 The United States was also drawn into an incredibly costly alliance commitment 
to UNITA in Angola in the 1980s. Despite being a global hegemon with considerable 
material resources, the Reagan and Bush administrations were unable to apply American 
influence to get Savimbi to behave. In fact, Savimbi consistently acted as a spoiler to a 
series of U.S.-sponsored peace agreements in the region, all the while continuing to 
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receive increasingly larger allocations of U.S. covert aid. In a sense, the outcome of this 
case was overdetermined: Savimbi had access to a variety of external sources of support, 
including the United States, South Africa, and Zaire, among others. However, probing the 
causal logic of the case provides strong evidence to support that claim that it was not 
Savimbi’s access to multiple state allies that served as the crucial source of his leverage 
over the United States. Rather, Savimbi took advantage of the domestic political 
landscape in the United States to form close relationships with members of Reagan’s 
political base, as well as his connections in the CIA, to cultivate independent sources of 
support that made it difficult for Reagan (and, later, Bush) to reign in UNITA when it 
took actions that went against U.S. interests. In fact, it was the existence of these hawkish 
domestic political veto players that prompted Reagan to choose a covert path in the first 
place, leading him to delegate considerable authority for alliance management to the CIA. 
However, this only empowered a bureaucratic actor with strong motivations to support an 
expansive program of covert aid to UNITA, which dovetailed with the preferences of the 
veto players and undermined Reagan’s leverage.  
 The four mini case studies provide additional confirmation of the causal story 
suggested by the theory. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the alliance politics literature would have 
expected the KDP to have a bargaining advantage over its external sponsors because it 
should have been able to manipulate them to serve its own interests. Instead, Iran, 
followed by the United States and Israel, dropped Barzani and the KDP following the 
1975 Algiers Agreement, which led to the near-decimation of the organization. The 
United States, despite delegating considerable authority for alliance management to Iran, 
was able to avoid getting drawn in any further because Iran established institutions for 
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alliance management that deeply constrained the KDP. Conversely, in Sri Lanka, the 
alliance politics literature would have predicted that India would have enjoyed incredible 
leverage over the various Tamil militant groups it was supporting. Instead, India was 
drawn into a costly intervention in Sri Lanka because it could not reign in the Tamil 
Tigers. Unlike some of the other Tamil militant groups India was supporting, the Tamil 
Tigers had close allies within India’s intelligence establishment, R&AW, as well as 
within the political establishment in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. This made it difficult 
for Indira and Rajiv Gandhi to influence the LTTE’s behavior and induce the group to 
accept a negotiated solution to the civil war in Sri Lanka, even as it was able to get other 
Tamil groups it was supporting to comply. The existence of the state of Tamil Nadu as a 
veto player with hawkish preferences and an independent capability to support the rebels 
influenced Indira Gandhi’s decisions about alliance management. In East Pakistan (what 
would become an independent Bangladesh), India was able to use its support of the 
Mukti Bahini to further its foreign policy goals there. Rather than getting drawn into 
intervening in East Pakistan early on in the conflict, which was what the rebels preferred, 
India used the Mukti Bahini to bleed the Pakistani Army dry so that the ground would be 
paved for the Indian Army to intervene at a time of its own choosing (December 1971). 
Indira Gandhi’s decision about alliance management played a critical role in averting 
what could have been a disaster; she shifted authority for managing the alliance from the 
Border Security Force (which had much more hawkish preferences on the East Pakistan 
issue) to the Army (which was more hesitant about intervening and established clear 
command and control institutions to manage the Mukti Bahini). Finally, in the United 
States’ first covert war in Angola, the stage was set for the Ford administration to get 
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drawn into an increasingly larger commitment to the FNLA and UNITA. Ford delegated 
considerable authority for alliance management to Henry Kissinger, who was determined 
to provide nearly unconditional covert aid to the rebels, as well as the CIA, which had an 
institutional preference to support an extensive covert operation there, even though 
American strategic interests were minimal. This delegation strategy was chosen largely 
because Ford wanted to insulate the Angola policy from dovish veto players in Congress. 
The only thing that prevented an ever-expanding American covert program in Angola 
was the fact that proxy alliance was leaked and Congress passed the Clark Amendment 
prohibiting any American aid to Angola. Together, these findings suggest strong support 
for the theoretical claims made by the dissertation. 
 
Reconciling with the Alliance Politics Literature 
 The purpose of my research is not to suggest that the alliance politics literature is 
entirely wrong about the sources of power and influence in the context of proxy alliances. 
Of course, the strategic context is deeply important for how allies interact with one 
another and attempt to extract the greater possible benefits from an alliance. However, 
this lens is incomplete when attempting to apply it to understanding an important subset 
of alliances, what I have termed proxy alliances. Furthermore, my findings also suggest 
that, even beyond the universe of cases of proxy alliances, there are important gaps in the 
alliance politics literature that need to be filled. What is lacking here, in essence, is a 
story about domestic political constraints and vulnerabilities that is not captured by the 
existing literature on domestic politics and alliances. Specifically, how leaders formulate 
effective alliance policies while managing the entrenched bureaucracies that are actually 
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responsible for carrying out the terms of an alliance agreement and that often have 
motivations that differ substantially from the political leadership, as well as the power 
and preferences of domestic veto players who could make or break a political leader, is a 
critical aspect of alliance bargaining that is missing in the existing literature. These issues 
are particularly acute in the context of proxy alliances because of the added complicating 
variable of secrecy, which has additional (often perverse) effects on alliance management 
and that exacerbates and complicates leaders’ attempts to mange both a proxy ally and 
the domestic political environment. Nevertheless, despite the centrality of secrecy and 
plausible deniability to the causal narrative explored in this dissertation, there are 
important insights to be gleaned about the role played by motivated bureaucracies and 
domestic political veto players in affecting alliance bargaining beyond the subset of cases 
of proxy alliances. 
     
Policy Implications 
 My research suggests important implications for U.S. policymakers. Questions of 
influence in the context of proxy warfare are crucial for American foreign policymaking 
as the United States makes a decisive shift away from large-scale, troop-intensive wars. 
In fact, the conditions under which the United States chose to from proxy alliances in the 
cases explored in this dissertation share many attributes with the current political 
environment. The covert war in Angola, for example, began in the wake of the American 
withdrawal from Vietnam, where a war-weary public was loathe to contemplate more 
large-scale direct military actions against adversaries or for interests that were perceived 
to be of relatively minor strategic concern. Similarly, the United States is about to close a 
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chapter on  twelve and a half years of large-scale war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, we 
are already witnessing a reallocation of increasingly scarce resources toward more 
indirect, covert, and deceptively cheaper means of achieving American foreign policy 
objectives. Therefore, it is imperative for policymakers to understand the risks and 
complexities associated with these kinds of relationships. A few basic lessons follow 
from the dissertation’s findings.  
First, buying friends is not nearly as easy or cheap as it may seem. Even states 
endowed with substantial material resources that could have a decisive impact on the 
fates of their allies can’t always shape the behavior of the recipients of their largesse to 
their advantage. The findings do not suggest that it is impossible; rather, influencing 
strategic actors with important interests at stake in a particular issue requires relatively 
expensive (either politically or in material terms) investments in institution building and 
oversight.  
Second, despite great efforts, secrets don’t stay secret for long. In fact, the more 
actors political leaders involve in their attempts to create distance between themselves 
and a proxy group, the more people are empowered with information that political leaders 
don’t want revealed. This raises important questions, therefore, about the value of 
plausible deniability and the relative weight of the tradeoffs that need to be made to 
ensure it. In other words, if secrets are difficult to maintain, especially as an increasingly 
larger number of individuals and organizations are brought into an effort to maintain the 
clandestine nature of a relationship, then the institutional control that political leaders 
have to relinquish to maintain that secrecy becomes less justifiable. 
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Third and relatedly, decisions that might have made sense at a given moment 
based on an immediate cost-benefit calculation could have unintended and unwanted 
consequences that decision-makers might come to regret. Making decisions to satisfy 
immediate political expediency is tempting, but can often backfire in ways that end up 
being far more costly. 
Fourth, local partners matter. This may seem like an obvious point, but it is 
certainly not trivial. American geography means that, in order for it to project power and 
influence in the international system, it has to rely on a constellation of local allies. A 
thorough understanding not only of local partners’ intentions and interests at stake but, 
perhaps more importantly, their internal institutional configurations, the preferences and 
capabilities of the various bureaucracies and bureaucrats within an ally’s security 
apparatus is crucial. That’s because it is these organizations—which have their own 
politics and which might diverge substantially from the political leadership—that will 
ultimately be managing operations on the ground. 
Finally, choosing the right agency to run a particular operation is important. The 
Indian case shows how the very different interests between the Army and the Border 
Security Force could have produced different results, one of which could have been 
disastrous. Adjudicating between competing bureaucracies is time consuming and 
frustrating, but also essential, because the executive branch in the United States is 
dominated by large, powerful, and unwieldy bureaucracies with their own interests at 
stake that can conflict with the foreign policy priorities of the political leadership.  
Together, these factors present a less than sanguine outlook on the value and 
utility of proxy alliances, despite their apparent cheapness. More overt relationships that 
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allow political leaders to invest in institution building to monitor, oversee, and enforce 
agreements with other political actors are more expensive to establish and maintain, but 
the benefit perhaps outweigh the costs in many instances. 
 
Looking Forward  
This research project presents many avenues for future research, beyond 
expanding the universe of cases to explore bargaining dynamics in other cases of proxy 
alliances. Specifically, the lessons learned from the cases of proxy alliances shed light on 
patterns of influence in the context of other secret relationships, such as secret interstate 
alliances, and also raise questions about the importance of internal bureaucratic politics 
for overt, interstate alliances. Exploring the incentive structure created in the context of 
other clandestine relationships or areas of foreign policy that involve some degree of 
secrecy (for example, secret diplomacy or cyber warfare) presents another potentially 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
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